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Daily Report—

Central Eurasia

Daily Report
Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-198 CONTENTS 13 October 1°95

NOTICE: An * indicates material not previously disseminated in electronic form.
DUMA ELECTION ISSUES
Key Developments

Yeltsin Wants Democratic Majority in Next Duma [ITAR-TASS]  .........cc.ccssssssesesseeseeeeeensneceeeees l
Grachev Issues Statement on Not Running for Duma [ITAR-TASS] _ .......c..sccssssesssssseesssessessnececees l
Lebed Denies Split in KRO, Urges Strong Army [TRUD 11] Oct] — ....ccsccccsccsesseoersereererseseeseneeeees |
National Republican Party Fails To Gain Allies [INTERFAX]  ............c.scsssssesesseressereseerenseneneeeeess 3
4 Liberal Democratic Party Candidates for Duma Deputy [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 28 4
ST <sxccecincentannnsnesuibsancbctitticgdtiahinaiiatnillaianinndicininanatiadsinatiimtneiiatiintrennenatneateeneetietes
Election Guidelines
CEC Approves Additions to Edict on Electoral Blocs [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 27 Sep] _........ 14
Forecasts & Commentary
Shumeyko Interviewed on Elections, Local Politics, Budget /ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 10 Oct] 15
Duma Chairman Rybkin Says Russia Needs ‘Labor Party’ [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 12 Oct] 20
Skokov Interviewed on KRO, Lebed, Yeltsin /MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 1-8 Oct] — ........0.000++ 21
INTERREGIONAL AFFAIRS
Need for CIS Security System Viewed [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Oct] ...cccccsccscssesescesssseseesersenenseeeseeeeees 23
TEP TAGS Camiee PUGS TROIS TU TS GIO Kecceciccecsnenstnsncsesccsssceccsscesesecceensccveserscstcsecssccsncnccececeene 25
RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Moscow Favors World’s ‘Impartial Approach’ to Croatia [INTERFAX] — .........cscecscsssssesesseseesseseeenseeces 27
Gromov Cited on U.S, NATO ‘Contempt’ for Russia [INTERFAX]  .........cssssssssssesesessesensnseeeseeseeeensces 27
Soskovets on Possible Cooperation With Cuba [ITAR-TASS]  .........sscsssssssesessessessssssescesensersnessecensensenee 27
Meets Cuban Armed Forces Minister Castro [ITAR-TASS]  ........c.ccccccsccceesscecseeeeeseeeeececceceeeeeeeees 28
Cuba Visit Said To Shift Foreign Policy [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 12 Oct]  ....s..cccesseseeseeseeees 28
Karasin on Border Guards’ Attacked in Tajikistan [ITAR-TASS] — ......ccccccccsssssesssserssssseseeeesseeserenseeseeses 28
U.S. Official Cited on Pipeline From Azerbaijan [Moscow ORT]  .....cc.csssscessesessessessssneresnssseesceseesneesnes 29
Russian Debt Repayments to U.S. Rescheduled [IZVESTIYA 13 Oct] — .......csscseocssssesessseeseeeeseecseecesnseeces 29
Russia To Supply Boosters for U.S. Missiles [ITAR-TASS]  ..........ccssssssssssssesssseesesersseeeesesesceeeececenseseerees 30
Further on Barents Sea Regional Council Session [IZVESTIYA 13 Oct]  .....ccccccccsssscsesessersesseseereeereneeees 30
Anti-Poland Sanction Rumors ‘Greatly Exaggerated’ [IZVESTIYA 12 Oct]  ......cccccssssscsssoseeseeesesseseeceees 31
Cooperation in Nuclear Safety Planned With Canada [INTERFAX]  ...........ssscssssesssessseseesssnseeeseseseseeses 31
Deputy Premier Stresses Importance of Ties With India [ITAR-TASS]  .........ccscssscssssseessssssseseseseneeseens 32
RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS
Political Issues
Yeltsin Rejects ‘Premature Optimism’ Over Economy [ITAR-TASS]  .....cc.cssssssssesesseseeereeesenseneees 33
ITAR-TASS Details Yeltsin Meeting With Chubays, Mikhaylov .............ccccccssscsssesereeseeseeeeeeseees 33

Yeltsin Signs Edict on Constitutional Conformity [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 11 Oct]  ...........:+ 34

FBIS-SOV-95-198

13 October 1995

Chernomyrdin Would Like To See Yeltsin Reelected [INTERFAX]

Daily

Military Issues

General Smirnov Discusses Military Draft Problems [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Oct]

Federal Assembly

Reportage on Chernomyrdin’s Address to State Duma
Proposes Duma ‘Nonaggression Pact’ [ITAR-TASS] — .......csccsssssssssssssssessssssseseeseessseesseeesenees
Asserts Willingness To Compromise on Budget [ITAR-TASS] —— ...ccsccsssssssessesssssseesecessneeeses
Says Defense Spending To Be Increased [ITAR-TASS] — .....ssssssssssssessesssssssesessecessensesessesees
AMEIENNES TECOROUINS TIUNGUOR FITIRTATSY —ccccecceceescscessescesccccescccssccecessscnscccessocescoscscsscnsess
Promises Investors’ Compensation Fund [ITAR-TASS]  .....ccssssssssssssssessesesescesseessssccecensecees
Addresses 1995 ‘Production Slump’ (ITAR-TASS] — .....cc.scccsssssssssssecsssesesseesesssserseessseseeeeseees
Rejects Miners’ Wage Nonpayment Claims [ITAR-TASS]  .........ccssessssssssesssesssenscnseesseeseees
Says Russia Needs ‘Clearcut’ Land Laws [ITAR-TASS]  ..ccccccccsssssssssssssensssecseeeceesensensencees

Duma Compromise Vote on Federation Council Reported [KOMMERSANT-DAILY 12 Oct]

Duma Rejects Draft Law Limiting Deputies’ Immunity /SEGODNYA 12 Oct]
Duma Urges Government To End State Pensions Crisis /ITAR-TASS]

Regional Affairs

Chechnya Reportage: Negotiations, Politics, Military
Yeltsin Pledges ‘No More War’ [ITAR-TASS] —— ....ccessssosesscssesesscnrecsecsesecsscescecsseecsensecesessesees
Volskiy Thinks War Not To Be Resumed [OBSHCHAYA GAZETA 12-18 Oct] .......s000
Service Warns of Dudayev Attack Plans [ITAR-TASS] —— ...sccccsccsccsscosessesssscsecsscesesecencensencees
Chechen Guamen Target LoBov [ITAR-TASS] — ....ccercccsscsccsssscscserscsecseseccesessecsscessosesseosecesses
Shkirko Said To Follow Same ‘Policy’ [ITAR-TASS]  .....cc.ccccscssssssssssssssssseesesessssesscssceensees
More on Shkirko as Troop Commander [INTERFAX]  ....sc.sccsssssssssssssssecesssesceesessseccnesesnees
Federal Troop Contingent in Chechnya Renamed [Moscow 2x2 TV] ececcsesssscsssseeseeseneees
Maslov Favors Limited Emergency State [INTERFAX]  .....cc.cccccsssssssssessessessssessesceacensensees
Maslov: Dudayev Fails To Honor Accord [INTERFAX]  ....cccccccssssssscesssscescssceceeceecescessenees
Lobov Interviewed on Chechen Situation [Moscow ORT] ouccc.ccccccccsscecssssssecsseesseesceecsnesceee
Air Raid Turns Residents Against Russia [IZVESTIVA 13 Oct] — ..ccccccsccscsssssessesseesssceeseesees
Explosion Destroys Chemical Plant in Sverdlovsk [INTERFAX]

Economic

Finance Minister Restates Stance on 1996 Budget [IZVESTIYA 13 Oct]
Agriculture Minister Cited on Grain Harvest, Prices [SELSKAYA ZHIZN 12 Oct]
Chubays: Economic Growth Will Begin in 1996 /ITAR-TASS]
Pre-Election Concessions Swell Money Supply [IZVESTIYA 12 Oct]
EBRD Provides $303 Million for Small Business Loans [IZVESTIYA 12 Oct]
Central Bank Money, Credit Policy Examined [IZVESTIYA 12 Oct]

UKRAINE

Issues

International Affairs

CE President Views Organization’s Principles /HOLOS UKRAYINY 7 Oct]

SOOO Oe ROS EET OSES ESE EE EEE EE OSES EEE EE ES

Reports Council on Cadre Policy 11 Oct Session [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 12 Oct]  ..........
Moscow Conference Discusses Aspects of Security [TRUD-7 13-19 Oct]

Council Discusses Local Self-Government /[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 12 Oct]
Panels Examine Illegal Migration, Export Problems [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 13 Oct]

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seereeeeeeereres

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SOOO ES EEE T ETE ETE EOE EE EEE EEE EEE EEE EO ESE OEE EE EEE EE EET OEE EOS

Ceeeeeeeeesceeseeeeeeeeee

SO OC ere eee ee eee sere eeeseereseseeeeees

FORO OE EES OEH OEE EES EE EES EEEEEEEEEEEET EOS OEE SESE ESOS OEE SEEOSS

SOOO CORO Ee EEO OEE E EEO OEE OE EES EEE ES OEE EEE EE SESS

COCR CRD eee EO Eee eee Ee eES eee esereeeee

SOCCER SC OEE OES EE EE REE EE RED ESE EEE EEE EE SEE E EE EE ES

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PTOOOD OS OCE See ORE R OEE SE EEE OEE E DEES SES EEEe

38

FBIS-SOV-95-198

13 October 1995 3 Central Eurasia
Kiev Asks G-7 for $3.2 Billion To Close Chernobyl [UNIAN]  ......cccsccssssssssssssssesssssssssseersnsensenes 59
Czech Official Does Not Discount NATO Nuclear Deployment [INTELNEWS] _ ..............s000000 59
Udovenko: Sanctions Against Belgrade ‘Ineffective’ [INTELNEWS]  ..........c.scsccssssssessessssssesensees 59
Kuchma Meets German Officials, Views Russian Relations [INTERFAX]  ............sc.scsccsssssseseeees 59
Joint Ukrainian-U.S. Military Exercises End [ITAR-TASS]  ..........scsssssssssssssssescssescsssscssseecsnsences 60
Kiev Expects To Import Kuwaiti Oil in “Near Future’ /HOLOS UKRAYINY 10 Oct] .........0 60
National Affairs
Prime Minister Marchuk on Government Program [Kiev International] ..........s.ccccssessssseseeeeees 61
Kuchma Hails Parliament’s Approval of Government Program [INTERFAX] _ ............sssssssseseees 63
Kuchma Rejects Cooperation With Supreme Council [UNIAN]  ......scsccsssssssssesseessssssesssneseeseaeeses 65
Economic Issues
Marchuk Presents Economic Program [Kiev International] ...........scssssessessessssesesssssssecesseecsencsenees 65
WESTERN REGION
Belarus
President Lukashenka Addresses Trade Unionists [BELAPAN] _ ........ccssccssssssessssssessessesessesseseenees 74
Balloonists’ Death Investigation Previewed [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 12 Oct]  ...ccccccccssssssesesseseesees 74
Moldova
Snegur Opposes Merger With Romania, Joining NATO [ITAR-TASS]  .........sc.ssessssssssessssceseeseees 75
Dniester Leader Supports Yeltsin’s Decree on CIS Policy [INFOTAG]  .........cccscssccsssssesceseseneees 76
CENTRAL ASIA
Tajikistan
Government Claims Rebels Accelerating Conflict [Dushanbe Radio] — .......cccscsscsssssesssesssssnscesees 77
Russian Border Guard Commander Threatens Retaliation [Dushanbe Radio]  .0...........cs.see0e00- 77
Uzbekistan
Ceremony Marks Aid Agreement Signed With Germany [Tashkent Radio] ..........c..cccsssseeseeeeee 78
Foreign Minister on Relations With Mideast [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 12 Oct] __........... 78
i Builds Himself New Summer, Winter Residences [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 11 1
UE - Gedesdiicadissascaeleieaidimeadditedieciaconcaplistianiadaisapinminiantbsniicainesieiiqenidiignsenstisathsansanishiipeinabeababnseipensoesatasianes
CAUCASUS
Armenia
Bropeds Council Ready To Cooperate [SNARK] — ..cccccsscssesesscsccesecesesecteccescsncscsscessescsceessoccseesoseees 80
Ministry Demands Extending ARF-Dashnaktsutyun Suspension [NOYAN TAPAN] _ .............++ 80
Georgia
Shevardnadze Says Nation Putting End to Terror [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 7 Oct] ........000.-+ 80
Shevardnadze Issues Directive Abolishing Rescue Corps [SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA 5 Oct] _.. 83
BALTIC STATES
Estonia

Meri Cancels Malta Trip Due To “Tapes Scandal’ [BNS] ........c.cccscscsssssessesesssscscessseeseesenceneeeneenes 84

Foreign Minister on ‘Constructive’ Meeting With Kozyrev [INTERFAX]
Defense Minister Comments on NATO Membership [Tallinn TV]  .........cccsscsssssssssssesssesessenseeees

Latvia

Government Approves Application To Join EU [Riga Radio] ..........cccscssssssssssssssesseesseseccesensesens
Ministers Terms Russian NATO Pressure ‘Blackmail’ [INTERFAX]  .........c.cssssssssssssssesseseeeseess
Ulmanis Postpones 3-6 Nov Visit to Krasnoyarsk [ITAR-TASS]  .......s.sccsssssssssssssssesessessessesesseeses
Foreign Minister Assesses Visit to U.S., UN [Riga Radio]  ........s.scscssscssssssessssssessecsssssseseesesceeees

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Key Developments

Yeltsin Wants Democratic Majority in Next Duma

LD1110182695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1737 GMT 11 Oct 95

{By Konstantin Kolesov and Andrey Storkh]

(FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 11 (ITAR-
TASS) — “The President is clearly in control of the
pre-election situation and he is well informed about
campaigning in the country. He has unequivocally de-
termined that the democratic forces should have a ma-
jority in the State Duma," chairman of the Prime Min-
ister’s election alliance “Our Home is Russia" Sergey
Belyayev [position as received] said after today’s meet-
ing with President Boris Yeltsin.

Asked whether the President continued to believe that
the movement would gain between eight and twelve
percent of all votes in the elections for the State Duma,
Belyayev said that since "the President is a guarantor
of concord in society, he cannot give open preference
to one or another movement,” but he nonetheless set a
clear task to us — “to form a democratic majority.”

Belyayev said society was in a vague state containing
radicals, left-wingers and centrist and right-of-centre
democrats. Belyayev said that the democratic wing,
including supporters of the movement "Our Home is
Russia,” embraces “a broad centre” oriented towards
implementing reforms which the President began and
the Government has continued.

Asked whether the President expressed his own political
sympathies during his meeting with the leaders of
the movement “Our Home is Russia" on Wednesday,
Belyayev said “it is easier to list all those whom the
President does not accept. Undoubtedly, they include
the communist party (and we regard all attacks on the
President by the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian
Federation] as a negative phenomenon for our society),
the Agrarian party that echoes the communists, and all
the fragments of the Communist party of the Soviet
Union and other former communist organisations which
now represent the left wing of the political spectrum.
They are not our friends, they are our most serious
adversaries in the elections. And Boris Nikolayevich has
never supported the Liberal Democratic party of Russia.
As regards the Congress of Russian communities, we
did not touch on it in the course of our meeting.”

DUMA ELECTION ISSUES

Grachev Issues Statement on Not Running for
Duma

LD1210180495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1645 GMT 12 Oct 95

{[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 12 Oct (ITAR-TASS)
— Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev made the
following statement today:

"In connection with reports appearing in the media on
my intention to stand for election in a number of con-
stituencies, I believe it necessary to provide the fol-
lowing clarifications. I have indeed received numerous
appeals from the working and military collectives and
public organizations urging me to agree to be nomi-
nated as a Duma candidate. However, I never intended
to stand and am not planning to do so.

"I should like to express my gratitude to all those who
proposed my nomination. I view this, first of all, as an
expression of trust and respect toward the army and the
navy and the recognition of the prestige of the armed
forces, which are fulfilling the difficult task of protecting
the national interests of the state."

ITAR-TASS received the text of Pavel Grachev’s state-
ment from the public relations officer of Russian defense
minister.

Lebed Denies Split in KRO, Urges Strong Army

MMI1210085795 Moscow TRUD in Russian
11 Oct 95 pp 1, 4

{Interview with Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed,
one of the leaders of the "Congress of Russian Com-
munities," KRO, electoral association and former 14th
Army commander, by Sergey Paviov; place and date
not given: "Aleksandr Lebed: You Can’t Have a Strong
Russia Without a Strong Army" — first paragraph is
TRUD introduction]

(FBIS Translated Text] Aleksandr Lebed, as commander
of the 14th Army in the Dniester Region, always had the
reputation of being the general in the Russian Army who
was most accessible to the press. After leaving his post
as commander of the 14th Army and becoming one of
the leaders of the "Congress of Russian Com:nunities"
[KRO] electoral association, General Lebed continued
his active contacts with the press. However, recently
he has changed his habits, and getting an interview
with him has become a big problem. At the same time
rumors are proliferating to the effect that there are
difficulties in the relationship between Lebed and the
other KRO leader, Yuriy Skokov, and that the Kremlin
intends to launch some kind of military movement in
support of army reform, for which Lebed himself is
tipped as leader. And according to some reports this

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

2 DUMA ELECTION ISSUES

movement will not necessarily be part of the KRO.
Our correspondent managed to get an interview with
Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed.

[Pavlov] Aleksandr Ivanovich, what, in your view, is
the present state of the Russian Army?

[Lebed] The Soviet Army was a strong army, for all
its many shortcomings. That must be admitted. It was
an education. But from 1988 onward, the principle of
combined [military and political] command disappeared
in the Soviet Army, and later this phenomenon was
carried over smoothly into the Russian Army. The
Army was used to plug political holes and cover up
blunders, and in the process it was constantly blamed.
The withdrawal of the Army, without any kind of
plan, from the territory of Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
and Poland was a disaster. Officers were shoved into
henhouses, barns, and barracks. People lost all hope.
Units with their own history that had raised generations
of servicemen were disbanded first of all. This was no
accident, it was, if you like, a malicious system. But I
have to say you can’t have a strong Russia without a
strong Army and Navy.

[Pavlov] Do you reject the idea of democratization of
the Army?

[Lebed] I can’t imagine a democratized army. If one
person has the right to send another into battle, what
kind of democracy can you have there? Nobody wants to
die, after all. We can and must take care of servicemen’s
social protection and give them a decent life. But a
democratic army isn’t an army, it’s something else. We
need a civilized army in which servicemen’s interests
are protected. Also, under present laws you can’t draft
students, you can’t draft elite children, not elite children,
but the children of elite parents. What we have now is
not a law on universal military service, but a law on
universal military exemption. The Army has become a
“worker-peasant" army, and that has led to a decline
in its intellectual level. But a strong army has great
intellectual potential.

[Pavlov] Let’s imagine you became defense minister.
What would you do first?

[Lebed] Whatever I say, it’s going to be seen on the
basis of the principle: “Everyone pictures himself as
a strategist when he’s watching the battle from the
sidelines." If I became that strategist, 1 would do what
needs to be done for the country. There is and has been
no reform in the Army. There has been nothing but
flimflam. Four years ago it was possible to talk about
a gradual reform of the Army, but now we must talk
about building it rather than reforming it. The Army
has largely been smashed up by Grachev’s own efforts.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

The job has gotten more difficult. But we still have an
army, even if it is half-ruined. It can’t be restored in a
short time, but the most important things could be done
in 1-1.5 years. You could eliminate all those mongrel
reduced-strength units with 30 officers and two men.
Let’s have 10 times fewer divisions, but combine them
to form expanded formations. They should each have
15,000 men, a modern training system, a dual or triple
arms basing system, and a well-oiled redeployment
system. And combat training!

A strong army is not one that fights, but one that by the
very fact of its existence destroys ideas of aggression.
Let’s have troops whose existence means that nobody
will want to tangle with us. And this should be under
the protection of the nuclear shield. That is the only
counterweight, given the existence of nuclear weapons
in the United States, Britain, France, and China. It
must also be taken into account that while there are
common problems, there are also the problems of each
specific garrison. It is a huge country, so an army reform
program cannot be the fruit of just one man’s work,
however smart he may be. This job must be done by
collective brain power. There are enormous numbers of
intelligent officers who were prematurely discharged.
They have plenty of ideas, they are ready to serve for
free, but they can’t put their ideas into practice. They
need a focus. That’s why I intend in the near future to
set up a public military movement, it’s realistic.

On the question of military organizational development
we should take into account both the tactical and the
Strategic level — what we can achieve over a period
of 20-30 years. Here we should proceed on the basis
of Russia’s national interests. We have a state with
“displaced borders," as we are reminded by, for instance,
Kaliningrad, the Dniester Region, Tajikistan.... And the
state must declare, through the mouths of its political
leaders, that this line is the line of state interests. But
as soon as you have interests, you also get threats to
those interests. The system of counteraction is realized
through the creation of the corresponding groupings,
airfields, etc. That is the starting point. But today
we have a country without interests, without enemies,
without friends, without traditions. And a strong army
is a repository of tradition.

[Pavlov] What threats do you see to Russia's security?

[Lebed] Russia must be defended! Let’s start with the
East. China. A territory about one-third the size of ours,
yet the population today is 1.2 billion. The prediction
for the year 2010 is 1.6 billion. One day they'll simply
no longer fit into their own territory. Shouldn't we
bear in mind this prospect and the possibility of a
potential danger to our interests arising? There is the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Islamic world, which we have not always been on good
terms with recently. Our actions in Afghanistan and
Chechnya affected this. Incidentally, Chechnya was a
pretext for the stepping up of the third military threat
factor — NATO expansion. Russia today is incapable of
confronting not only all three threats at once, but even
any one of them individually. Our economy is in ruins,
our Army is half in ruins, and the main thing is that
people see no glimmer of light. The world balance is
important. Any system tends toward equilibrium. And
there is nothing stopping us becoming strong again.
Not through heightened aggressiveness. It’s true, ours
is a self-sufficient country, we have everything. We
don’t need to borrow from anyone. We have our own
autonomous economic system. And we have enough of
a population, enough bright people, to live by our wits.

[Pavlov] How should Moscow’s relations with the
Federation components be structured?

[Lebed] The processes that wrecked the USSR have now
been carried over to Russia’s territory. Once there were
the union republics, now they have become independent
states. And there are 23 national territorial formations
in Russia’s territory now. If they are separated off, the
result will be a blanket full of holes.

[Pavlov] What do you see as the way to solve the
Chechen problem?

{Lebed}] I have the impression that in Chechnya a
frankly criminal, mafia regime was being lovingly
nurtured, and until a certain point that regime paid
up. When it realized that it was strong enough, that
it had grown up and could tell its elder brother to get
lost, it stopped paying up. It had to be punished. But
how could you punish it? Only by using the Army, the
police isn’t going to be any use. So they sent in the
Army. Whereas they should have adopted political and
economic measures of influence, closed the airspace,
surrounded the borders, cut off the flow of oil.

[Pavlov] So you suggest imposing an economic block-
ade?

[Lebed] Why put it so crudely? Just give people the
opportunity to feel the burden of independence.
[Pavlov] Would you grant them political independence?
[Lebed] No.

[Pavlov] Why are you in the KRO specifically?

{Lebed] I can sense the growing strength of this
movement. This organization grew up on the basis
of the Russian communities of the near abroad and
was supposed to coordinate their actions ard give
them direct moral and spiritual support. Now it is a
broader association. There are democrats, socialists, and

DUMA ELECTION ISSUES 3

communists within it. Personally, I don’t care who you
are, what you consider yourself to be. If you want to
come with us, come. You might be an atheist or a
believer. Let’s get on with the job. You must recognize
the mighty force that goes by the name of "my Russian
people." Russians in Russia are 85 percent of the
population, so why car’t we live by our own ideas in our
own country and why can’t we start building our lives
according to our own plan? At the same time, naturally,
we must build civilized relations with all the peoples of
Russia. We have been living together for 1,000 years,
and we have to go on living together, and so one day,
after all, we will arrive at the concept "citizen of Russia"
["rossiyanin"]. Take the Americans. An American can
be of Chinese, Japanese, or Russian extraction, but he’s
still an American.

[Pavlov] Many people are now talking about political
differences within the KRO, in particular your differ-
ences with Skokov.

[Lebed] They’ ve been talking, and they’ll go on talking.
This is one of the attempts to bring about a split in
the movement. There are no differences of principle
between us. We have known each other a long time, for
more than four years we’ve known each other well. I
have my own personal criteria. There are three of them:
my relations with people after August 1991, the summer
of 1992, and the summer of 1995. Those were my three
moments. And, judged on these three criteria, Yuriy
Vladimirovich [Skokov] is beyond reproach. When you
are close to power, when you're strong, you always
have a lot of friends. But when things are going badly
for you, only your true friends remain. On these three
criteria Skokov suits me absolutely fine.

National Republican Party Fails To Gain Allies

LD0910154495 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1436 GMT 9 Oct 95

(FBIS Transcribed Text) MOSCOW, Oct 9 (INTER-
FAX) — The National-Republican Party of Russia,
headed by Duma deputy Nikolay Lysenko, has failed
to gain allies in the election campaign. It will partici-
pate in the elections on its own, political secretary of
the party Nikolay Pavlov told an exclusive INTERFAX
interview Monday.

In his opinion, the progress of signature collection
(100,000 signatures have been collected) inspires hopes
the Party will have no less than 5% of votes in the
elections of December 17, 1995.

Pavlov said he does not take into account the 30,000
Signatures taken away in an armed attack at the party
headquarters in St. Petersburg on September 28.

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

4 DUMA ELECTION ISSUES

Speaking of the party’s possible allies, the political
secretary said "the recent consultations revealed that the
party will not act together with the Russian all-People’s
Union of Sergey Baburin or the election bloc of Power
to the People of Nikolay Ryzhkov "because they are far
from the genuine Russian national movement.”

Regional branches of the party, which has about 12,000
members, have been formed in 36 Russian areas.
Ex-deputy of the parliament of the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic Nikolay Paviov, who
was a leader of the National Salvation Front and the
opposition till October 1993, runs on the top of the
party’s list of candidates to the Duma together with
Lysenko.

List of Liberal Democratic Party Candidates for
Duma Deputy

954E1511A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA

in Russian 28 Sep 95 pp 3-4

{List of Liberal Democratic Party Election Association
candidates for deputy on federal ticket, signed by
Congress Chairman A.D. Vengerovskiy and Congress
Secretary 1.A. Karpukhin, copy notarized by RF Central
Electoral Commission Decree 12/94-II of 5 September
1995]

{[FBIS Translated Text] 1. Zhirinovskiy, Vladimir
Volfovich, b. 25 April 1946, leader of LDPR faction
in State Duma of RF Federal Assembly, res. Moscow.

2. Abeltsev, Sergey Nikolayevich, b. 6 May 1961, State
Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res. Moscow.

3. Vengerovskiy, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich, b. | April
1953, deputy chairman of State Duma of RF Federal
Assembly, res. Moscow.

4. Zhebrovskiy, Stanislav Mikhaylovich, b. 24 Febru-
ary 1942, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly,
res. Moscow.

5. Mitrofanov, Aleksey Valentinovich, b. 16 March
1962, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

6. Gutseriyev, Mikhail Safarbekovich, b. 9 March
1958, general director of "BIN" industrial-financial
company, res. Moscow.

7. Monastyrskiy, Mikhail Lvovich, b. 10 November
1945, director of St. Petersburg Northwestern Industrial
Company, res. St. Petersburg.

8. Musatov, Mikhail Ivanovich, b. 23 August 1950,
retired from RF Ministry of Defense, res. Moscow.

9. Gusev, Vladimir Kuzmich, b. 19 April 1932, State
Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res. Moscow.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

10. Narycheva, Natalya Borisovna, b. 19 Septem-
ber 1944, president of “Promtek” firm, res. Bolshevo,
Moscow Oblast.

11. Finko, Oleg Aleksandrovich, b. 23 May 1941, State
Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res. Moscow.

12. Kalashnikov, Sergey Vyacheslavovich, b. 3 July
1951, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

Adyge Republic (Adygea)

1. Slobodenyuk, Sergey Vasilyevich, b. 6 July 1962,
coordinator of Adyge Republic LDPR organization, res.

Maykop.
Altay Republic

1. Tyunin, Nikolay Aleksandrovich, b. 12 October
1957, deputy secretary of kray LDPR committee, res.
Bashtap, Ust-Koksinskiy Rayon, Altay Republic.

Bashkortostan Republic

1. Astafyev, Nikolay Pavlovich, b. 26 December 1940,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Lyubertsy, Moscow Oblast.

2. Tuinov, Yevgeniy Vyacheslavovich, b. 26 January
1954, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
St. Petersburg.

3. Petrov, Vyacheslav Vasilyevich, b. 26 September
1946, aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assem-
bly, res. Ufa.

4. Nemtsov, Sergey Yevgenyevich, b. 28 April 1952,
aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

5. Iskhakov, Askhat Gammarovich, b. 16 April 1966,
coordinator of Ufa public association “Zhirinovskiy’s
Falcons,” res. Ufa.

Republic of Buryatia

1. Lazebnikov, Yuriy Zakharovich, b. 18 July 1945,
aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Ulan-Ude.

2. Medvedev, Georgiy Aleksandrovich, b. 24 Septem-
ber 1940, chief engineer of Water Management Com-
mittee of Republic of Buryatia, res. Ulan-Ude.

Dagestan Republic

1. Zhirinovskiy, Pavel Andreyevich, b. 15 June 1970,
aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

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FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

2. Nasrullayev, Asadulla Gamzayevich, b. 20 January
1959, deputy chairman of Usisha Village Kolkhoz, res.
Usisha, Akushinskiy Rayon, Dagestan.

Ingush Republic
1. Stolyarova, Albina Sergeyevna, b. 10 January 1940,

State Duma specialist-expert of RF Federal Assembly,
res. Moscow.

2. Bogatyrev, Magomet Debirovich, b. 21 March
1956, head of Ordzhonikidze Village Administration,
res. Ordzhonikidze, Sunzhenskiy Rayon, Ingushetia.

Kabardino-Balkar Republic

1. Dragunova, Valentina Ivanovna, b. 5 October
1952, vice president of Republic Cultural-Ecological
Benevolent Fund, res. Mayskiy, Kabardino-Balkaria.

2. Bodrov, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich, b. 12 September
1951, Kabardino-Balkar Republic Procuracy investiga-
tor, res. Nalchik.

Republic of Kalmykia—Khalmg Tangch

1. Khosroyeva, Bela Nikolayevna, b. 23 October 1937,
aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Muscow.

2. Matveyenko, Boris Gennadyevich, b. 21 May

1965, deputy general director of "Trast-Fin" joint-stock
company, res. St. Petersburg.

Karachay-Cherkess Republic

1. Davydov, Viadimir Sergeyevich, b. | January
1958, coordinator of republic LDPR organization, res.
Cherkessk.

Republic of Karelia

1. Maksimov, Mikhail Aleksandrovich, b. 17 October
1949, deputy chief mechanic at "“Onega Tractor Plant"
joint-stock company, res. Petrozavodsk.

2. Samokhin, Yuriy Borisovich, b. 24 September 1942,
aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Petrozavodsk.

3. Yurkevich, Yuriy Paviovich, b. 2 August 1963,
republic LDPR organization representative to LDPR
Supreme Council, res. Petrozavodsk.

Komi Republic

1, Ageyev, Sergey Viktorovich, b. 20 March 1961,
chief economist of "Ochag" joint-stock company, res.
Moscow.

DUMA ELECTION ISSUES 5

2. Ziobin, Valeriy Veniaminovich, b. 2 August 1950,
coordinator of republic LDPR organization, res. Syk-
tyvkar.

3. Borisov, Sergey Gennadyevich, b. 24 January 1971,
teacher at Vorkuta Night School No 2, res. Vorkuta.

Republic of Mari El

1. Markelov, Leonid Igorevich, b. 25 June 1963,
Interrepublic Bar Association attorney, res. Yoshkar-
Ola.

Republic of Mordovia

1. Gridnev, Yuriy Sergeyevich, b. 9 June 1947,
Saransk Municipal Council deputy, res. Saransk.

2. Demidov, Igor Alekseyevich, b. 4 August 1955,
RF Ministry of Defense Military Mission engineer, res.
Nizhniy Novgorod.

Sakha Republic (Yakutia)

1. Pozdnyakov, Yuriy Pavlovich, b. 14 August 1948,
deputy chief of Yakutsk Administration, res. Yakutsk.

2. Molchanov, Nikolay Grigoryevich, b. 23 October
1938, director of Mirninskiy Rayon Secondary School
No 4, res. Almaznyy, Mirninskiy Rayon.

3. Vinogradov, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, b. 13 Jan-
uary 1954, coordinator of republic LDPR organization,
res. Udachnyy, Mirninskiy Rayon.

North Ossetian Republic

1. Ivanov, Viktor Petrovich, b. 17 March 1938, State
Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res. Moscow.

2. Karginov, Viktor Lazarevich, b. 14 May 1954, aide
to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Vladikavkaz.

3. Zozrov, Georgiy Mayramovich, b. 15 May 1966,
coordinator of republic LDPR_ organization, res.
Vladikavkaz.

Tatarstan Republic (Tatarstan)

1. Kuznetsov, Mikhail Varfolomeyevich, b. 22 August
1968, chairman of benevolent fund of Boarding School
No 18, res. Kazan.

2. Skum, Dmitriy Aleksandrovich, b. 16 Apri! 1961,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

3. Golyandin, Vladimir Nikolayevich, b. 1 September
1948, coordinator of republic LDPR organization, res.
Kazan.

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6 DUMA ELECTION ISSUES

Tyva Republic

1. Kashim, Aleksandr Yuryevich, b. 12 June 1963, aide
to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Kyzyi.

Udmert Republic
Bardanov, Viedimir Aleksandrovich, b. 20 Feb-
y 1960, general director of “Kineskop" limited-
fiability parmership, res. Moscow.
2. Bekhanov, Vitaliy Yevdokimovich, b. 24 August
1944, State Duma consultant of RF Federal Assembly,
tes. Moscow.

Republic of Khakassia
1. Vimogradov, Aleksey Germanovich, b. 11 Novem-

ber 1965, economist at "Sukhovey" joint-stock com-
pany, res. Vologda.
Chechen Republic
1. Podlipayev, Nikolay Nikolayevich, b. 22 June 1942,

department head in LDPR headquarters, res. Mozhaysk,
Moscow Oblast.

Chuvash Republic—Republic of Chavash

1. Shipov, Aleksandr Borisovich, b. 1 January 1955,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Moiseyev, Viadimir Aleksandrovich, b. 15 March
1963, editor-in-chief of VESTNIK ZHIRINOVSKOGO,
res. Cheboksary.

3. Kuzmin, Gennadiy Sergeyevich, b. 5 march 1939,
shop chief at Kanash Electric Loading Equipment Plant,
res. Kanash, Chuvashia.

Altay Kray
1. Vishnyakov, Viktor Grigoryevich, b. 22 January

1931, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Solovyev, Mikhail Nikolayevich, b. 6 March 1957,
first secretary of kray LDPR committee, res. Barnaul.

3. Pyakin, Valeriy Viktorovich, b. 7 May 1963, second
secretary of kray LDPR committee, res. Barnaul.

Krasnodar Kray

1. Kostyutkin, Viadimir Mikhaylovich, b. 13 Novem-
ber 1948, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly,
res. Moscow.

2. Lisichkin, Viadimir Aleksandrovich, b. 3 October
1941, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

3. Yepifanov, Anatoliy Yuryevich, b. 17 September
1963, general director of “Intermarist" joint-stock com-
pany, res. Moscow.

4. Vasilevskiy, Ivan Adamovich, b. 1 February 1944,
deputy director of “Yeyskaya" fishery, res. Yeysk,
Krasnodar Kray.

Krasnoyarsk Kray

1. Ivanov, Viadimir Pavlovich, b. 25 August 1946,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Krasnoyarsk.

2. Zhurko, Vasiliy Vasilyevich, b. 15 July 1963, State
Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res. Achinsk,
Krasnoyarsk Kray.

3. Stroyev, Sergey Kuzmich, b. 9 September 1955,
aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly,
res. Krasnoyarsk-26.

Maritime Kray

1. Bolshakov, Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich, b. 23 Octo-
ber 1949, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly,
res. Vladivostok.

2. Ulyanov, Aleksandr Viktorovich, b. 25 July 1955,
deputy coordinator of kray LDPR organization, res.
Vladivostok.

Stavropol Kray

1. Zarichanskiy, Stanislav Konstantinovich, b. 31 Oc-
tober 1962, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly,
res. Khimki, Moscow Oblast.

2. Maksakova, Larisa Sergeyevna, b. 29 November
1946, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

3. Panin, Valeriy Pavlovich, b. 1 January 1941, senior
instructor at Stavropol State Pedagogical University, res.
Stavropol.

Khabarovsk Kray

1. Zhuraviev, Vitaliy Yevgenyevich, b. 16 February
1964, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Semenov, Sergey Sergeyevich, b. 30 November
1973, State Duma specialist-expert of RF Federal As-
sembly, res. Moscow.

3. Grishkov, Viadimir Vasilyevich, b. 1 September
1946, deputy coordinator of kray LDPR organization,
res. Khabarovsk.

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FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

4. Marin, Yuriy Nikolayevich, b. 4 April 1950, gen-
eral director of "Khingan" joint-stock company, res.
Khabarovsk.

Amur Oblast

1. Mormin, Sergey Valeryevich, b. 20 December
1963, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.

Vologda.
Arkhangelsk Oblast

1. Churilov, Aleksey Viktorovich, b. 20 June 1972,
aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly,
res. Podyuga, Konoshskiy Rayon, Arkhangelsk Oblast.

2. Ukhin, Yevgeniy Vadimovicn, b. 6 October 1960,
chairman of the board of "ROSSNOR" residential
construction combine, res. Arkhangelsk.

3. Kurochkin, Sergey Viadimirovich, b. 27 December
1960, director of "Sever-INefteservis" joint-stock com-
pany, res. Arkhangelsk

Astrakhan Oblast

1. Lebedintsev, Viktor Yakovievich, b. 5 December

1941, deputy department head in LDPR headquarters,
res. Moscow.

2. Babaytsev, Dmitriy Grigoryevich, b. 22 March
1952, instructor at Astrakhan Medical Institute, res.
Astrakhan.

3. Shcherbakov, Yuriy Nikolayevich, b. 14 July 1956,
deputy director of "Fakel" printing house, res. As-
trakhan.

Belgorod Oblast
1. Sychev, Sergey Viadimirovich, b. 1 March 1962,

State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Belgorod.

2. Goltsev, Vasiliy Fedorovich, b. 8 March 1948,
chief engineer of northern power supply networks of
"Belgorodenergo" joint-stock company, res. Gubkin,
Belgorod Oblast.

3. Gabelkov, Yuriy Leonidovich, b. 30 July 1958,
coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res. Belgorod.

Bryansk Oblast

1. Lemeshov, Gennadiy Vladimirovich, b. 26 Septem-
ber 1968, deputy editor-in-chief of PRAVDA ZHIRI-
NOVSKOGO, res. Bryansk.

2. Khramchenkov, Valeriy Grigoryevich, b. 16
September 1960, deputy coordinator of oblast LDPR
organization, res. Bryansk.

DUMA ELECTION ISSUES 7

3. Roshchina, Galina Viktorovna, b. 17 March 1946,
oblast bar association attorney, res. Bryansk.

Viadimir Oblast

1. Gvozdarev, Vladimir Zakharovich, b. 3 June 1951,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Panev, Anatoliy Alekseyevich, b. 20 September
1937, general director of "Moscow Machine Tool Plant
imeni S. Ordzhonikidze" joint-stock company, res.
Moscow.

3. Zhukov, Boris Anatolyevich, b. 13 July 1947,
coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res. Orgtrud,
Kameshkovskiy Rayon, Vladimir Oblast.

4. Boykin, Pavel Anatolyevich, b. 4 September 1962,
deputy department head in LDPR headquarters, res.
Murom, Vladimir Oblast.

Volgograd Oblast

1. Ishchenko, Yevgeniy Petrovich, b. 15 October 1972,
deputy chairman of the board of "Moskovskiy Kredit”
commercial bank, res. Volgograd.

2. Karpenko, Oleg Anatolyevich, b. 28 October 1967,
coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res. Vol-
gograd.

3. Karpenko, Aleksandr Anatolyevich, b. 1 January
1970, aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assem-
bly, res. Volgograd.

Vologda Oblast

1. Kuznetsov, Yuriy Pavlovich, b. 12 October 1947,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res. St.
Petersburg.

2. Churkin, Sergey Aleksandrovich, b. 22 November
1956, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Vologda.

3. Lednev, Igor Dmitriyevich, b. 28 April 1967, editor
of PRAVDA ZHIRINOVSKOGO (Vologda edition),
res. Vologda.

4. Rogozhnikov, Viadimir Valeryevich, b. 28 February
1966, coordinator of Cherepovets city LDPR organiza-
tion, res. Cherepovets, Vologda Oblast.

Voronezh Oblast

1. Zhirinovskiy, Aleksandr Andreyevich, b. 16 Oc-
tober 1932, chief of staff of LDPR faction in State
Duma of RF Federal Assembly, res. Vatutinki, Lenin-
skiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast.

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8 DUMA ELECTION ISSUES

2. Khvorikov, Yuriy Petrovich, b. 24 May 1959,
teacher at Voronezh Secondary School No 76, res.
Voronezh.

3. Glebov, Viktor Ivanovich, b. 20 October 1939,
department head in LDPR headquarters, res. Moscow.

Ivanovo Oblast

1. Dorovskikh, Andrey Mikhaylovich, b. 2 May 1965,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Balashov, Saratov Oblast.

2. Parshakov, Yuriy Nikolayevich, b. 5 September
1941, coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res.
Ivanovo.

3. Norkin, Aleksandr Vadimovich, b. 13 June 1973,
legal counsel of "Alibi" legal aid agency, res. Kineshma,
Ivanovo Oblast.

Irkutsk Oblast

1. Kozlov, Valeriy Nikolayevich, b. 26 May 1956, chief
specialist of "Stroymaterialy" joint-stock company in
Syktyvkar, res. Syktyvkar, Komi Republic.

2. Kudryavtsev, Sergey Ivanovich, b. 8 April 1960,
coordinator of Irkutsk LDPR organization, res. Irkutsk.

3. Noskova, Natalya Viadimirovna, b. 8 March 1971,
editor of PRAVDA ZHIRINOVSKOGO (Irkutsk edi-
tion), res. Irkutsk.

4. Makarov, Nikolay Anatolyevich, b. 2 October 1951,
director of “Koblyakovskiy" sovkhoz, res. Koblyakovo,
Bratskiy Rayon, Irkutsk Oblast.

Kaliningrad Oblast

1. Moiseyev, Anatoliy Semenovich, b. 26 October
1947, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Zapovednoye, Slavskiy Rayon, Kaliningrad Oblast.

Kaluga Oblast
1. Sidorov, Mikhail Nikolayevich, b. 17 April 1947,

State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Podmazov, Vladimir Nikolayevich, b. 15 January
1952, department head in LDPR headquarters, res.
Mytishchi, Moscow Oblast.

3. Pushkin, Gennadiy Anatolyevich, b. 5 October
1959, coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res.
Kaluga.

Kamchatka Oblast

1. Lemeshev, Mikhail Yakovlevich, b. i January 1927,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

2. Yekimov, Mikhail Veniaminovich, b. 20 June
1959, coordinator of regional LDPR organization, res.
Petropaviovsk-Kamchatskiy.

Kemerovo Oblast

1. Solomatin, Yegor Yuryevich, b. 3 October 1964,
chairman of board of directors of "Financial Center"
joint-stock company, res. Moscow.

2. Listopadova, Vera Andreyevna, b. 9 August 1938,
aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Pyatigorsk, Stavropol Kray.

3. Bryukhanov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, b. 15 June
1961, aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assem-
bly, res. Pyatigorsk, Stavropol Kray.

Kirov Oblast

1. Vakulenko, Mikhail Yuryevich, b. 7 May 1964,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res. Kirov.

2. Salikhov, Marat Rivgatovich, b. 8 September 1969,
aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Kirov.

3. Ivonin, Yuriy Sergeyevich, b. 5 May 1943, aide to
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res. Kirov.

Kostroma Oblast

1. Sidorov, Anatoliy Stepanovich, b. 18 February
1933, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Kulay, Aleksey Arkadyevich, b. 16 April 1966,
department head of Kostroma Bank of RF Sberbank,
res. Kostroma.

Kurgan Oblast

1. Moiseyev, Boris Vasilyevich, b. 24 November 1935,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Gorokhov, Vladimir Vasilyevich, b. 16 December
1941, coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res.
Kurgan.

Kursk Oblast

1. Antonov, Yuriy Mikhaylovich, b. 19 February 1945,
composer, res. Moscow.

2. Ruda, Yuriy Mikhaylovich, b. 28 April 1958, State
Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res. Boloto,
Gorshechenskiy Rayon, Kursk Oblast.

3. Astakhov, Sergey Kuzmich, b. 3 March 1956,
director of "ASKI" firm, res. Kursk.

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FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

4. Ishkova, Nina Yevgenyevna, b. 8 April 1962, aide
to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Gorshechnoye, Gorshechenskiy Rayon, Kursk Oblast.

Leningrad Oblast

1. Sadchikov, Ivan Aleksandrovich, b. 20 June 1940,
president of Leningrad Association of Scientific Soci-
eties, res. St. Petersburg.

2. Bodrov, Sergey Viktorovich, b. 26 November 1965,
coordinator of municipal Afghanistan War Veterans
Fund, res. St. Petersburg.

3. Ulybin, Vyacheslav Vyacheslavovich, b. 19 Novem-
ber 1968, deputy coordinator of St. Petersburg city
LDPR organization, res. St. Petersburg.

4. Glushchen‘o, Mikhail Ivanovich, b. 5 May 1957,
vice president of municipal Association of Retired
Boxers, res. St. Petersburg.

5. Ravdis, Gennadiy Veniaminovich, b. 5 November
1943, aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assem-
bly, res. St. Petersburg.

6. Rozhok, Petr Mikhaylovich, b. 13 September 1939,
deputy department head in LDPR headquarters, res.
Moscow.

Lipetsk Oblast

1. Orlov, Viadimir Stepanovich, b. 25 October 1955,
aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Lipetsk.

2. Sviridov, Valentin Yefimovich, b. 16 July 1941,
coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res. Lipetsk.

3. Yefanov, Lev Anatolyevich, b. 10 May 1965, deputy
coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res. Yelts,
Lipetsk Oblast.

4. Puzikov, Nikolay Petrovich, b. 3 January 1946, shop
chief at “Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine" joint-
stock company, res. Lipetsk.

Magadan Oblast

1. Bagrov, Valeriy Ivanovich, b. 15 February 1947,
deputy coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res.
Magadan.

2. Miroshnikov, Viadimir Ivanovich, b. 2 March 1953,
deputy coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res.
Magadan.

Moscow Oblast

1. Kiselev, Vyacheslav Viktorovich, b. 3 June 1948,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Pushkino, Moscow Oblast.

DUMA ELECTION ISSUES

2. Surinov, Tatevos Romanovich, b. 19 July 1960,
president of “Orel-A ia" airline, res. Moscow.

3. Lebedev, Igor Vladimirovich, b. 27 September
1972, aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal As-
sembly, res. Moscow.

4. Balakhovskiy, Viktor Nikolayevich, b. 19 Septem-
ber 1956, editor of PRAVDA ZH’RINOVSKOGO
(Lyubertsy edition), res. Lyubertsy, Moscow Oblast.

5. Shcheglov, Vladimir Vladimirovich, b. 3 April
1947, deputy coordinator of oblast LDPR organization,
res. Podolsk, Moscow Oblast.

6. Zorin, Viadimir Nikolayevich, b. 13 January 1947,
deputy director of "Radius" limited-liability partnership,
res. Dubna, Moscow Oblast.

7. Khlebnikov, Sergey Mikhaylovich, b. 14 September
1961, coordinator of Yegoryevskiy Rayon LDPR organ-
ization, res. Ramenki, Yegoryevskiy Rayon, Moscow
Oblast.

Murmansk Oblast

1. Buzov, Yuriy Yevgenyevich, b. 3 January 1955,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Vikhorev, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, b. 1 June
1954, coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res.
Safonovo, Severomorskiy Rayon, Murmansk Oblast.

3. Kubayev, Leonid Mikhaylovich, b. 22 May 1947,
deputy coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res.
Murmansk.

Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast

1. Kozyrev, Aleksandr Ivanovich, b. 30 December
1949, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Gagut, Luiza Dmitriyevna, b. 28 September 1949,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

3. Novikov, Vadim Gennadyevich, b. 24 June 1957,
coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res. Nizhniy
Novgorod.

4. Ponomarev, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, b. 17
November 1962, State Duma deputy of RF Federal
Assembly, res. Nizhniy Novgorod.

Novgorod Oblast

1. Zhukov, Dmitriy Anatolyevich, b. 30 August 1927,
writer, res. Moscow.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
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10 DUMA ELECTION ISSUES

2. Kondratyev, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, b. 14
March 1939, general director of "Malyy Volkhovets"
joint-stock company, res. Novgorod.

3. Ignatyev, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, b. 11 April
1945, assistant dean of School of History, Novgorod
State University, res. Novgorod.

Novosibirsk Oblast

1. Loginov, Y..geniy Yuryevich, b. 13 May 1965,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Novosibirsk.

2. Balberev, Aleksandr Ivanovich, b. 2 January 1942,
production chief at "Volga Motors" joint-stock com-
pany, res. Ulyanovsk.

3. Davidenko, Viadimir Ivanovich, b. 29 July 1948,
laboratory supervisor at General Human Pathology and
Ecology Institute of Siberian Department of Russian
Academy of Medical Sciences, res. Novosibirsk.

4. Prosenko, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, b. 2 May
1947, department head at Novosibirsk State Pedagogical
University, res. Novosibirsk.

5. Dorovskiy, Andrey Mikhaylovich, b. 12 August
1968, coordinator of Kochenevskiy Rayon LDPR organ-
ization, res. Kochenevo, Kochenevskiy Rayon, Novosi-
birsk Oblast.

Omsk Oblast

1. Zuyev, Aleksey Alekseyevich, b. 11 March 1970,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Rokhin, Yevgeniy Dmitriyevich, b. 24 January
1947, aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal As-
sembly, res. Omsk.

3. Sidorov, Gennadiy Nikolayevich, b. 26 August
1952, senior scientific associate at Scientific Research
Institute of Natural Foci of Infections, res. Omsk.

Orenburg Oblast °

1. Snezhkov, Mikhail Nikolayevich, b. 19 July 1945,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Kits, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, b. 11 November
1956, coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res.
Orenburg.

3. Korobov, Aleksey Viktorovich, b. 11 December
1961, Armavir Municipal Administration specialist
in organization of territorial administrative bodies in
Krasnodar Kray, res. Armavir, Krasnodar Kray.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

4. Baturin, Gennadiy Nikolayevich, b. 28 January
1958, aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal As-
sembly, res. Novoorsk, Orenburg Oblast.

Orel Oblast

i. Isakov, Sergey Vladimirovich, b. 12 July 1961,
vice president of "Orel-Avia" airline, res. Mtsensk, Orel
Oblast.

2. Shorenko, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, b. 5 May 1949,
coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res. Mtsensk,
Orel Oblast.

3. Zybunovskiy, Mikhail Georgiyevich, b. 28 October
1939, aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assem-
bly, res. Orel.

Penza Oblast

1. Magomedov, Stanislav Yunusovich, b. 6 October
1965, deputy general director of "M-Avto" firm, res.
Dolgoprudnyy, Moscow Oblast.

2. Dubinin, Sergey Valeryevich, b. 27 March 1963, di-
vision head at "Universal" scientific-production center,
res. Mtsensk, Orel Oblast.

3. Korobov, Sergey Aleksandrovich, b. 31 October
1958, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Penza.

4. Sakhnov, Sergey Veniaminovich, b. 21 July 1959,
surgeon at Vadinsk Central Regional Hospital, res.
Vadinsk, Penza Oblast.

5. Smirnov, Mikhail Grigoryevich, b. 27 August 1960,
electrician at Penza Radio Plant, res. Penza.

Perm Oblast

1. Skurikhin, Sergey Vasilyevich, b. 4 August 1956,
State Duma specialist-expert of RF Federal Assembly,
res. Usva, Gremyachinskiy Rayon, Perm Oblast.

2. Novozhilov, Sergey Gennadyevich, b. 25 January
1958, general director of “Ural-Zerno" joint-stock com-
pany, res. Berezniki, Perm Oblast.

3. Parkhomenko, Stanislav Ilyich, b. 25 January 1945,
head of security service of “Santa” firm, res. Perm.

4. Sobko, Andrey Garriyevich, b. 7 May 1969, coor-
dinator of oblast LDPR organization, res. Perm.

Pskov Oblast

1. Mikhaylov, Yevgeniy Eduardovich, b. 17 March
1963, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Velikiye Luki, Pskov Oblast.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
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FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

2. Yashin, Viktor Anatolyevich, b. 9 February 1965,
aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.

Meloy,

3. Shakho,, “~itriy Viadimirovich, b. 26 March
1968, aide to State Lu ~* deputy of RF Federal As-
sembly, res. Moscow.

Rostov Oblast

1. Korniyenko, Viktor Ulyanovich, b. 21 December
1937, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Grinberg, Aleksandr Leonidovich, b. 29 April
1953, deputy general director of "Sevkavavtoresurs"
joint-stock company, res. Rostov-on-Don.

3. Goncharov, Mikhail Yuryevich, b. 4 May 1952,
director of “Urozhay” limited-liability partnership, res.
Rostov-on-Don.

4. Gusev, Vadim Rudolfovich, b. 24 April 1966,
director of "INTERPromservis" joint-stock company,
res. Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Rostov Oblast.

5. Kasyanov, Aleksandr Anatolyevich, b. 25 July
1946, coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res.
Rostov-on-Don.

6. Kokorev, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, b. 4 March
1952, chancellor of Economic Security Academy, res.
Moscow.

7. Tkachev, Viktor Sergeyevich, b. 2 August 1950,
secretary of Novoshakhtinsk city LDPR organization,
res. Novoshakhtinsk, Rostov Oblast.

8. Krivokobylko, Vera Aleksandrovna, b. 15 January
1949, chief legal counsel of "Rostovtara” joint-stock
company, res. Rostov-on-Don.

9. Bezborodko, Aleksandr Borisovich, b. 4 March
1953, coordinator of Rostov city LDPR organization,
tes. Rostov-on-Don.

Ryazan Oblast

1. Kapustin, Anatoliy Vladimirovich, b. 10 January
1939, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Rakov, Viktor Nikolayevich, b. 2 October 1949,
coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res. Ryazan.
Samara Oblast

1. Burlakov, Mikhail Petrovich, b. 31 January 1952,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Tolyatti, Samara Oblast.

2. Kireyev, Anton Valeryevich, b. 23 May 1972, State
Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res. Moscow.

DUMA ELECTION ISSUES 11

3. Davydov, Vsevolod Gennadyevich, b. 17 November
1961, director of Samara Project Planning Institute, res.
Samara.

4. Kantariya, Kandid Georgiyevich, b. 28 February
1945, deputy director of "Elion" construction enterprise,
res. Samara.

Saratov Oblast

1. ivaityevev, Ivan Ivanovich, b. 14 April 1965, pres-
ident of "Ekip.7*" economic-finance corporation, res.
Moscow.

2. Chugunov, Mikhail Fedorovich, .. 75 November
1948, coordinator of oblast LDPR organizauc- res.
Saratov.

3. Matveyev, Dmitriy Viktorovich, b. 11 February
1972, coordinator of Balakovo city LDPR organization,
res. Balakovo, Saratov Oblast.

Sakhalin Oblast

1. Semenov, Anatoliy Sergeyevich, b. 11 December
1945, department head in LDPR headquarters, res.
Lobnya, Moscow Oblast.

2. Glazov, Mikhail Mikhaylovich, b. 6 March 1950,
coordinator of Sakhalin Oblast LDPR organization, res.
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

Sverdlovsk Oblast

1. Pchelkin, Viadimir Viktorovich, b. 22 April 1967,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Zhirinovskaya, Lyubov Andreyevna, b. 13 Septem-
ber 1942, department head in LDPR headquarters, res.
Moscow.

3. Filyushenko, Anatoliy Alekseyevich, b. 30 Novem-
ber 1938, assistant professor at Ural Law Academy, res.
Yekaterinburg.

4. Bestuzhev, Igor Zinovyevich, b. 12 January 1937,
chairman of Nizhniy Tagil Committee on Land Re-
sources and Land Management, res. Nizhniy Tagil,
Sverdlovsk Oblast.

5. Borisov, Viadimir Sergeyevich, b. 21 December
1953, deputy chief of laboratory at Nizhniy Tagil
Metallurgical Combine, res. Nizhniy Tagil, Sverdlovsk
Oblast.

Smolensk Oblast

1. Zlobin, Viadimir Veniaminovich, b. 6 April 1956,
head of Traffic Organization Service of "Orel-Avia"
airline, res. Orel.

is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

material. Copyi and di inati

12 DUMA ELECTION ISSUES

2. Zhogov, Valeriy Leonidovich, b. 20 November
1965, deputy editor-in-chief of PRAVDA ZHIRI-
NOVSKOGO, res. Moscow.

Tambov Oblast

1. Krivelskaya, Nina Viktorovna, b. 10 October 1948,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Karev, Aleksey Gennadyevich, b. 9 May 1961,
department head at "Kont" firm, res. Dedovsk, Moscow
Oblast.

3. Grebenshchikov, Yuriy Petrovich, b. 30 January
1952, coordinator of Tambov city LDPR organization,
res. Tambov.

Tver Oblast

1. Paviyuk, Nikolay Yakovlevich, b. 10 October 1948,
aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Bolsnal:ov, Vadim Ivanovich, b. 17 July 1930, State
Duma deputy oi RF Federal Assembly, res. Moscow.

3. Rozov, Viktor Ivanovich, b. 20 March 1947, coor-
dinator of oblast LDPR organization, res. Rzhev, Tver
Oblast.

Tomsk Oblast

1. Aleksandrov, Valeriy Anatolyevich, b. 28 Decem-
ber 1964, coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res.
Seversk, Tomsk Oblast.

2. Shibayeva, Mariya Olegovna, b. 11 November
1963, head of division of Tomsk Municipal Property
Committee, res. Tomsk.

Tula Oblast

1. Filatov, Aleksandr Valentinovich, b. 16 July 1967,
State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Shemyakin, Aleksandr Vasilyevich, b. 14 January
1943, department head in LDPR headquarters, res.
Moscow.

3. Kovalev, Viadimir Anatolyevich, b. 25 August
1959, coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res.
Tula.

Tyumen Oblast

1. Vasilishin, Aleksey Viktorovich, b. 11 January
1945, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Tobolsk, Tyumen Oblast.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

2. Zhuravkov, Petr Valentinovich, b. 3 November
1953, general director of “Sintra” joint-stock company,

res. Tyumen.

3. Ilin, Andrey Aleksandrovich, b. 23 February 1960,
coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res. Tyumen.

4. Timofeyev, Valentin Borisovich, b. 31 January
1956, general director of Tyumen municipal “Neftepro-
dukt" enterprise, res. Tyumen.

Ulyanovsk Oblast

1. Balberov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, b. 28 August
1962, aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assem-
bly, res. Ulyanovsk.

2. Petrov, Valeriy Valentinovich, b. 13 August 1961,
general director of “Energoblok" joint-stock company,
res. Odintsovo, Moscow Oblast.

3. Kishkinev, Aleksandr Fedorovich, b. 4 August
1954, general director of “Volga” joint-stock company,
res. Ulyanovsk.

Chelyabinsk Oblast

1. Travkin, Maksim Lvovich, b. 23 February 1969,
aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly,
res. Moscow.

2. Yalovenko, Aleksey Fedorovich, b. 23 January
1951, coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res.
Chelyabinsk.

3. Kotelnikov, Mikhail Sergeyevich, b. 9 April
1946, chief designer at "Signal" state enterprise, res.
Chelyabinsk.

4. Tuyev, Anatoliy Ivanovich, b. 20 August 1949, “At-
lant" check investment fund adviser, res. Chelyabinsk.

Chita Oblast

1. Bogatov, Vladimir Vladimirovich, b. 18 December
1960, coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res.
Chita.

2. Chesnykh, Ivan Alekseyevich, b. 16 February 1938,
chairman of "Zabaykalskiy Khleb" joint-stock company,
res. Chita.

Yaroslavl Oblast

1. Zvyagin, Aleksey Alekseyevich, b. 19 October
1936, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

2. Fedorov, Gennadiy Andreyevich, b. 31 August
1950, coordinator of oblast LDPR organization, res.
Yaroslavl.

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FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

3. Nasonov, Vladimir Yuryevich, b. 6 December 1956,
aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

City of Moscow

1. Zhukovskiy, Aleksandr Ivanovich, b. 13 October
1949, chairman of the board of Voyenkombank, res.
Moscow.

2. Dunets, Mikhail Ivanovich, b. 11 March 1950,
deputy chairman of LDPR, res. Moscow.

3. Lebedeva, Galina Aleksandrovna, b. 23 July 1947,
senior scientific associate at Virology Institute of RF
Academy of Medical Sciences, res. Moscow.

4. Zhebrovskaya, Natalya Anatolyevna, b. 11
April 1954, executive secretary of PRAVDA ZHIRI-
NOVSKOGO, res. Moscow.

5. Groza, Aleksey Vladimirovich, b. 19 May 1951,
vice president of "Yevroazbiznesbank,” res. Moscow.

6. Shishelin, Vyacheslav Nikolayevich, b. 31 August
1948, aide to State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assem-
bly, res. Moscow.

7. Spirin, Yuriy Leonidovich, b. 21 March 1938,

State Duma sector head of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

8. Aleksandrov, Vladimir Viktorovich, b. 7 May
1928, lead scientific associate at Institute of Scientific
Information on Social Sciences of Russian Academy of
Sciences, res. Moscow.

9. Strygin, Andrey Vadimovich, b. 19 July 1952,
assistant professor at State Management Academy, res.
Moscow.

10. Lukava, Georgiy Grigoryevich, b. 22 August
1925, State Duma deputy of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

11. Kozlov, Andrey Anatolyevich, b. 13 October
1947, coordinator of regional LDPR organization, res.
Moscow.

12. Karpukhin, Igor Aleksandrovich, b. 13 November
1960, deputy department head in LDPR headquarters,
res. Moscow.

City of St. Petersburg

1. Kiselev, Viadimir Anatolyevich, b. 20 January 1940,
serviceman, res. Sosnovyy Bor, Leningrad Oblast.

2. Kuznetsov, Sergey Viktorovich, b. 2 May 1968,
driver for municipal first-aid station, res. St. Petersburg.

DUMA ELECTION ISSUES 13

3. Shevchenko, Vyacheslav Alekseyevich, b. 9 June
1953, general director of “Rosvuzdizayn" scientific
research enterprise, res. St. Petersburg.

4. Sadchikov, Kirill Ivanovich, b. 12 June 1967,
chairman of "Pravda" trade union in St. Petersburg, res.
St. Petersburg.

Jewish Autonomous Oblast

1. Batogov, Aleksey Maratovich, b. 7 June 1946, State
Duma adviser of RF Federal Assembly, res. Moscow.

2. Kazko, Vasiliy Ivanovich, b. 12 August 1950, deputy
head of cultural office of Jewish Autonomous Oblast
Administration, res. Birobijan.

Aga-Buryat Autonomous Okrug

1. Tsybendarzhiyev, Bator Shirapovich, b. 26 April
1958, chairman of Duldurginskiy Rayon Consumers
Society, res. Uzon, Duldurginskiy Rayon, Chita Oblast.

Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug

1. Popov, Aleksandr Yuryevich, b. 23 August 1956,
production chief at Perm State Medical Academy, res.
Perm.

Koryak Autonomous Okrug

1. Bachish, Anatoliy Vladimirovich, b. 25 January
1959, deputy coordinator of oblast LDPR organization,
res. Petropaviovsk-Kamchatskiy.

Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug

1. Laskin, Dmitriy Yuryevich, b. 22 March 1963,
helicopter pilot of Naryan-Mar Air Detachment, res.
Naryan-Mar.

Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenetsk) Autonomous Okrug

1. Levenets, Irina Nikolayevna, b. 11 April 1949,
coordinator of Norilsk city LDPR organization, res.
Norilsk, Krasnoyarsk Kray.

Ust-Orda Autonomous Okrug

i. Volgov, Oleg Yevgenyevich, b. 1 October 1964, vice
president of "Sodruzhestvo" industrial-trade firm, res.
Moscow.

Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug

1. Sigarev, Sergey Fedorovich, b. 16 July 1959,
president of “Rossiyanin" international humanitarian
fund of law enforcement agencies, res. Moscow.

2. Starikov, Vladimir Vasilyevich, b. 6 January
1943, director of "Starikov and Co." firm, res. Khanty-
Mansiysk.

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14 DUMA ELECTION ISSUES

Chukotsk Autonomous Okrug

1. Filatov, Viktor Ivanovich, b. 25 September 1935,
State Duma consultant of RF Federal Assembly, res.
Moscow.

Evenki Autonomous Okrug

1. Nikiforov, Andrey Olegovich, b. 13 August 1962,

department head in LDPR headquarters, res. Krasno-
yarsk.

Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug

1. Ponomarenko, Viktor Nikolayevich, b. 5 April
1949, coordinator of okrug LDPR organization, res.
Novyy Urengoy, Yamalia.

[Signed] A.D. Vengerovskiy, Congress Chairman
L.A. Karpukhin, Congress Secretary

Election Guidelines

CEC Approves Additions to Edict on Electoral
Blocs

964FO0SIA Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Sep 95 p4

[Additions to the "Explanations to Procedures for Form-
ing Electoral Blocs, Their Registration by the Central
Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation, and
the Nomination of Candidates for Deputy by an Elec-
toral Bloc")

(FBIS Translated Text] The Central Electoral Commis-
sion [CEC] of the Russian Federation [RF] in Decree
No. 17/146-II, dated 18 September 1995, approved ad-
ditions to the "Explanations on Procedures on Forming
Electoral Blocs, Their Registration by the RF CEC, and
the Nomination of Candidates for Deputy by an Elec-
toral Bloc,” approved by RF CEC Decree No. 8/50-II
dated 28th July 1995.

An electoral bloc’s registration by the RF CEC does not
preclude the possibility of it subsequently changing its
composition in the future, by reason of more associa-
tions joining the electoral bloc or by reason of one or
several other associations dropping out of it.

The RF CEC will revoke the decision on an electoral
bloc’s registration if, after the electoral bloc’s registra-
tion is carried out but before certified copies of can-
didate lists are issued to the electoral bloc’s autho-
rized representative, the following are submitted to the
commission: when joining a bloc—relevant decisions
of congresses (conferences) of public associations and
a joint decision of all public associations to create an
electoral bloc in a new composition, and when leaving

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

a bloc—televant decisions of congresses (conferences)
or their authorized leadership bodies.

Public associations, both those that set up a bloc in the
new composition and those that decide to remain in the
bloc after one or several public associations leave it,
have the right to submit to the RF CEC in keeping with
established procedures the documents necessary for the
electoral bloc’s registration, enumerated in part four of
Article 33 of the federal law “On elections of deputies to
the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian
Federation.”

At the same time, with respect to public associations that
were previously part of an electoral bloc and confirm the
decision to remain in the bloc in its new composition,
they may submit protocols of congresses (conferences)
with the decision to join the electoral bloc that was
submitted to the RF CEC in order to register the bloc
that was subsequently revoked.

A joint decision of public associations on creating an
electoral bloc in a new composition (retaining the bloc
after one or more public associations drop out) must
be signed by authorized representatives of only those
public associations that remain in it.

RF CEC decisions on revoking an electoral bloc’s
registration and on registering an electoral bloc in a new
composition may be made at the same meeting of the
commission.

An electoral bloc’s composition may be changed even
after its authorized representative receives certified
copies of lists of candidates nominated by the electoral
bloc. In this case, the electoral bloc’s registration is
done in keeping with the requirements and procedures
envisaged for an electoral bloc’s registration during
the period before its authorized representative is issued
certified copies of lists of candidates. f

Changing an electoral bloc’s composition by reason of
additional public associations joining it voids the legal
validity of voters’ signatures in support of the federal list
of candidates and candidates nominated by this electoral
bloc in single-seat districts collected before the RF CEC
issues a decision on registering the electoral bloc in a
new composition.

However, voters’ signatures collected by an electoral
bloc whose change in composition and registration in
a new composition were caused by public associations
dropping out of it do not lose their legal validity.

Over the period after the registration by the RF CEC of
the list of candidates nominated by the electoral bloc,
its registration in a new composition is only possible
by reason of public associations dropping out of the

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

electoral bloc, but no later than five days before the
elections.

Forecasts & Commentary

Shumeyko Interviewed on Elections, Local Politics,
Budget

MMI1210085595 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA

in Russian 10 Oct 95 pp 1, 3

{Interview with Russian Federation Council Chairman
Vladimir Shumeyko “prepared by" Mikhail Gurevich
and conducted at ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA editorial
office on 2 October: “Three Pillars of Strong Gov-
ernment: Center, Regions, Party" — first paragraph is
ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA introduction]

(FBIS Translated Text] Sessions of the Russian Feder-
ation Federation Council resumed 3 October after the
summer recess. But the vacation ended earlier than that
for Federation Council Chairman Vladimir Shumeyko.
The previous day he came to the ROSSIYSKAYA
GAZETA editorial office. The top senator’s conversa-
tion with journalists was very meaty. Judge for your-
selves.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] What is your view of the
current “upsurge” in press interest in you?

[Shumeyko] It is an entirely justified “upsurge.” After
all, the election campaign is under way. Unfortunately,
in our country it is proceeding according to the princi-
ple: “The further into the forest you go, the muddier it
gets." Our unforgettable Ruslan Imranovich [Khasbula-
tov] put it like this: “Politics is a dirty business." Admit-
tedly, he himself made considerable efforts to vindicate
this thesis.

Although I am not taking a direct part in the election
campaign and am a member of no bloc, my role as
chairman of the Federation Council, with a strong
influence on what is happening with the Duma elections,
is very clear. When all these polls assessing influence
are published, I always ask just one question: “What I
would like to know is: Where, when, on whom, and on
what decisions does this politician exert influence?” I am
perfectly aware of where and on whom I exert influence.
And the publishers of the polls also know this. So it is
all quite natural at this stage of the elections.

Without Middlemen

{[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] It is well known that
you do nothing simply for its own sake. You recently
went to Yekaterinburg for the founding congress of the
“Transformation of the “atherland” bloc. And the press
again began to speculate: The Kremlin is trying to turn

DUMA ELECTION ISSUES 15

the party of regional leaders into a counterweight to the
“Russia Is Our Home" movement.

([Shumeyko] I would answer this question in broader
terms. Let us analyze what is happening today with
the Duma elections from the viewpoint of ordinary
statistics and formal logic. Sixty electoral associations
have already been registered. Experts from the Central
Electoral Commission say that there will be around
70 or even more. When it comes to the federal lists,
there are now 40 contenders per seat, and there are 20
contenders per seat in the single-seat districts. This is
quite unprecedented!

The deadline for collecting signatures is 22 October, and
I hope that fewer contenders will be left and that not
everyone will surmount the first barrier — collecting
5,000 signatures for themselves personally and 200,000
per association. But a simple calculation already shows
that the single-seat districts — these are the only ones
that interest me at present — will have between seven
and 12 people per seat. That is also a great many.

Let us divide all the contenders into three groups. The
first group is those who are connected with major blocs
and associations — "Russia Is Our Home," "Democratic
Choice," the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian
Federation], the Agrarians — and with those who are
currently in the Duma. The second is those who are
supported by the local authorities. And the third is those
who are supported by commercial organizations, and
experts testify that up to 10 percent of them will be
directly connected with criminal formations.

When we discussed the law on elections to the State
Duma in the Federation Council we bluntly said: It
would be best for all the deputies to be elected according
to the first-past-the-post system. We don’t want party
lists, we want people elected directly in the district
because of their personal qualities.

I read a comment in one newspaper: "All the deputies
from the regions will come along and defend only
regional interests."

But what interests does Russia have besides regional
interests?

There are no purely party interests — these are in fact
group interests. A specific group rather than the whole of
society is behind even the biggest association — “Russia
Is Our Home." But it should be everybody. Because
the most important thing for the state today is for it
to develop the way it is developing — federally. So
far as I am concerned democracy is inseparable from
federalism.

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

16 DUMA ELECTION ISSUES

I am most interested in the second group in my
classification. So far as I am concerned this is one of
the main criteria — whether a deputy is supported by
the local authorities. This usually coincides with the
opinion of people themselves. I agree that in Russia
it is bad to belong to the authorities at all. But if you
compare the local authorities and the central authorities
— for people who live in the regions — statistics show
that the local authorities are trusted 27 percent more.
And people know that these are their own authorities,
they defend them. Whereas the central authorities, by
contrast, are "alien" and are responsible for everything
bad. Such is the mentality.

[Sverdlovsk Governor] Rossel’s “Transformation of
the Fatherland" movement is not the most powerful
movement, and I said as much at their congress. But
its value is that it was not formed to suit a central
leader. Suppose Shumeyko decided to create his own
movement — there is no question, it would spring
up overnight. And it would be of no value. But this
movement emerged from below — it developed from
"Transformation of the Urals" into “Transformation of
the Fatherland." They have different tasks and different
aims. And the Federation Council must support regional
deputies without middlemen in the shape of a Moscow
party-political coterie. Any middlemen only worsen the
process and, as is well known, make it more expensive.

But participation in congresses and visits are just the
first stage. There will also be a second stage — when
all the signatures have been collected and it is clear who
is left. I have quite a lot of ideas about how to give them
real, all-around support. The more regional deputies
there are in the Duma, the better. But there are no
particularly cheerful prospects, the Duma will probably
be a patchwork and nobody will have a majority. Hence
a different issue arises. The Federation Council must
be formed from heads of administrations and heads of
legislative assemblies from the regions and nobody else.
I am sticking to my view. Otherwise in addition to the
unpredictable Duma that may result we may have a
similar Federation Council — and then, as the joke says,
we can melt Hershey bars [allusion unknown]. I don’t
want to do that.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Have you had offers to
join a bloc? Or to create your own?

[Shumeyko] There have actually been misunderstand-
ings: We are all members of something, but you are not
a member of anything? But now everybody has calmed
down, everybody realizes that the chairman of the Fed-
eration Council cannot espouse any other position. They
say to me: “You are cutting off the branch you are sitting
on. The elections would be more to your advantage." All

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

right, I am sawing away. But that is totally beside the
point. The point is the development of the state as such.
I have spent five years in the very thick of this. I know
everybody. I know who has done what, how, and for
what purpose. And this gives me the right to behave in
the way I am behaving. Freely and independently. You
asked about the reason for these "surges" in the press.
They really hate it when someone has their own opin-
ion. You simply have to be a member of some bloc. In
all these five years I have not been a member of any
bloc and I have not joined any coterie. And in general
I have never listened to anyone. It is easier to bury me
than change me.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] What do you mean, you
have never listened to anyone? What about the presi-
dent?

[Shumeyko] The president is a different matter. The
president is the head of state. Whether it’s Yeltsin,
Ivanov, or Petrov, Shumeyko will always work for the
head of state. To build democracy today is to strengthen
power. Anarchy cannot be permitted.

Just look at events: As soon as the situation changes,
half the people who shouted that they were in favor of
the president are no longer in favor of the president. As
for Shumeyko, he has never shouted anywhere, from
any rooftop, that he is in favor of Yeltsin, has never
taken him anywhere or done anything for him. He has
worked for the authorities, is working for them, and will
continue to work for them.

My whole life — from lathe operator to director — took
place in a large enterprise, and I always knew: “If there
is no authority, nothing will work out." But things were
simpler at the plant, of course. If anyone had tried not to
fulfill my instructions, he would simply have been gone
the next day. But so far as the president is concerned,
just look what is happening. Loads of edicts are not
being fulfilled at all, and there are officials who say:
"So what if the president has signed an edict. I know
better." It is not a lack of respect, it is just that the
very authority is lacking. But democracy is a form of
authority. And authority must be strong no matter what
it is called: monarchy or democracy.

At first people in our country took for democracy ab-
solutely anything you like except democracy. Freedom
of speech, action, and assembly are all indicators of
a developed society, but not of authority. Authority is
something else.

Beloved Country

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] I would like to ask you
as an advocate of strong authority a regional question.

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Three equal Federation components have emerged on
the territory of Tyumen Oblast — the oblast itself, and
the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous
Okrugs. Three vertical power structures.

[Shumeyko] When the constitution was being writ-
ten (and I attended the Constitutional Conference and
headed the group of industrialists and entrepreneurs) we
discussed this question many times. From both the eco-
nomic viewpoint and the state management viewpoint
our Federation is not the best. It is called a symmetri-
cal federation, where all the components are absolutely
equal in status vis-a-vis the center. This is enshrined in
the constitution. This is one of the worst options. It was
necessary in order to preserve Russia’s unity and pre-
vent separatism.

Three components on a single territory is what is
called a “nested component.” There is one lot of land
and mineral resources but four managers: the federal
authorities and three equal components. It is a complex
question. Yes, measures must be taken. We must move
in the direction of amalgamation.

Not all Federation components — I am aware what I
am saying — are today actually Federation components.
Some arose artificially — precisely in order to ensure
symmetry, equal rights, and the country’s unity. Now
there must certainly be a process of transformation.

The constitution contains an excellent mechanism: Any
Federation component can delegate powers to the cen-
ter, the center can delegate powers to a component, and
the same thing can also take place between components.
By gradually delegating powers on the basis of a treaty
process Tyumen Oblast can be transformed — not to-
day, nor maybe even tomorrow — into a single compo-
nent. The most important point is that an economic in-
frastructure is required for this. It is impossible to deal
with politics in isolation from economics, Lenin was
absolutely right about that: Politics is the concentrated
expression of economics.

I am a candidate of technical sciences, but I took up my
pen, and my book "Russian Reforms and Federalism.
Socioeconomic Essays” will come out shortly. I spent
two years putting it together. In it I attempt to examine
problems of federalism not from the ethnic or state
viewpoint, but solely from the economic viewpoint. To
examine how Moscow exerts influence here, and what
are the bad results and the good results of the reforms
devised in the center and carried out at local level.
Sometimes totally without consideration of the regional
element. The 89 regions are totally different in terms
of all conditions and parameters. In my view, there is a
lack of theory. There is simply none. Whereas there was
theory when we were building communism before, there

DUMA ELECTION ISSUES 17

were hundreds of thousands of lecturers on Marxism-
Leninism alone in the country.

([ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] In any state power begins
in villages, settlements, and districts — both power and
the whole of life. In your view, do the new authorities
now exist at this level? Do the people who are in daily
contact with them accept them?

{[Shumeyko] In general terms what are the authorities?
They can give something or take something. When the
authorities give something or allocate it, they are viewed
as the authorities. If we compare things with the past
— where did the people used to live? We all used to
live in sectors of industry. What ministry had what —
that is what determined our lives. And the system of
soviets permeated the entire country. It distributed what
was given.

Today we have local self-government. According to
the constitution, it is separated from the state. Does it
constitute the authorities today? Not at present. They
cannot be the authorities since they have nothing. There
is no power without money.

Why, when examining the draft budget for 1996, do
the Duma and our committees today intend to reject
it? Because it does not enshrine the law on local self-
government. It is paradoxical: The law on local self-
government has been adopted, it provides a great deal
of scope, but unless the budget immediately defines
guidelines for people at local level, all this power will
be left hanging in the air, it will not be power.

Why are the local authorities more trusted? Because,
since they have the local budget, they do more to solve
people’s problems. Masses of material laws are adopted
at federal level which say: "Via local resources.” Teach-
ers, doctors, pensioners, and veterans are perfectly well
aware: The people at the top will not hand out money.
But the local authorities look for it — by increasing
taxes and by other means — and hand it out. That is
why they are the authorities today and they are trusted.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] What view do the local
authorities take of the changes occurring in the state?

{Shumeyko] Would they choose the present political
and economic system? They would. I have not seen
anybody today who wants to return to a different form
of government. But we must clearly make up our minds
here.

We used to have centralized power and its mode of
existence — the planned command economy. We chose
the power called democratic, which has only one mode
of existence — the market, open economy. If you want

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18 DUMA ELECTION ISSUES

to build democracy, you have to want to build the
market. Love me, love my child.

But how is the market to be built? Here too we “run up
against" the local authorities. They are more pragmatic
people.

They too want to build democracy, but national interests
cannot be forgotten. The aggregate of all the regions’
interests constitutes national interests.

From this viewpoint, excuse me, but I could not give
a damn whether our market is theoretically pure or not
and what kind of stabilization there is going to be there
— mild or firm. The most important thing is for this to
correspond to the development that is under way in the
State.

Deputy From the Baltic

Why do many people fail to understand Moscow’s
ideas: This is the only thing for us to do, not anything
else? Anatoliy Borisovich Chubays — I like and respect
him, he is one of the few intelligent people there are,
so to speak — declares from the platform that packages
of shares in 29 enterprises are going on sale. These
enterprises are in 13 regions. There has been preliminary
discussion with just one head of administration. The rest
learn of this from the newspapers and object. Do you
want this kind of politics to go ahead? And everybody
simply to salute?

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] You are the Federation
Council deputy from Kaliningrad Oblast. What are
things there like at the moment? The oblast has a unique,
very advantageous position, but, since the law "On the
Kaliningrad Oblast Special Economic Zone" has passed
only its first reading, inefficient use is being made of
it as yet and a lot of money that could be Russia’s is
going to Lithuania, for instance.

[Shumeyko] The Duma is still holding hearings about
this matter. Two stumbling blocks remain: flank arma-
ments and what our Foreign Ministry has in treaties
with Germany. Duma deputies are very seriously inter-
ested in these two questions. A myth has emerged: The
oblast’s economy cannot be developed so long as there
are armed forces there. It is impossible, it is argued, to
develop a free zone in a militarized zone. This myth
must be debunked. At these hearings it should calmly
be proved, with pencil and paper, that the presence of
such a small number of troops on the oblast’s territory
is no hindrance to having a free zone. This law in no
way specifies what kind of free zone is wanted: a free
customs and banking zone or a free production zone? It
ought to be comprehensive, because Kaliningrad Oblast
is located separately from Russia.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

They say: What is the point in making a law for
Kaliningrad Oblast? Then the others will want one too.
But the others will not want one, because of where the
oblast is — you have to go 300 km across Lithuania
to get there. Nobody else is in this position. I think the
law will eventually emerge. And until it does, you are
absolutely right: We are losing out on a colossal scale.
We could have organized a very great many normal
links via this gateway right in the center of Europe.
Russia’s only remaining ice-frec port is on the Baltic —
we must make intensive use of it. We will find ourselves
in tough competition with Klajpeda and other ports in
all the Baltic countries. There is a need for the law.

{[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] You are chairman of the
Federation Council and chairman of the CIS Interpar-
liamentary Assembly. What is your biggest headache at
present in each capacity?

[Shumeyko] In the Federation Council, the biggest
headache is the 1996 budget. It encapsulates all the
problems, all the contradictions.

In the Interparliamentary Assembly the headaches are
not so bad, but they do exist. I would like all the CIS
States to be represented in it. Thank God, there has
been a shift in Ukraine. Moroz is an ardent advocate of
Ukraine joining the Interparliamentary Assembly. So far
Uzbekistan has not joined. If everyone was represented
in the Interparliamentary Assembly, things would be
rather simpler, of course.

We are now trying to adopt model laws. While Russia
has adopted only the first part of the Civil Code, the
Interparliamentary Assembly has adopted both the first
and second parts. Ratification of the second part is
already under way in many countries. It appears that we
are drawing closer together not at the political level, but
at the economic and legislative levels. We are drawing
closer quietly, without noise and dust, so to speak. But
everyone realizes that the closer economic integration
is, the sooner political integration will begin.

Eminences Arise in a Gray Economy

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] The other branches of
power have now been joined by a "fifth" branch: the
criminal one.

[Shumeyko] I have already mentioned the 10 percent
of candidates from criminal structures. But I would be
very careful about the word “crime.” What does it mean?
There is utterly black crime that can only be combated:
weapons, drugs, murder. This has no right to exist in any
society. There is also another type — crime in relation to
the state’s legislative infrastructure. For instance, there
is no border between Russia and Azerbaijan. There is

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

DUMA ELECTION ISSUES 19

the Republic of Dagestan between us. It is a Russian
but next door, across a small river, is not

{[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] There is also the follow-
ing point. Previously, it was said, if you worked for
three years as a [plant) director they would be able to
throw you in jail: You would be bound to have com-
mitted some kind of offense.

(Shumeyko] Yes, because everything was prohibited
and it was altogether impossible to work if you complied
with everything. So we have to investigate what crime
means. If, heaven forbid, people connected with "black"
crime become deputies, they must immediately be swept
aside. You cannot devise any solution except destruction
here. But “economic” crime is known as the "gray
economy” in the West. And Western theoreticians tell
us: "What do you think you are up to? This is bound
to happen during the transition to the market, you have
to turn a blind eye to the ‘gray’ economy, it creates
the economic infrastructure of the state." You explain
to them that our morality and our entire history make
it impossible to turn a blind eye. They cannot believe
it. But this negative attitude is actually genetically built
into us.

I also “come under fire" for this — the fact that I have
never taken a kopek — in all the newspapers. The
fact that I have not taken anything really bugs some
people.... So they have to write that I have been on the
take. They wrote that in Kaliningrad I have a dacha in
Kurshskaya Kosa. You would have to be a real idiot to
build a dacha in a prohibited zone.

A representative of crime — absolutely any sort —
becoming a legislator is crazy. You cannot divide crime
into black, gray, and white here. Both society and you,
the press, must keep an eye on who is seeking to become
a deputy.

Lofty Indeed

{[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Does the counterweight
in the form of strong regional power strengthen central
power?

{[Shumeyko] Of course it does. Power is a system. The
system must be totally balanced. It is not for nothing

that the three branches of power (admittedly they do
not now carry equal weight) are separated according to
the law. What is regional power in today’s democratic
and federal Russia? If the Federation Counci. consists
of the heads of executive and legislative power from
the regions it is a proper counterweight to the president
and the government. Not counteraction, but a balance of
power. The system of power becomes more effective.
You can go to the Federation Council and immediately
learn the reaction of the whole of Russia, as represented
by persons in authority.

I have already mentioned my book. It is a critical book.
I do not name any names, but I name phenomena: what
we wanted and what we have got. But I am entitled to
do this, for five years I myself have been involved in
this together with everyone. I am not interested in the
reaction to the criticism — it will be very harsh. But if
you are to remain a honest man, you have to act this
way. I cannot do otherwise.

([ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Another book came out
recently — by your colleague Oleg Poptsov, called
"Chronicles of the Time of ‘Czar Boris.’" It says the
following about you: “He took too literally Yeltsin's
remark about his presumed successor: “The president of
Russia must stand tall and eminent.’" What would be
your comment on this passage?

{[Shumeyko] I don’t want to insult anybody. It all
depends on who judges height. Maybe I do stand tall so
far as some people are concerned.

That is not the point. Liking yourself is one thing. Stupid
people like themselves. Being self-confident — sure. I
am self-confident, I tell you that quite firmly. I know
my worth. And I am marching through life with utter
confidence. [Shumeyko ends]

In Place of an Afterword

Knowing Vladimir Filippovich as a cheerful and
straightforward person, we asked him finally to tell us
a joke.

{[Shumeyko] Two peasants are walking along and sud-
denly fall into a pit. A deep pit. One says: "What are
we going to do?" The other replies: "I know! You just
sit there quietly.”

Here is another joke. The dragon Gorynych attacked
a village and burned it to the ground The people go
running to Ilya Muromets: “Help us, Ilyusha!" “Is it
a big dragon?” “Huge, it covers half the sky. It’s
black and terrifying and it’s stealing the women!” "I'll
have to have a think, guys." "How long will that take,
Ilyushenka?” "A week." "But in a week it will have
killed us all!”

pee : Shaed material’ Gopvinn and disseminadl
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

20 DUMA ELECTION ISSUES

They go running off to see Dobryna Nikitich. They tell
him the whole story, and he asks: "Have you been to
see Ilya?" "Yes." “What did Ilya say?” “He would have
a think." “How long for?" "A week.” "I’m going to have
a think, too." "For a week?" "For three days." "But that
is too long again!" So they run off to Alesha Popovich:
“Dear Alesha, you are the only protector we have left!"
And they tell him everything. Alesha shouts: “Bring
me my steed! And my armor! Come here, my sword-
bearer!" The peasants fall to their knees: "Alesha! Aren't
you going to have a think?" "What's the point? I’ve got
to run away!"

Duma Chairman Rybkin Says Russia Needs ‘Labor
Party’

MM1110185895 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA

in Russian 12 Oct 95 pp 1-2

{Interview with State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin
by Mikhail Gurevich; place and date not given:
“Bloc Emerges from Blockade" — first paragraph is
ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA introduction}

(FBIS Translated Text] It is wrong for Ivan Rybkin’s
center-left bloc to complain that it is not being paid at-
tention. Virtually every week some observer produces
a gloomy forecast regarding its future. But the rumors
of its death have as always proved exaggerated. State
Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin, the bloc’s leader, answers
your ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent’s ques-
tions.

[Gurevich] Has Rybkin’s bloc proved viable as an
election formation and group of confederates? What will
be the main item on its program?

[Rybkin]} I can now say clearly that the bloc has proved
viable. Its formation was democratic. People came
along, studied the program, the leader's opinion, and
one another’s views. Some left, and that is their right.
But over 50 movements, associations, trade unions, and
associations of various kinds stayed. I can say that the
bloc is working successfully in this difficult election
campaign. And I am convinced that we are just bound
to get through the 5-percent barrier. We have the support
of agrarians, trade unions, entrepreneurs, industrialists,
bankers, and, most importantly, voters.

In our program we have singled out five principles: so-
cial justice, order, citizens’ personal security, construc-
tion, and realism. Our program is different from the
declarations made by other parties, association, blocs,
bloclets, and cells in that for the last few years my col-
leagues and I have been implementing firmly and con-
sistently the ideas that we have conceived. We will cer-
tainly carry out our current plans. The bloc comprises
people who have real action to their credit over many

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

years, people with tremendous experience of governing
regions large and small and collectives — engaged in
production, science, higher education, culture, and state
organs of power. There is a mixture of age groups: the
wisdom and experience of the old; middle-aged people
with a mature approach who still have a good bit of
life left in them; and young, thrusting, energetic peo-
ple. The bloc includes the Russian Youth League —
the largest youth organization. Little attention is now
being devoted to young people; everything has been let
slip. The elderly and middle-aged are indebted to young
people since they have helped us in the past.

[Gurevich] Whom do you see as the bloc’s partner?

{Rybkin} Our partners are people whom we know,
those with whom we cooperate and have long-standing
relations: namely, the Agrarian Party, "Women of
Russia," and many social democratic associations that
are taking part in the elections. God knows what kind
of success they will have, whether they will collect
the required 200,000 signatures. Our bloc has collected
nearly 250,000, and quickly at that.

[Gurevich] There is no authority without a strong party.
Do you not want to set up your own party — not an
electoral bloc, but a party? If you do, what will you call
it? And what are your personal plans?

{Rybkin] I think that there should be a party. Right now
I would be wary of giving it a name in order to prevent
the name turning up later somewhere else. Although
Yuriy Vladimirovich Petrov, my colleague in the bloc,
and I have been discussing this since 1991. There are
like-minded people and painstaking, unhurried work is
under way. A labor party is needed to represent the
working man and defend his rights.

I am standing in a single-seat district — I was nominated
by my fellow inhabitants of Voronezh, who have known
me since I was a babe in arms. In all 9,000 signatures
were collected in three days — how can the bloc be
weak? I had 16 rivals. I said to myself: "I must stand
and I must win."

If I see that there are intelligent, practical people who
can go further and have a broader outlook, undoubted
talent, and all the qualities required to be chairman of
the Duma, I will definitely give up my post; but if I do
not, you understand what I am driving at.

[Gurevich] The last session of Russia’s Fifth State
Duma is under way. What issues and draft laws will
you be putting first?

[Rybkin} Priority is being given to all the social laws.
Needless to say, we will try to ratify the draft 1996

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FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

budget. We must not leave it until next year, for the
next Duma.

[Gurevich] A few days ago a session of the Russian Fed-
eration Presidential Council for Local Self-Government
was held. You and the prime minister, who is also the
leader of an electoral association — “Russia Is Our
Home” — cochair the council. Do you see local self-
government as the basis of a revived authority today?

[Rybkin} This is a key question for the country now.
There will not be a strong center or a strong unified
Russia without strong, autonomous regions. Everything
cannot be seen from Moscow, and the regions need to
be given the maximum autonomy. At the same time the
federal center must be concerned with pursuing a unified
policy for the whole state. The Federation Council must
be formed immediately 13 December and comprise the
regional elite: the heads of legislative assemblies and
local administrations. It must coordinate interests and
decide which powers of authority should be given to
the center and which should be left at local level. Then
every local administrator must realize that he cannot see
everything from his capital either — whether it be the
capital of a republic, a kray, or an oblast center. That is
when local self-government structures start to emerge.

It is my profound conviction that some local self-
government should have state support — both in the
federal budget and in the regional budget. The rest will
come from the local self-government unit itself and self-
funding.

The council session discussed at length how to make
self- t better and more effective. People’s
creativity must not be curbed in all its endeavors;
initiative must be unleashed. It is necessary for people
to co and accept the ideas of reform and the
ideas of local self-government.

Needless to say, it is not all that easy. But Tyutchev
said that Russia has one ally, namely history. And for
centuries history has resolved all the ordeals that have
beset Russia in its favor. That will happen this time too.

Skokov Interviewed on KRO, Lebed, Yeltsin

MK1010064795 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No. 67, 1-8 Oct 95 p 8

{Interview with Yuriy Skokov by Aleksandr Zhilin and
Sergey Yastrebov: "I Have Never Enjoyed the Support
of Influential Patrons")}

(FBIS Translated Text] There have been many rumors
about Yuriy Skokov, leader of the Congress of Russian
Communities [KRO], making a comeback soon to a
position of power as prime minister. MOSKOVSKIYE

DUMA ELECTION ISSUES 21

NOVOSTI [MN] correspondents asked the KRO leader
himself for comments on these rumors.

[Skokov] All these rumors are absolutely groundless.
I did not meet with the president, and we had no
discussions whatsoever on my appointment as prime
minister despite what is being said today on television
and written in the papers. In a word, as far as I
am concerned, no change of position is in the offing.
Whether the president will continue to work with
Chernomyrdin or whether he appoints someone else
is the president’s constitutional right. What I cannot
understand is why my name should have been bandied
about of late absolutely without any grounds. Yes,
there are indeed serious differences between myself
and Chernomyrdin; and yes, I indeed disagree with the
current government's policies, which I openly declare.

[MN] That is to say, you do not intend to link your
political future with the present authorities. If the KRO
wins the elections, in what role do you see yourself?

[Skokov] Today I am working so as to conduct the
election campaign in an organized and sensible manner
and to secure the greatest possible number of votes and
seats in parliament. After the Duma elections it will
be possible to speak of the KRO’s political prospects
and its leaders, while now it is not serious to let
one’s imagination get carried away on this subject.
Going into the elections, we are putting forward two
fundamental tasks connected with our country’s national
interests. First, we all have to survive under these
difficult conditions. Second, to protect Russia as a single
state. I am not worried what position I will hold after
solving this two-pronged task.

{(MN] Your record of service indicates that you have
never emerged in a top position in big-time politics,
remaining in secondary roles. You invited Aleksandr
Lebed into the KRO. Does this mean you are prepared
to once again retire into the background?

[Skokov] The notion of “first-second" in politics is
conventional. If a team is playing on the political field,
the important thing is to benefit from the strong points
of each player. I worked in Boris Yeltsin’s team and
saw the way the people idolized him at that time, and
my task consisted of helping the president, and I was
not worried about being first or second.

My relationship with Aleksandr Lebed is somewhat
different. We are partners who are working together to
create a team capable of solving the tasks I spoke of
earlier. If we manage it, this will be our shared victory,
and it is absolutely unimportant who of us is first and
who is second. We have no differences in this respect.
I value Aleksandr Ivanovich for his decency, natural

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2 DUMA ELECTION ISSUES

intelligence, ability to take responsibility, and his ability
to learn on the hoof, as they say. I think he has very good
political prospects. True enough, some people always
want to cause a quarrel between us, but they will not
succeed and, I think, they will not succeed also thanks
to Aleksandr Ivanovich’s being levelheaded.

[MN] Do you think there are influential people who
are deliberately nurturing the KRO to create a counter-
weight to Viktor Chernomyrdin’s bloc?

[Skokov] I wish someone knew how much effort it cost
me to create the KRO! I have never enjoyed the support
of influential patrons, perhaps because I have always
been inconvenient for bosses. But then I have never
become dependent, and today I know I am absolutely
free in my actions.

[MN] Nevertheless, you have friends in the Kremlin....

[Skokov] Yes, for example, I have friendly relations
with the president’s first aide Ilyushin; I have good con-
tacts with other members of the presidential team. But
no more than that. All reports about the present author-
ities supporting the KRO are outright insinuations.
[MN] What is the KRO’s financial basis?

[Skokov] In addition to the funds appropriated for the
elections under the law, we count on support from

those who share our program objectives. An appeal
has been drawn up to many juridical organizations and

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

structures asking them for help. I would like to note that
such support is being felt. For example, we gathered
Signatures at no cost at all in record time.

[MN] The KRO is counting on what is usually called
the national-patriotic idea. However, after your visit
to the United States, radical patriots came to suspect
you of connections with "world Zionism" and American
capital. Are the “colleagues’" suspicions disconcerting
for you?

[Skokov] I went to the United States to uphold my own
country’s interests. I said there that it is impossible not
to reckon with Russia in solving important international
problems. A direct military-political standoff between
our countries will not lead to anything good. It is indeed
unknown who would lose more in that, Russia or the
United States. But generally, I am not interested in the
views of people who confuse patriotism with idiocy.

[MN] Your attitude to the president?

{Skokov] Boris Yeltsin is the people’s choice. There-
fore, all of us are responsible for what is happening
in the country. The president is our country’s symbol,
and I do not share the hysterical wails to the effect that
a trial should be instituted against him. Whether the
choice turned out good or bad is the problem of those
who voted. One should think before casting a ballot, not

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FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Need for CIS Security System Viewed

MMI1110150395 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Oct 95 p 3

[Article by Colonel Nikolay Khomchenko and Major
Igor Bizyuk of the Russian Federation Armed Forces
General Staff: “All Is Not Yet Lost; Polemical Notes
on Some Aspects of Military Cooperation Within the
CIS Framework"]

{[FBIS Translated Text] The further the time of the
CIS’ disappearance from the world map recedes from
us the more clearly there emerges in the consciousness
of people living in the post-Soviet space the thought
that we have all lost out. After all, it is no secret that
the former union republics are experiencing increasing
difficulties both in establishing their statehood and
in developing political, economic, military, and other
relations within the CIS. Considering the specific nature
of the newspaper, let us dwell in more detail on the
military aspect of these relations.

Questions of military-political cooperation within the
CIS framework, as we know, have been reflected in
the collective security concept approved in February
1995. But today that is no longer enough because
alongside the integration processes in Europe there
is also an intensification of the military threat there.
It is not out of the question that we could become
witnesses to the emergence of a new world order
(the expansion of NATO's borders to the East) which
will be more dangerous than the one which existed
previously. Is it not time under these conditions to
move from slogans and promises to each other to real
deeds — to the creation of an effective mechanism for
collaboration between states which actually complies
with the collective security treaty? Historical experience
shows us that however powerful a state may be it
cannot safeguard its security alone — for that it must
have strategic allies. Is this problem resolved by the
existing “Partnership for Peace" program? Hardly, since
it does not offer equal cooperation and consequently
cannot fully safeguard the interests of Russia and the
other CIS countries (and ultimately their security). In
our view the most acceptable thing in this case is to
seek to safeguard our own security in conjunction with
our existing “genetic allies" who are the majority of
republics of the former Soviet Union.

Problems exist here too. But many of them are artificial
and are of a subjective nature, proceeding from specific
forces which in their majority are pursuing populist aims
and also from the imperfect legal norm base. We can
be convinced of this if only from the example of the
operational equipping of the CIS countries’ territory. It
seems to us that it is here that all the prerequisites ex-

INTERREGIONAL AFFAIRS 23

ist for integration. The existing military infrastructure
bequeathed to the countries from the USSR and in its
majority of the same type and locked into a single sys-
tem combined with the Russian infrastructure would in
general terms make it possible to safeguard those coun-
tries’ security. To proceed along the path of accession to
NATO would essentially mean totally restructuring the
existing system of military infrastructure installations
(since such an alliance presupposes the standardization
of weapons, military equipment, and all servicing sys-
tems). And that would mean rejecting the approaches
we have formed toward the development of military-
technical thinking (the so-called military-technical pol-
icy), enormous financial expenses, and the loss of jobs
in the military-industrial complex. Moreover, there are
no guarantees that this alliance would indeed fully safe-
guard our interests.

During the time of the CIS’ existence many of its
members have become convinced of how hard it is to
implement their own independent policy and safeguard
and protect their own interests in the world community
without having an adequately reliable guarantor of their
own security in the shape of the armed forces. In the
absence of a firm economic base and the necessary
experience in building a national army it is hard not only
to create armed forces meeting modern requirements but
also to ensure the maintenance and retention of the little
that is still left since the division of the USSR Armed
Forces (weapons, military infrastructure, and so forth).
Subsequently far larger funds for restoring, for instance,
the necessary military infrastructure installations will be
required than now. So their conservation, development,
and improvement are possible only by joint efforts.
Naturally the approach toward this issue should be
mutually advantageous and interdependent for all CIS
countries so that it is possible to safeguard the security
both of all members of this alliance and of each of them.

Here we can cite the experience of constructing, mod-
ernizing, and making joint use of military infrastruc-
ture installations by the states which used to belong to
the Warsaw Pact. In the Warsaw Pact countries, as we
know, this question was closely linked with the USSR
Armed Forces groupings deployed on their territories.
The plan for operational equipping of the territories of
these countries provided for bilateral agreements be-
tween the Warsaw Pact states for the creation of military
infrastructure installations since it was proposed to use
these states’ armed forces in conjunction with the group-
ings of Soviet troops there. On the territories of these
states a well developed network of military infrastruc-
ture installations was created in some places jointly, in
some places only with the Soviet Union's funds, backing
up both the troops’ daily activity and the implementa-

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2 INTERREGIONAL AFFAIRS

tion of operations, including strategic operations, by the
joint groupings. The Warsaw Pact countries’ military in-
frastructure largely accorded with the approaches of the
Soviet Union the only differeuce being that it was pro-
posed to use its installations primarily in the interests of
the groupings of Soviet troops which were located there
and were fulfilling a collective task. The withdrawal of
the Soviet (Russian) troops from East Europe has shown
that at that period the question of financing these mea-
sures was not specified and agreed. As a result of which
we were obliged, when the troops were withdrawn, to
leave behind most of the installations of our own or the
joint infrastructure, receiving nothing in return at home
(apart from some housing for the families of service-
men).

Considering this experience within the framework of
collective security, in our view it is essential to deter-
mine in advance the solution of a number of priority
tasks concerning the operational equipping of the terri-
tory.

First of all in elaborating agreements on the joint use,
development, and improvement of the military infra-
structure the contracting sides must speak "the same
language." That is it is essential to have a document
(memorandum) which would determine common con-
cepts, provisions, and terminology in the field of the
operational equipping of the country’s territory and not
allow them to be interpreted arbitrarily. Thus it is a case
of creating a unified legal norm base for the CIS coun-
tries which would include initially at least a minimum
list of information concerning this issue. The mecha-
nism and procedure for compiling this list could be de-
termined on the basis of the elaboration of unified views
of this issue.

The need also arises to introduce the relevant changes
and additions to legal norm acts of the CIS states al-
ready in operation concerning questions of the mutual
use of military infrastructure establishments and the de-
ployment of armed forces on the territory of other states.
As we know, the constitutions of a number of CIS coun-
tries (Belarus, Moldova) rule out the presence of foreign
states’ armed forces on their territories and the location
of foreign bases and other military infrastructure estab-
lishments. Naturally difficulties could arise when these
states’ legislative organs ratify agreements with other
countries (including Russia) on the creation of a unified
system of military infrastructure installations.

That is a question for the legislative authorities. At the
same time we must realize that a collective security
treaty can hardly be considered effective unless it
provides for the joint use of the military infrastructure.
We must also determine the legal status of military

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

infrastructure installations which could be used in
the interests of collective security: Either they will
be national installations made available for use by
other CIS countries or they will be installations which
are jointly created on the basis of the proportional
participation of each country. And perhaps on the
basis of the most important and complex military
installations (for instance special strategic nuclear forces
installations, ABM, aerospace defense system, and other
installations) situated on the territory of other CIS
countries it would be expedient to create Russian
military bases which would function in the interests
of all CIS countries. In any case the procedure for
creating and using military infrastructure installations
should be determined within the framework of the
collective security treaty (as an appendix to it) or on
the basis of bilateral (multilateral) treaties between the
CIS countries. International experience in the creation
and joint use of military infrastructure installations is
probably also of interest here. For instance, the status
of U.S. bases and installations abroad is regulated
by many bilateral and multilateral agreements and
accords, to wit — treaties on the lease of a territory,
treaties and agreements on mutual security and defense,
agreements on the location of military bases and military
infrastructure installations between a military-political
alliance and its individual members...

In our view multilateral (collective) treaties and agree-
ments on mutual security and defense signed within the
NATO framework merit particular attention. They de-
termine primarily the alliance’s collective tasks: the pro-
cedure for deploying troops on foreign territory, for the
use of bases, military infrastructure installations, sectors
of terrain, and responsibility for ensuring the defense
of a particular NATO zone, and others. For the suc-
cessful implementation of these tasks an agreement is
signed between the countries specifically involved (as
a rule this agreement is between two states at govern-
ment level) which also stipulates the specific details of
their joint activity. As a result the agreements signed by
the countries belonging to the same alliance, bilateral in
form and collective in content, are the implementation
of the bloc’s common plans and tasks. As we can see
the range of cooperation in the mutual use of military
infrastructure installations is very wide. But agreements
in the field of the operational equipping of territory are
not enough on their own. For their practical implemen-
tation, as we can see from the proposed scheme [the
article is printed around a diagram showing the vari-
ous subdivisions of the CIS states’ collective security
council] the relevant structures in the organs of military
management of the states united by the collective se-
curity treaty are required. In our opinion the following
tasks should be assigned to these structures:

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FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

— the leadership of the carving up of the geostrategic
space of the territory of the treaty’s signatory states;

— the preparation of recommendations for the leader-
ship regarding the determination of strategic orienta-
tions;

— the organization of collaboration with general (main)
staffs of the CIS states’ armed forces for the joint use,
construction, and modernization of military infrastruc-
ture installations.

This work should obviously be based on the planning
of measures for the operational equipping of their
territories in national interests and in the interests of
the security of the entire CIS within the framework of
the joint program for the development of the military
infrastructure.

The next, no less important, task is the restoration of
the single strategic space of the CIS states which are
signatories of the collective security treaty. The solu-
tion of this global task is connected primarily with the
conservation and now the restoration of military infra-
structure installations ensuring warning against a mis-
sile attack, the management of strategic and operational
intelligence, and the implementation of space and air
defense.

The first steps in this direction have been taken — doc-
uments have been signed on the creation of a unified air
defense system (including the infrastructure) for the CIS
countries. It has turned out that many states cannot inde-
pendently cover the air space above their territory (vast
regions have been outside radar observation and con-
trol). Approximately the same situation is taking place
in the system of communications, hydronavigation, and
the transport complex, which also requires the creation
of similar systems within the CIS framework.

There is another path — the creation of duplicate mil-
itary infrastructure installations on their own territories
to replace those left on the territories of other CIS coun-
tries. But right now that is a difficult task to perform.

And one last point. We cannot view the collective
security system of the CIS countries as a counterweight
to the NATO bloc that exists at present. At the same
time this is not an “elite club for selected states." Here,
we think, there will be room for all those who want to
join, including those from East Europe because, apart
from geopolitical proximity and interdependence, these
CIS states and countries are linked by over 50 years’
experience of their inte” sation. And as of today there are
still enough points o{ ~satact for fruitful cooperation on
fundamentally new and mutually advantageous terms,
including in the military field.

INTERREGIONAL AFFAIRS 25

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 13 October

LD1310071695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0703 GMT 13 Oct 95

("Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

(FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 13 (ITAR-
TASS) — Most Moscow-based Russian newspapers
focus their attention on the problems of Chechnya.

OBSHCHAYA GAZETA runs an interview with
Arkadiy Volskiy, Deputy Leader of the Russian del-
egation at the talks in Chechnya, who, in response
to a question about the assassination attempt against
General Romanov, stated as follows: "It is possible to
speak in earnest about a third force (in Chechnya) only
when investigation is conducted reasonably but then
one should want to conduct it.

“There were obvious traces — 250 metres of wire
from the land mines to the detonator. Shortly before
the assassination attempt against Romanov, a vehicle
of Russian Chief Negotiator at the talks in Groznyy,
Mikhaylov, was fired upon precisely from the bridge
in Minutka square, under which the land mine was
blown up. The press kept silent about that, although
the vehicle was badly damaged. Luckily, no one was
killed. Mikhaylov did not report the incident. After that,
armoured personnel carriers and patrolmen were posted
on the bridge. Why then were they removed several days
before the terrorist act against Romanov?"

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries an interview with
General Aslakhanov who believes that "(Dzhokar) Du-
dayev is ill with Bonapartism".

“Dudayev is the number one enemy of the Chechens.
He is a Soviet General who is well aware that it is
impossible to defeat a Soviet army and that the army
is enraged as a result of incessant humiliations and will
use firearms indiscriminately as far as possible.

“But Dudayev all the time tried to unleash a war as was
demanded by his Moscow masters who armed him from
head to foot. The Chechens did not want a war. They
did not elect Dudayev. Only the one who does want to
know is oblivious of the truth about those elections. He
has never been the leader of the nation".

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA runs an interview with
Chechen parliament chief Doku Zavgayev. He believes
that “even among those, who are referred to as Dudayev
militants, there are many people who took up arms only
because their close relatives had been killed and their
houses destroyed. This is why explanatory work among
the population should move to the fore in Chechnya”.

IZVESTIYA states that “it was Federal forces, namely
military aircraft that bombed Roshni-Chu village in

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26 INTERREGIONAL AFFAIRS

Urus-Martan district, that put Russia on the verge of
a new flare-up of full-scale war in Chechnya.

“This was a real present to mutinous Dudayev, an ex-
cellent pretext to declare termination of further talks on
peace terms and speak about Moscow’s unwillingness
to observe the already reached accords and a new factor
inclining in his favour even those Chechens who until
recently were loyal to Moscow and opposed the gen-
eral’s regime.”

TRUD reports the start of the operation Poisk (Search).

“We address you, the mothers of Russia, whose children
have become victims of the undeclared war in Chech-
nya. Your participation in the operation Poisk is neces-
sary not only for yourselves. It will help to see the stark
realities of this cruel slaughter," the newspaper writes.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA devotes attention to false
avisos, the letters of advice, that come in from Chechnya
and enable criminal elements to get rich by getting huge
funds from the Treasury.

“Over the past year and nine months alone, investigators
have referred 12 cases, involving 57 defendants, to law-
courts, retrieving more than 47,000 million roubles in
already stolen amounts and preventing the stealing of
another 50,000 million roubles.

“Let us recall that the same months saw the lack of
money for a timely payment of wages and salaries to
the miners and teachers, pensions, and interruptions in
financing rehabilitation work in Chechnya. Thieves, as

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

we see it, have no such problems. The money bag is
always open for them".

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI runs an interview with Niko-
lay Malyshev, leader of the Centre of Presidential Pro-
grammes, who points out:

"We have many programmes but the country is experi-
encing a crisis. Reforms are skidding. Production down-
turn continues, agriculture is in a serious position. Mu-
tual debts have spread over even to the sphere of in-
terbank settlements... The government does it utmost to
keep the depressive economy afloat, and tackle current
tasks with an eye to long-term prospects".

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the safety of military ser-
vice.

"Ensuring the safety of military service involves a com-
plex of measures which must be taken by all state struc-
tures without exception,” Lieutenant-General Vladimir
Kulakov, Head of the Russian General Staff Department
for Force Management and Safety of Military Service.

"Only in that case the military service safety system
which is being established will bring tangible results,
and the armed forces will cease being unfoundedly
reproached that it is dangerous to send sons to the army,"
General Kulakov emphasised.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carries a large inter-
view with former KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov.

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Moscow Favors World’s ‘Impartial Approach’ to
Croatia

LD1210203395 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1914 GMT 12 Oct 95

(From the "Diplomatic Panorama” feature)

(FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 12 (INTER-
FAX) — The Russian Foreign Ministry’s spokesman
Grigoriy Karasin said Russia favored a well-thought-out
and impartial approach of the world community towards
all illegal actions committed in the former Yugoslavia
“no matter which party to the conflict has launched
them."

Karasin praised the statement made by the chairman
of the U.N. Security Council on October 3. The U.N.
Security Council’s head said he was seriously concerned
about the actions of the Croatian authorities towards
refugees staying in Croatia, towards “both the Serbs
expelled from Krajina and the Moslems threatened with
an expel to Bosnia."

Karasin repeated that Russia had proposed the draft
of this statement to the U.N. Security Council on
September 29.

Karasin said that the document "highlights the inadmis-
sibility of returning refugees by force to the areas which
they have left." He said the document underlined that
such actions ran counter to the Geneva Convention of
1951 which had also been signed by Croatia.

Karasin said the U.N. Security Council’s statement
“demands that the Croatian government put an end to all
actions violating human rights and respect the rights of
the local Serbian population." He said the U.N. security
Council “urges Zagrev to continue providing shelter to
all refugees regardless of their ethnic affiliation and to
remove all restrictions concerning the time for the return

of refugees.”

Gromov Cited on U.S, NATO ‘Contempt’ for
Russia

LD1210212495 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1924 GMT 12 Oct 95

{(FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 12 (INTER-
FAX) — General Boris Gromov, leader of the My Fa-
therland movement, believes that the talks between Rus-
sian and U.S. defense chiefs Pavel Grachev and William

Perry have emphasized the depth of contempt the U.S.
and NATO feel for Russia.

“The plane with the Russian defense minister had barely
taken off after all the smiles, speeches, glasses of
champagne and handshakes when the U.S. and NATO
carried out air strikes against the Serbs to show who

RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 27

is who in the Balkans and in Europe," Gromov told a
correspondent at My Fatherland’s press office.

A transcript of the interview was made available to
INTERFAX Thursday.

Gromov believes that meetings of this kind harm
Russia’s political and military interests.

NATO, Gromov believes, should end the air strikes and
the UN should stop using double standards in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.

Soskovets on Possible Cooperation With Cuba

LD1310052795 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 2347 GMT 12 Oct 95

(By ITAR-TASS correspondents Oleg Veiichko and
Konstantin Zhukovskiy]

(FBIS Translated Text) Havana, 13 Oct (ITAR-TASS)
— During the Russian delegation’s meeting with Cuban
leader Fidel Castro, the prospects for bilateral coopera-
tion in the near future were discussed. Oleg Soskovets,
first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation govern-
ment, reported this on Thursday at a meeting with Jose
Luis Rodriges, Cuban minister of the economy and plan-
ning.

According to the first deputy prime minister, the pro-
posals of the Russian side regarding the prospects for
bilateral cooperation were formulated in a message from
the president of Russia which had been handed to Fi-
del Castro the day before. “Both states have chosen the
only correct path in their mutual relations, aimed at in-
tegration into the world economic system,” he stressed.

Russia is not reckoning, he noted, on cooperation
with Cuba providing immediate "crazy profit.” Oleg
Soskovets sees the main task today as that of seeking
mechanisms and possibilities for bilateral cooperation.
“For Russia, Cuba is a strategic partner with deep-rooted
traditions," he stressed. The first deputy prime minister
proposed to the Cuban side that the possibility of setting
up joint structures, banking structures among them,
should be examined. A Russian-Cuban joint enterprise is
already to be set up at the end of this year in Cienfuegos
on the basis of the oil-refining combine, and a similar
project is to be implemented in Santiago de Cuba at the
beginning of next year.

At the talks, the Cuban minister told the Russian dele-
gation about the situation on the island, having stressed
the great economic and financial difficulties. In future,
when Cuba will be able to restore its economic potential,
it will be possible "to talk about cancelling debts,” he
explained. The minister stressed the importance of the

prt bp orp oye pope poet aghmaaamy

is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

28 RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Russian market and promised Russian financial struc-
tures assistance within the framework of the banking
reforms expected here.

Meets Cuban Armed Forces Minister Castro

LD1310063595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 2310 GMT 12 Oct 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Oleg Velichko
and Konstantin Zhukovskiy]

(FBIS Translated Text] Havana, 13 Oct (ITAR-TASS)
— Oleg Soskovets, first deputy chairman of the Russian
Federation government, who is here on an official visit,
met Raul Castro, minister of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Cuba, on Thursday.

During the meeting, the sides discussed in detail issues
relating to Russian-Cuban cooperation in the military
sphere. The subject of the Russian radioelectronics
center situated not far from Havana occupied a special
place in the talks. The problem of financing this facility
in the coming year was examined in particular.

According to information received by ITAR-TASS
from a source in the Russian delegation, Moscow
intends to offer Havana a draft agreement on setting
up joint enterprises in the military sphere, including
a specialized center for repairing special equipment.
To all appearances, the sides are limiting themselves
solely to discussion of the Russian proposals within
the framework of the first deputy prime minister’s visit,
and the military departments of both countries will be
engaged directly in signing them.

Cuba Visit Said To Shift Foreign Policy

MK1310091295 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Oct 95 pl

[Report by Aleksandr Zhelenin under the "Visit" rubric:
"Soskovets in Cuba. A New Turnabout in Relations
With the Island of Freedom"]

{[FBIS Translated Text] To all appearances, the five-day
Official visit to Cuba by First Deputy Prime Minister
Oleg Soskovets, which began on 10 October, will not
only be a new milestone in relations between the two
countries, but will also become an integral part of the
process of revising Russia’s foreign policy doctrine.

Such a conclusion can be drawn if only from the visit’s
Stated objectives, such as the signing of a protocol on
trade turnover and payments for 1996-1997, which calls
for Russian oil deliveries in exchange for sugar, and
a memorandum on cooperation in the peaceful use of
nuclear power. Talks will also be held with the Cuban
leadership on cooperation in the production and refining
of oil and gas, and also on the nickel industry. Therefore,

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

the issue is thawing and restoring, virtually to the full
extent, former economic — and not only economic —
relations.

This is attributable first of all to purely practical reasons:
Since sugar production in Russia and Ukraine is on
the decline, it should be imported, cheaply if possible.
Evidently, buying sugar from Cuba is still profitable,
even if one has to pay for it with oil.

But the most sensational news concerns the resumption
of military-technological cooperation with the Island
of Freedom. If this really happens, one can state that
in its bid to restore relations with its former allies,
Russia is beginning to act proceeding from its own
interests. During the Soviet era cooperation with Cuba
was mandatory for the USSR for ideological reasons,
just as after 1991 precisely the same reasons caused a
drastic scaling down of ties. Ideological premises have
changed, but not so the approach.

Soskovets’ visit may mark the adoption of Russia’s first
new role since 1991, which manifests itself in a much
more independent policy on the international scene —
in deed, not just in words.

It is quite possible that the resumption of military co-
operation between Russia and Cuba has been prompted
by the plans for NATO's eastward expansion. In this re-
gard, the Russian move to meet Cuba half way appears
to be fully logical.

Karasin on Border Guards’ Attacked in Tajikistan

LD1210151195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1412 GMT 12 Oct 95

(By Yuriy Kozlov]

(FBIS Transcribed Text) MOSCOW, October 12
(ITAR-TASS) — "The Russian Foreign Ministry as-
sesses the attack on Russian borderguards in Tajikistan
as a planned criminal action, and puts all the blame
for it on the leadership of the Tajik Islamic Revival
Movement (IRM)," ITAR-TASS was told today by
Head of the Foreign Ministry’s Information and Press
Directorate Grigoriy Karasin.

As earlier reported, a vehicle, carrying servicemen from
the group of Russian borderguards in Tajikistan, was
fired upon on October 10. Seven men, including four
Russians and three Tajiks, were killed. Four other
servicemen were wounded. The fire from small arms
and heavy weapons was opened by a group of IRM
men, commanded by Said Afzali.

The official spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry
drew attention to the provocative nature of the incident,
noting that the purpose of this tactic, to which the Tajik

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

opposition is resorting, is to “make the Russian border
guard troops give up the protection of Tajikistan’s
border with Afghanistan, to open it up for the invasion
of armed extremists from Afghan territory, and finally
to forcibly seize power in Tajikistan”.

According to Karasin, the fire opened on Russian bor-
derguards “calls in doubt the readiness of the Tajik op-
position to settle the intra-Tajik conflict on principles
stipulated in the agreements, reached with the govern-
ment of Tajikistan", which rule out the use of armed
force. The opposition’s attitude to the commitments,
which it has assumed during the talks held under U.N.
aegis, can only complicate the achievement of final
agreements, the spokesman pointed out.

“Hand in hand with other CIS states, the Russian
side will go on taking all the necessary measures
to ensure the protection and security of Tajikistan’s
border with Afghanistan,” Karasin stressed. He pointed
out that further assistance would be rendered to the
Tajik government and that sorties against Russian
borderguards “will be suppressed by every means that
may be deemed necessary”.

The Russian Foreign Ministry urges the United Nations
and the states, which have sent their observres to the
intra-Tajik talks, to make an objective and principled
assessment of the latest provocative action. The min-
istry deems it necessary to secure the earliest possible
resumption of the talks under U.N. aegis and to ensure a
scrupulous observance of the agreements reached during
the negotiations. The Russian side, as before, is ready
to render all the necessary assistance “to the dialogue
for the sake of national reconciliation in Tajikistan”.

U.S. Official Cited on Pipeline From Azerbaijan

LD1210224095 Moscow Russian Public Television
First Channel Network in Russian
1800 GMT 12 Oct 95

[From the "Vremya” newscast]

(FBIS Translated Text] If the political situation in
Afghanistan has adopted features of the Balkan crisis,
then Turkey two days ago considerably strengthened
its position in the region. This became obvious after
the international oil consortium decided that oil from
the Caspian Sea would be pumped from Azerbaijan
along two pipelines — Georgian and Russian. Ankara is
banking on the prospect of extending the Georgian route
to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea
to redirect the transportation system of Caspian oil from
Russia to Turkey. The United States also supports this
position but has not yet rejected the northern Russian
option on purely pragmatic grounds.

RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 29

[Correspondent Sergey Goryachev] This is one of the
most important departments in Washington, responsible
for not only oil and gas but also nuclear energy and
everything to do with it. That is why they speak Russian
here.

[Begin recording) [Unidentified U.S. official] We con-
sider that the decision of the consortium of 11 compa-
nies puts forward a positive result for everyone. One
ean say that all participants, all countries in the region
win this way.

[Goryachev] Robert Burrows is a senior aide to the
Secretary of Energy of the United States. Why has
President Clinton personally intervened? He telephoned
the leaders of Azerbaijan.

[Official] We do not consider that to be intervention.
Our president telephoned Aliyev and other leaders
regarding various issues.

[Goryachev] As Robert Burrows says, the position of the
president was thus from the very beginning: We need
two oil pipelines simply so that various countries can get
the economic benefit. The United States is interested in
the success of its own companies abroad — again, one
of the eleven participants in the consortium is U.S. The
United States would like to see the dual route system in
other similar projects.

[Official] We have to have several pipelines, one of
course for Russia and through Russia and the second
maybe through Turkey, not only for the oil in Azerbaijan
but in the whole region, I mean, oil in Kazakhstan, in
the southern areas of Russia and other oil fields. [end
recording]

[Goryachev] The U.S. press these days is concentrating
its attention on politics. According to THE WASHING-
TON POST, the second pipeline is needed to support
Turkey, a member of NATO. This weakens the influ-
ence of Russia on the southern republics of the former
Soviet Union. Pressure from the Clinton administration
is not seen as anything bad. When the global interests
of the United States are affected then it is worth get-
ting on the phone to help your own and yourself. [video
shows U.S. official, maps, stills of Clinton, and oil field
installations]

Russian Debt Repayments to U.S. Rescheduled
MM1310110095 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Financial
Section) in Russian 13 Oct 95 pl

{RIA NOVOSTI report: "Russian Debt Repayment to
the United States Deferred”)

{FBIS Translated Text] Russian Finance Minister
Vladimir Panskov and U.S. Secretary of the Treasury

i. report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination

is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

3” RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Robert Rubin have signed an agreement rescheduling
payments on Russia’s foreign debt to the United States
in 1995. This has been announced by the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury Information Service. According
to its figures, Russia was to have paid the United States
$64 million this year as repayment of its total debt,
which had reached $6.3 billion by the end of 1994.

Russia To Supply Boosters for U.S. Missiles

LD1310070395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0657 GMT 13 Oct 95

[By Vitaly Chukseyev]

(FBIS Transcribed Text] WASHINGTON, October 13
(ITAR-TASS) — Ballistic missiles of the former Soviet
Union will compete with American missiles in launch-
ing payloads into space. Following long and difficult
talks in Geneva President Bill Clinton approved a pol-
icy recommended by his aides for science and national
security.

Russians are prepared to revamp and rename as Start
their SS-25 missiles for peaceful uses. Although, the
new U.S. policy covers all foreign-made boosters, for
the start it will apply to Russia and Ukraine.

In addition to the Start booster, Russia is prepared
to supply the refurbished SS-19 renamed Rokot, and
Ukraine, which is seeking access to the American
markets, offers the SS-10.

The first American company to use a Russian booster
is EarthWatch Inc., which intends to launch its first
commercial satellite in the first half of next year.

The Space News weekly, which reported the move does
not conceal that the American booster makers are not
happy about the news. Their representatives conducted
an intense lobbying campaign to prevent competitors
from entry to American markets. The corporations
Orbital Sciences and Lockheed Martin were particularly
concerned.

The U.S. President is expected to issue a special
ordinance in November to provide for the use of foreign
boosters in the United States in line with the existing
bilateral commercial agreements on space problems.

The United States has agreements of this sort with
Russia and China. EarthWatch officials said the launch
of their satellite with the help of the Start booster will
cost, per one pound of payload, just as much as with
the help of the Launch Vehicle offered by Lockheed.

Along with this, the Space News weekly reports that
the U.S. Administration is taking steps to protect the
interests of American manufacturers: Russia has been

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

granted the right to launch not more than eight Western
satellites to the year 2000.

Further on Barents Sea Regional Council Session

MM1310105295 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Oct 95 p3

[Report by Marat Zubko: "Let Us Fly to the Arctic with
Our Northern Neighbors’ Help")

(FBIS Translated Text) Helsinki — During the third ses-
sion of the Barents-European Arctic Regional Council
in the Finnish city of Rovaniemi, the foreign ministers
of Norway, Russia, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, and Den-
mark have advocated the unprecedented development of
a transportation network in Europe’s polar regions:

“To continue the Murmansk (Russia)-Kirkenes (Nor-
way) railroad and to modernize the highway between
the two cities. To build a highway between Petroza-
vodsk and Parikkala in Finland.

“To develop the so-called ‘Barents Corridor,’ envisaging
the construction of a railroad between the Finnish
town of Salla and Alakurtti in Russia, as well as the
“Arkhangelsk Corridor,’ building two railroads.

“To build a new Russian port with oil and gas terminals
at Linakhamari in Pechenga Bay. To modernize the
commercial ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.

“To improve air transportation on the Lulea (Sweden)-
Rovaniemi (Finland)-Murmansk-Arkhangelsk route. To
Carry out work to modernize airports at Petrozavodsk,
Arkhangelsk, and Murmansk...."

Joint programs are also being proposed in the sphere of
power generation, telecommunications, and the modern-
ization of a number of enterprises that pose a threat to
people and the environment. The Barents Council ap-
proved the signing by Norway and Russia of an agree-
ment to modernize the foundries at Nikel and Pechenga.

Needless to say, the question arises of just who will
pay for all this. The Council appealed to national and
international financial institutions. There is hope of
aid from the EU, whose representatives attended the
meeting.

The ministers were particularly concerned about the
problem of recycling the decommissioned nuclear sub-
marines which, as is well known, have built up at naval
bases in northwest Russia.

Next spring, the meeting participants noted, the “clear-
ing up" [sanatsiya] of these Russian submarines should
begin. Touching on this acute problem, Swedish For-
eign Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallen stated:

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

“The recent incident involving the cutting off of power
to Russian submarine reactors shows that the nuclear
safety issue is very topical."

Different countries take it in turns to chair the Barents
Council. Finnish Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen has
handed over her powers to the new chairman, Andrey

Kozyrev.

Anti-Poland Sanction Rumors ‘Greatly
Exaggerated’

MM1210145895 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Oct 95 p3

[Report by Maksim Yusin: "Economic War Against
Poland? Rumors Greatly Exaggerated by One Un-
scrupulous Journalist")

(FBIS Translated Text] Last week Russian-Polish rela-
tions went through some difficult moments. The Krakow
radio station RMF reported to its listeners that Moscow
was preparing to introduce economic sanctions against
Warsaw, citing some very telling statements by Deputy
Foreign Minister Sergey Krylov as confirmation of this.

The author of the material, RMF’s Moscow correspon-
dent, made the following sensational statement, quot-
ing sources in the Foreign Ministry: Displeased with
Poland’s attempts to join NATO, Russia was consider-
ing the possibility of scaling down economic coopera-
tion with Poland, and, in particular, of freezing construc-
tion of a gas pipeline intended to supply Russian gas to
West Europe via Polish territory. The information on
the impending sanctions was followed by a quote from
Sergey Krylov: "Surely the Poles need this gas pipeline?
Surely they need the Russian market?" The suggested
conclusion was clear: The deputy minister was openly
threatening Warsaw.

Persistent attempts by Polish journalists accredited in
Moscow to get through to Krylov on the telephone and
ask him to comment on RMPF’s findings failed. This
merely strengthened the Poles’ suspicions that Russia
really was preparing to declare economic war on their
country.

Approached by IZVESTIYA for an explanation, Sergey
Krylov categorically rejected this assumption: "We
have no intention of introducing any sanctions against
Poland. It is an absurd idea. It is particularly disgraceful
that these notions have been attributed to me. I am
fundamentally opposed to sanctions, because world
practice shows that very rarely is the desired result
achieved with their help."

According to the deputy minister, he has never given
an interview to RMF. He met some Polish television
journalists a few weeks ago. It was then that he

RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 31

uttered the words used by the Krakow radio station.
However, he assured us that they were spoken in
a totally different context: "We were talking about
Russian-Polish economic cooperation and joint projects
of benefit to both our countries. I cited the contract to
build the gas pipeline as the most striking example; it is
worth a total of $2.4 billion, of which $400 million will
be invested in Polish territory. It was then that I asked
(arguing with those opposed to ties between Poland and
Russia): Surely the Poles need this gas pipeline? Surely
they need the Russian market? Naturally, I made no
reference to any sanctions."

Krylov was extremely vexed that he had been used
"as some kind of bugbear" and set up as virtually
Poland’s number one enemy. In the deputy minister’s
opinion, the journalist who had provoked the scandal
had been extremely unscrupulous. "As I had not said
anything reprehensible, I did not feel it necessary to try
to justify myself and thereby become a laughing stock,"
Krylov said, explaining his reluctance to discuss the ill-
starred interview with Polish journalists. However, we
understood from the deputy minister’s words that he
had not been able to avoid this unpleasant subject in a
conversation with the Polish ambassador.

As far as RMF’s Moscow correspondent is concerned,
this is not the first time he has been at the center of a
scandal. After last year’s incident at Warsaw’s East Sta-
tion (when Polish police beat up some Russian tourists),
the Krakow radio station announced that Boris Yeltsin
had signed an edict to protect his compatriots abroad
which allegedly gave Russian assault forces the right to
cafry out a punitive operation in Polish territory. This
news caused mild panic in Warsaw. Leading politicians
were asked to comment on Moscow’s aggressive sally.
The Poles only calmed down when the text of the edict
was published and it became clear that it deait with
something quite different. Poland, and the incident at
Warsaw’s East Station, were not even mentioned.

Cooperation in Nuclear Safety Planned With
Canada

LD1210192495 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1712 GMT 12 Oct 95

(FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 12 (INTER-
FAX) — The Federal Nuclear and Radiation Safety
Inspectorate, or Gosatomnadzor, plans to sign in mid-
January 1996 a memorandum of understanding and co-
operation with the Atomic Energy Control Board of
Canada.

Yelena Kuznetsova, an official in the Gosatomnadzor
foreign relations board, said that the two agencies will
cooperate in nuclear safety supervision.

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

32 RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

In particular, she said, they will jointly study safety
standards in nuclear power stations and reactors, in the
production, storage anc transportation of nuclear fuel
and in the production and use of radioactive substances
in the industry, science and medicine.

The Canadians will help their Russian colleagues de-
velop the technology of decommissioning nuclear and
radioatively hazardous installations and draft the legal
framework and the licensing procedure, in particular, of
commissioning power units in nuclear power stations.

Kuznetsova said that the memorandum has been cleared
with the Russian government and the Nuclear Energy
Ministry.

Cooperation in nuclear energy was a major item on
the agenda of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Cher-
nomyrdin’s visit earlier in October. The two sides
agreed on Canadian participation in designing nuclear
power stations for the Russian Far East.

Deputy Premier Stresses Importance of Ties With
India

LD1210153995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1344 GMT 12 Oct 95

(By Yuriy Kozmin]

(FBIS Transcribed Text] NEW DELHI, October 12
(ITAR-TASS) — "For Russia cooperation with India
was and remains the most important direction of its
foreign economic activity," Russian Vice-Premier
Yuriy Yarov, who is also co-chairman of the inter-
governmental Indian-Russian commission for trade,
economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation,
declared today.

Yarov was speaking at a press conference in the Indian
capital following the signing of a memorandum about
the results of work of this major inter-governmental
commission. Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee
is the commission’s Indian co-chairman.

Yarov stressed that the accords on the intensification of
bilateral cooperation reached during talks in New Delhi
should be seen as a landmark in the development of
relations between India and Russia. “Prospects for the
participation of Russian entrepreneurs in the reconstruc-

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

tion of the major facilities built on Indian territory with
the assistance of the former Soviet Union are among
the priority directions considered within the framework
of the commission meetings,” the Russian Vice-Premier
said.

Yarov added that the two countries must use the entire
accumulated experience of work in this direction and
their rich scientific and technical potential.

The commission also considered problems relating to
the implementation of the earlier agreements on the
building, with Indian assistance, of a sea terminal
in Novorossiysk, and on the building with Russian
assistance of facilities in India. The commission also
examined some aspects of investments in the national
economies of Russia and India, Yarov said.

Along with this, the Russian Vice-Premier pointed
to considerable opportunities that offer themselves at
present for the development of Russian-Indian cultural
cooperation. He said the commission agreed on holding
a Russian culture festival in India in early December.
Performers from all parts of India will play to Russian
audiences within the framework of an Indian culture
festival in the Russian Federation in 1996, Yarov said.

As concerns Indian-Russian relations as a whole, the
Russian government official stated that “positions of the
two countries coincide on most problems." "India and
Russia are reforming their economic systems, and these
transformations serve as an important factor influencing
the rapid progress of our relations," Yarov stressed.

“We are interested in seeing the economy, science and
culture flourish in our states, and we believe that close
interaction will be to the benefit of both Russia and
India," Yarov declared.

The press conference in New Delhi was told that
the inter-governmental Russian-Indian commission for
trade and economic, scientific, technical and cultural
cooperation would next meet in the first quarter of
next year to consider implementation of the agreements
reached in New Delhi during the current visit and
prospects for further bilateral cooperation in a variety
of fields.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Political Issues

Yeltsin Rejects ‘Premature Optimism’ Over
Economy

LD1310114995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1132 GMT 13 Oct 95

[By Andrey Shtorkh)

{[FBIS Transcribed Text) MOSCOW, October 13
(ITAR-TASS) — President Boris Yeltsin today told the
government to step up activity in ensuring stabilisation
of the quality of life of the entire population and every
individual citizen of Russia.

According to presidential press secretary Sergey
Medvedev, the President told participants in today’s
meeting in the Kremlin that during his recent meeting
with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin he had
criticised the government for the failure to ensure the
timely payment of wages and pensions, as well as
compensations to the investors in banks and firms that
become insolvent.

Boris Yeltsin said he has ordered the Prime Minister to
ensure a turn-around.

According to Sergey Medvedev, the President disagreed
with those who were ready to "sing praises" to the gov-
ernment in connection with "revivification of Russia’s
economic life." The President refused to share "prema-
ture optimism” and said the task was not to “lose pace
but to preserve and consolidate the turn-around” the first
signs of which have appeared in the economic and so-

cial spheres.

The President did not fail to note the positive trends
which have appeared in the country’s social and eco-
nomic situation. He pointed out in particular that one in
every four regions has reported that its industrial pro-
duction has grown since last year. Along with this, the
President subjected to “tough, serious criticism" the sit-
uation in the agro-industrial complex where production
slump was reported this year.

As concerns the draft budget for 1996, the President
called for ruling out "elements of arbitrariness", pointing
out that some of the basic provisions of the draft should
be corrected when finalizing it. He pointed specifically
to the forecast of the country’s social and economic
development and the level of inflation.

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS 33

ITAR-TASS Details Yeltsin Meeting With Chubays,
Mikhaylov

LD1310142495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1324 GMT 13 Oct 95

(By Andrei Shtorkh)

(FBIS Transcribed Text) MOSCOW, October 13
(ITAR-TASS) — President Boris Yeltsin today met the
leaders of the component parts of the Russian Federa-
tion in the Kremlin to discuss two major issues — the
social, political and economic situation in the regions
and the draft federal budget for 1996, particularly that
part of it which concerns relations between the federal
budget and the budgets of the component parts of the
federation.

With this in view, today’s meeting in the Kremlin
is attended by First Vice-Premier Anatoliy Chubays
and Minister for Nationalities and Regional Policy
Vyacheslav Mikhaylov.

Presidential press secretary Sergey Medvedev told
ITAR-TASS that much attention was given to the
economic situation in the North Caucasian republics
which participants described as extremely complicated.
It was noted, however, that there were pleasant excep-
tions to that rule. For example, industrial production in
Kabardino-Balkaria this year reached 156 percent of
last year’s level, and in the Adyge republic, it amounted

to 106 percent of last year’s figure.

Sergey Medvedev pointed out that the situation in the
Chechen republic, including economic restoration, was
not discussed in detail but only touched upon in today’s
meeting.

As concerns the second item on the agenda relating
to the draft federal budget for 1996, particularly that
part of it which concerns relations between the federal
budget and the budgets of the component parts of
the federation, the President noted that the document
was being finalised and it was necessary to take into
consideration the views of the leaders of the component
parts of the Russian Federation in order to make
necessary changes in time.

Yeltsin noted that the budget potential of the component
parts of the federation had increased considerably but
there were still "elements of arbitrariness" which needed
to be eradicated. The President proposed changing the
principles of interaction between the federal budget and
the budgets of the regions.

The Presidential press secretary explained that "in ac-
cordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federa-
tion, the budgets of the component parts of the Russian

fap ~ Tepe copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

ot RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Federation are independent, but, taking into considera-
tion a number of economic, geographical and climatic
conditions, relations between the federal budget and the
budgettts of the republics are built proceeding from the
resources which come from that part of the taxes which
are due to the federal budget."

The component parts of the Federation receive financial
assistance from the centre. This year, the process is
“quite tense, but its dynamics is positive," Medvedev
said.

He added that, according to the current plans of the
federal government, next year’s financial assistance
to the subjects of the Federation will become more
substantial. It will be distributed from the federal budget
along four lines, Medvedev said. First of all, a federal
fund of financial support will be formed to compensate
for differences between the spending of the component
parts of the Federation and the revenue due to them
in the regional budgets. Another direction provides for
funding the expenditure for the maintenance of facilities
in the social sphere and the housing fund, which the
republics cannot afford on their own. The third direction
is federal programmes for the development of regions
which have their specifics in each republic. Finally, the
fourth direction of assistance from the federal budget to
the budgets of the republics provides for subsidies to
individual administrative and territorial entities in case
they experience temporary financial difficulties.
According to Medvedev, "the existing practice of inter-
action between the federal and regional budgets does not
meet new requirements." In this context, the meeting in
the Kremlin discussed ways of improving the existing
system. In particular, the Russian government proposed
introducing "for the next three years, stable rates and
norms of assignations from the federal budget to the
budgets of the component parts of the Russian Federa-
tion,” Medvedev said.

He recalled that this year the Federal fund of financial
support of the component parts of the Federation was
formed on the basis of 27-percent deductions from
the value-added tax collected throughout the Russian
Federation. Next year, resources channelled to the fund
would be made up of 15-percent deductions from the
amount of the federal budget tax revenues.

According to government experts, this would ensure
a steady inflow of resources to the budgets of the
republics.

. The need for specific changes to the draft federal budget
for 1996 was stressed by the President in the course
of today’s meeting in the Kremlin. Yeltsin said that
the forecast for the country’s social and economic

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

development and the level of inflation in the next year
needed revising. He also said that it was necessary to
modify the main guidelines of the tax reform and to
look for additional sources to do away with the budget
deficit.

Participants in the meeting called for closer cooperation
between the government, State Duma deputies and
members of the Federation Council in finalising the
1996 budget. Both First Vice-Premier Anatoliy Chubays
and Minister for Nationalities and Regional Policy
Vyacheslav Mikhaylov, who were taking part in the
meeting, expressed agreement with the proposal.

Yeltsin Signs Edict on Constitutional Conformity

MMI1210142495 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 11 Oct 95 p 3

{"Edict No. 1007 of the Russian Federation President
on Measures To Ensure Collaboration Between the
Federal Organs of State Power and the Organs of State
Power of the Russian Federation Components During
the Implementation of Constitutional and Legal Reform
in the Russian Federation Components," signed by
Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin in the Kremlin,
Moscow, on 5 October — from the “Documents”
section]

(FBIS Translated Text] With the aim of ensuring that
the Constitutions and laws of the republics and the
charters, laws, and other statutory legal acts of the krays,
oblasts, cities with federal status, the autonomous oblast,
and the autonomous okrugs conform to the Russian
Federation Constitution and to federal laws; ensuring
collaboration between the federal organs of state power
and the organs of state power of the Russian Federation
components during the implementation of constitutional
and legal reform in the Russian Federation components;
and eliminating disagreements which may arise between
the legislative (representative) and executive organs
of state power of the Russian Federation components
during the adoption of statutory legal acts; and guided
by Article 80 of the Russian Federation Constitution, I
decree:

1. That violation of the Russian Federation Constitution
and federal laws by the organs of state power of the
Russian Federation components during the elaboration
and adoption of Constitutions and laws by the republics
and of charters, laws, and other statutory legal acts
by the krays, oblasts, cities of federal status, the
autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrugs, is deemed
impermissible.

2. The organs of state power of the Russian Federation
components are instructed:

is report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

— to remove any contradictions with the provisions
of the Russian Federation Constitution and the federal
laws which exist in the Constitutions and laws of the
republics and the charters, laws, and other statutory legal
acts of the krays, oblasts, cities with federal status, the
autonomous oblast, and the autonomous okrugs;

— in drafting and adopting statutory legal acts of
Russian Federation components, to adhere strictly to
the provisions of the Russian Federation Constitution,
which enshrine as the basis of the Russian Federation’s
constitutional system a federal structure for the Russian
Federation based on its state integrity, the unity of the
system of state power, the delimitation of spheres of
jurisdiction and powers between the federal organs of
state power and the organs of state power of the Russian
Federation components, and on the equality and self-
determination of the peoples in the Russian Federation;

— on the basis of the provisions of Articles 73, 76, and
77 of the Russian Federation Constitution, pending the
publication of the federal law on the general principles
of the organization of the representative and executive
organs of state power of the Russian Federation compo-
nents, the Russian Federation components are to refrain
from adopting statutory legal acts which establish or-
ganizational principles or a system of organs of state
power in the Russian Federation components.

3. A Commission Under the Russian Federation Presi-
dent for Collaboration Between the Federal Organs Of
State Power and the Organs of State Power of the Rus-
sian Federation Components During the Implementa-
tion of Constitutional and Legal Reform in the Russian
Federation Components (hereinafter called the Commis-
sion) is to be formed.

The Commission is responsible for:

— ensuring collaboration between the federal organs
of state power and the organs of state power of the
Russian Federation components during the process of
the elaboration and adoption of the Constitutions and
laws of the republics and the charters, laws, and other
Statutory legal acts of krays, oblasts, cities with federal
Status, the autonomous oblast, and the autonomous
okrugs and during the resoluiion of other questions of
constitutional and legal reform in the Russian Federation
components;

— elaborating measures to ensure that the Constitutions
and laws of republics and the charters, laws, and
other normative legal acts of the krays, obiasts, cities
with federal status, the autonomous oblast, and the
autonomous okrugs conform to the Russian Federation
Constitution and federal laws;

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS 35

— eliminating possible disagreements between the fed-
eral organs of state power and the organs of state power
of the Russian Federation components and also between
the legislative (representative) and executive organs of
State power of the Russian Federation components;

— drafting proposals on the application by the Rus-
sian Federation president of conciliation procedures to
resolve such differences in line with Article 85 of the
Russian Federation Constitution.

4. The Russian Federation President’s State Legal Ad-
ministration is responsible for providing legal support
for the Commission’s activity, forming a special sub-
department within its structure and increasing its per-
sonnel by 25; and the Russian Federation Presidential
Staff Administration for Working With Territories and
other structural subdepartments of the Russian Feder-
ation Presidential Staff, as well as the Office of the
Administrator of Presidential Affairs are responsible for
providing organizational and material and technical sup-
port for the Commission’s activity.

5. The leader of the Russian Federation Presidential
Staff, with the participation of the interested federal
organs of state power and organs of state power of
the Russian Federation components, is to present for
ratification by the Russian Federation president within
two months a statute on the Commission Under the
Russian Federation President for Collaboration Between
the Federal Organs Of State Power and the Organs
of State Power of the Russian Federation Components
During the Implementation of Constitutional and Legal
Reform in the Russian Federation Components, and a
proposal for its composition.

6. The Russian Federation Government is to adopt the
necessary measures to strengthen collaboration with the
organs of executive power of the Russian Federation
components in legislative activity.

7. The present edict comes into force from the moment
of its publication.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin
[Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin, 5 October 1995
No. 1007

Chernomyrdin Would Like To See Yeltsin
Reelected

LD1210214695 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1805 GMT 12 Oct 95
[From the “Presidential Bulletin" feature]

(FBIS Transcribed Text] Russian Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin told the faculty and students of Moscow
State University Wednesday that he would like to see

pre ote contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

%6 RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Boris Yeltsin work some more in presidential office for
the good of Russia. He was answering a question on
next summer’s presidential elections.

Commenting on his recent meeting with Yeltsin, he said
it focused on monetary and credit policies.

Chernomyrdin said they had thoroughly discussed how
to accomplish the current monetary and credit policies
aiming for economic stabilization.

Chernomyrdin said they also considered “how not to
infringe” on social issues while pursuing these policies.

Speaking on alternative military service, he said the
government was preparing a draft law which contained
a relevant provision. Once finalized, the document will
be submitted to the president, he added.

According to Chernomyrdin, "there is a possibility for
and area of the introduction of alternative military
service in the country."

Daily Reports Council on Cadre Policy 11 Oct
Session

MM1210103995 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 12 Oct 95 pl

[Report by Pavel Anokhin and Vladislav Krukovskiy:
"Deeds, Not Length of Service, Determine an Official’s
Standing")

(FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday’s [11 October] ses-
sion of the Council on Cadre Policy under the Rus-
sian Federation president considered the draft presiden-
tial edicts "On Qualification Requirements for Holding
State Office in the Federal State Service" and “On Ex-
penditure Norms for Federal State Officials on Official
Travel Within the Russian Federation" and discussed the
national report on the question of "State Administration
and Development" for the UN General Assembly’s 50th
session.

Recently the Kremlin has clearly stepped up its efforts
on questions of developing the system of state admin-
istration. The head of state recently signed the edict
“On Urgent Measures To Improve Work With Cadres
Within the Russian Federation State Service System,"
and fresh documents are already being prepared in its
further development. Thus, the draft edict "On Qual-
ification Requirements..." suggests tightening up these
requirements as regards the length of service and work
experience of federal state officials, defines the prac-
tice for their promotion to suitable office, and envisages
" measures to prevent unjustified cadre transfers.

For example, in order to hold one of the top state offices,
a candidate must have at least 15 years of state service.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

The problem of state officials’ length of service
prompted the lengthiest discussion among Council
members. It was emphasized that it is not always right
to absolutize this indicator when appraising various
officials. During the discussion of this problem it was
proposed to amplify the actual formulation of the pres-
idential edict. The following wording was agreed: "On
Uniform Qualification Requirements for the Length of
Service and Remuneration of State Officials."

Another draft of the edict "On Expenditure Norms for
Federal State Officials on Official Travel Within the
Russian Federation" lays down a uniform procedure in
this important work. The draft envisages differentiated
norms for such expenditures depending on the office
held and the price index. Council members proposed
that, in individual cases, the document should provide
for supernormative expenditure of official travel funds.

While discussing the draft presidential edicts, the Coun-
cil members expressed alarm in connection with the de-
lay in submitting to the State Duma the draft law "On
State Service." It was decided to convene a special con-
ference on this question, to be hosted by Sergey Filatov,
chief of the Russian Federation Presidential Staff. The
Council on Cadre Policy under the president approved
its work plan for October-December 1995.

Moscow Conference Discusses Aspects of Security

MM1310140595 Moscow TRUD-7 in Russian
13-19 Oct 95 p3

[Report by Viktor Gorlenko: “White Paper, Black
Cloaks"}

(FBIS Translated Text] A scientific practical conference
on "The Security of the Individual, Society, and the
State and Russia’s Special Services," attended by repre-
sentatives of the Security Council and Russian Federa-
tion Federal Assembly committees, scientists, and prac-
tical workers of the law enforcement agencies, special
services, and establishments and organizations directly
involved in safeguarding Russia’s security, was held in
Moscow on the Federal Security Service’s initiative.

The RAU Corporation, an international nongovernmen-
tal scientific research and educational organization, has
prepared and published the "Russian Special Services
White Paper,” which includes a large number of articles
devoted to various questions concerning the activity of
the organs of state security and law enforcement agen-
cies and their role in safeguarding the country’s security
at the contemporary stage, based on the conference ma-
terial.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Council Discusses Local Self-Government

MM1210100495 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 12 Oct 95 pl

[Report by Lyubov Tsukanova: "Self-Government
Without Pressure. Initiative From Below Enjoys Sup-
port from President and Government")

(FBIS Translated Text] On opening the first session of
the Council on Local Self-Government, a consultative
organ under the Russian Federation president, Prime
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin announced that his cab-
inet would examine in the very near future a federal
program in support of local self-government.

This program is one of the first practical documents
aimed at implementing the Law on Local Self-
Government. Everyone knows the difficulties and
acrimonious contradictions which accompanied this
law’s elaboration and adoption. Now it is accepted for
implementation with just as many difficulties, since its
essence is to redistribute power.

The lengthy period of time since the adoption of the -

Russian Federation Constitution, Minister for National-
ities Affairs Vyacheslav Mikhaylov said, has led to nu-
merous complications at regional level. While there was
no law, local self-government was taking shape haphaz-
ardly, accompanied by the development of progressive
and dead-end tendencies alike. But even now, when the
Law on General Principles of Local Self-Government
has come into force, its provisions are clearly inade-
quate for establishing a smooth system of power at the
local level. It is necessary, as Viktor Chernomyrdin said,
to adopt more than 20 federal laws developing and am-
plifying the “general principles."

The main knot of problems is to be found in the sphere
of mutual relations between regional organs of power
and organs of local self-government. City mayors unan-
imously assert that the authorities in Russian Federation
components have given a “poor” welcome to the Law on
Local Self-Government since they are unwilling to let
cities (which are now objects of self-government) slip
away from their subordination. The governors, for their
part, fear the loss of governability since, as Moscow
Oblast Administration Head Anatoliy Tyazhlov said,
“the executive power is answerable to the population for
everything.” The problem, as many people have noted,
lies in the fact that there is no clear-cut and unambigu-
ous definition of territorial formations which are objects
of local self-government. This question must be resolved
either by a special federal law or by Federation compo-
nent laws.

It is generally believed that local self-government
will be unable to properly stand on its own two feet

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS 37

until such time as solutions are provided to ques-
tions like budget and financial regulation, formation
of organizational-legal foundations of local self-
government, and provision of cadres and information
technology for it. Local self-government heads insist on
long-term (for at least three or four years) guarantees
of the main sources of budget revenues for municipal
formations and on solution to the problem of trans-
ferring land and real estate to municipal ownership,
without which it would be impossible to ensure at
least some stable and forecastable development. But
even now, while many of the most complex questions
still remain unsolved, the law offers an opportunity
to develop local self-government, this "foundation of
the state’s stability," as Nikolay Travkin defined it.
He does not share the “universal lament" about the
allegedly catastrophic state of affairs in the regions:
Things are still getting done and much depends on
people. Viktor Dorkin, mayor of Moscow Oblast’s city
of Dzerzhinskiy, agrees with him and also believes that
much depends on the initiative of people who head the
organs of local self-government.

Nikolay Travkin correctly noted that the question of ac-
countability is a question of elections when the popu-
lation itself will be able to decide who is capable of
heading the process of restructuring life in its com-
munity. The elections are yet another tense aspect of
the process of establishing the local self-government
system. The legislators, having prescribed that elec-
tions to local self-government organs should be held
in six months’ time, have, in the opinion of many prac-
titioners, “rushed ahead" somewhat. Many Federation
components simply lack the legislative basis for this
(which, incidentally, prompted the Russian Federation
president’s edict proposing that local elections be post-
poned until December 1996). But many practitioners do
not advise any artificial delays to the electoral process
in places which are comprehensively prepared for it.
The main point, and members of the Council on Local
Self-Government are convinced of this, is that it is nec-
essary to avoid the process of politicizing the election
campaign and to prevent any speculation on this topic.

Local self-government is a vast field for activity and, to
all intents and purposes, it “has neither been plowed
nor sown" in our country. But, as Sergey Filatov
remarked, "things are not altogether bad," there are some
“encouraging signs" which ought to be nurtured. The
establishment of effective local authority will take n.any
years, there is no need for haste so as not to inflict any
damage in the “rush,” but there is no need either to
postpone this work “until later" and wait for the creation
of all conditions. Local self-government, Sergey Filatov

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

38 RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

said, must be created through joint efforts, it is a
guarantee of Russia’s transformation.

Panels Examine [legal Migration, Export Problems
MM1310133295 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Oct 95 pl

(Russian Federation Security Council Press Service
report: ““Migration Threat’ to Our Interests")

(FBIS Translated Text] Moscow — On 11 October
1995 there was a joint session of two interdepartmental
commissions of the Russian Federation Security Council
— the commission on border policy, chaired by Andrey
Nikolayev, director of the Federal Border Service, and
the commission on public security and the fight against
crime and corruption, chaired by Valentin Kovalev,
Russian Federation justice minister.

The session examined the question "On Measures To
Prevent Illegal Migration on the Territory of the Russian
Federation.” It was noted that Russia has become a mag-
net for migrants from almost all parts of the world. Ille-
gal migration, especially from states in Asia and Africa,
China, and the Near and Middle East, poses a threat to
national interests. The question "On the Activity of the
Russian Federation Customs Organs in Preventing the
legal Export of Strategically Important Raw Materials"
was also examined. It was noted that there have been
instances when foreign economic activity has been ac-
tively used to launder funds obtained by criminal means.

Military Issues

General Smirnov Discusses Military Draft Problems

MMI1110091295 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Oct 95 pl

{Interview with Lieutenant General Vasiliy Smirnov,
deputy chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces
General Staff Main Organizational and Mobilization
Directorate, by Oleg Falichev; place and date not given:
"Fall Draft Should Proceed in Strict Accordance with
the Federal Law")

{(FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Falichev] Vasiliy Vasilye-
vich, the attitude of society and the state toward the
army is formed from many criteria. There is supply and
financing.... But perhaps one of the most important is
its staffing. For some years now this process has been
proceeding with great difficulties, to put it mildly. The
reasons for this phenomenon are a subject for a separate
talk. But today let us talk about results. And here we
should obviously begin with the spring draft campaign.
After all, you will agree that the press has said virtually
nothing about its final results.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

[Smirnov] Perhaps.... Especially as the problems of the
1995 spring and fall draft remain among the most acute.
Unfortunately some of our citizens have formed the
persistent opinion that the new draftees are needed for
the army, for the military department, and not for the
country. Although the Constitution speaks directly of
citizens’ duty to defend their Fatherland. As before
many people are saying that the military commissariat is
“seizing” draftees for the army. Yet in accordance with
existing legislation the organization and execution of the
military draft are assigned to the local administration
heads. It is largely precisely thanks to their attention
toward this state task that the target for the drafting
of citizens set by the Russian Federation president was
fulfilled in the spring.

Social structures also played a positive role in carrying
out the draft. Structures like the Russian defense techni-
cal sports organization, the “Council of parents of Rus-
sian servicemen" movement, and a number of others.
At the same time someone was, figuratively speaking,
putting a spoke in the wheels. Unfortunately we have
to note the adverse influence exerted on the draft by the
"Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia" movement and the "com-
mittee of soldiers’ mothers of Russia." They organized
picketing of the draft and assembly points, issued ille-
gal ultimatums to the organs of state power, and incited
citizens not to fulfill the requirements of the relevant
laws.

Alas, we have instances of the nonfulfillment of the
law’s requirements by the organs of local power. Thus
the heads of the local administrations of Naberezhnyye
Chelny and Aznakayevskiy Rayon in the Republic of
Tatarstan dodged leadership in carrying out the military
draft. As a result the draft was in fact disrupted in these
regions.

[Falichev] That is the laws were broken by people
whose official duty was to keep track of their fulfill-
ment?

{Smirnov} Yes, and that is very regrettable. Moreover,
some officials even impeded the draft. I have in mind
the leaders of individual enterprises, organizations, and
institutions. Thus the rector of the Orenburg regional
institute of management tried to disrupt the notification
of the institute’s graduates and their appearance at the
draft commissions. And the prosecutor’s office organs,
despite appeals from the military commissariats, took
no effective steps against the violator of legislation.
Well! After that can we be surprised that the number
of “dodgers” today is already in excess of 27,000.

[Falichev] As we know in the spring amendments were
adopted to the law “on military service obligation and
military service." But to this day passions around them

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

have not abated in parliament. The Duma defense com-
mittee adopted its own “amendments to the amend-
ments” in the summer.... What kind of a situation do we
have here? What has happened recently on this "front?"

[Smirnov] Indeed, on 29 April the law “on the intro-
duction of changes and additions to the Russian Fed-
eration law ‘on military service obligation and military
service’” was adopted. In accordance with this law the
duration of military service upon drafting is set at 24
months. Which will make it possible as early as this
fall to staff the troops to 85-90 percent. But there was
no complete clarity here until the very last moment.
Why? You rightly mentioned the “amendments to the
amendments.” On 29 July this year they were suggested
by the State Duma. If they had gotten through then this
would have had the most adverse effect on the staffing
level of the troops and would have virtually canceled
out all the preceding lawmaking work. Judge for your-
self. The troops’ staffing level would have declined to
50 percent (!) and each soldier and sergeant would have
had to perform the duties of two or even three service-
men. Combat capable formations and units would have
disappeared in the Armed Forces.

We must pay tribute to the Federation Council. It
approached the examination of these “amendments” in a
quite serious and balanced manner. As a result they were
rejected at the session 4 October this year. So that the
draft will proceed in accordance with the law adopted
in the spring. [passage omitted]

{Falichev] And one last question, Vasiliy Vasilyevich.
How long will the soldiers and sergeants recruited
earlier serve? In particular is release into the reserve
being delayed for those who were drafted for 18 months
in 1994 under the old law?

[Smirnov] I must stress once again that the changes
introduced to the law this spring will now operate. They
affect those who were drafted earlier, for 18 months, for
instance. I shall explain. The 29 April 1995 federal law
“on the introduction of changes and additions to the
Russian Federation law ‘on military service obligation
and military service’" for servicemen who are serving
under the draft now sets the term of this service at 24
months. And for those with higher education the term is
12 months. Article 4 of this law introduces these terms
of military service as of 1 October this year and extends
them to servicemen drafted previously and undergoing
military service under the draft.

Thus, this fall only those servicemen who were drafted
to military service in the fall of 1993 will be released
into the reserve. As will those who have higher educa-
tion and were drafted in the fall of 1994. Young men

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS 39

drafted to military service in April-June 1994 will be
released into the reserve in the spring of 1996.

Federal Assembly

Reportage on Chernomyrdin’s Address to State
Duma

Proposes Duma ‘Nonaggression Pact’
LD1310102995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0811 GMT 13 Oct 95

(By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Pavel
Kuznetsov]

(FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 13 Oct (ITAR-TASS)
— Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, speak-
ing today in the lower house of the Russian parliament,
suggested that “a nonaggression pact" should be con-
cluded between the government and the State Duma on
the eve of the parliamentary elections.

He said that the tension of political struggle on the eve
of the elections should not affect the relations between
the legislative and executive branches of power. "We
have little time left and yet a great many things are
to be done,” Chernomyrdin stressed. “That is why we
should coexist peacefully.”

Asserts Willingness To Compromise on Budget
LD1310094295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0833 GMT 13 Oct 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Pavel
Kuznetsov]

(FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 13 Oct (ITAR-TASS)
— The 1996 draft budget must retain “continuity
in rate of change,” Russian Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin has said.

During a speech in the State Duma today on the coun-
try’s socioeconomic situation, he said the government
is prepared to make compromises when discussing the
budget in the Duma.

Viktor Chernomyrdin said the main indicator for the
country’s financial plan is the budget deficit, and meth-
ods of reducing it other than new emissions.

Speaking on the laws which the government thinks the
State Duma should adopt first, Chernomyrdin named the
1996 draft budget, and bills on joint-stock companies,
mortgages, limited liability companies, and the second
part of the Civil Code.

Chernomyrdin also thinks that changes to tax legislation
which reflect new economic realities must be made by
the end of the year.

py by ey

coheed a —
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

ae RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Says Defense Spending To Be Increased

LD1310110595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1024 GMT 13 Oct 95

[By Gennadiy Yezhov]

(FBIS Transcribed Text) MOSCOW, October 13
(ITAR-TASS) — Russian Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin said Friday that his government was
ready to reconsider and increase the country’s defence
appropriations as compared to the figures of the 1996
draft budget.

The budget envisages 78.9 trillion roubles (over 17
billion USD) for the purpose, while, according to
sources in the Defence ministry, the military demand
111 trillion roubles (25 billion USD) saying the current
budget figures will not allow the armed forces to be a
reliable guarantor of national security and state integrity
of Russia.

Chernomyrdin did not disclose how much the govern-
ment may add, but told the State Duma that the "govern-
ment was ready to earmark more means for the upkeep
of the army, for buying fuel, food, and the necessary
supplies”.

The premier also promised that the construction of
housing for servicemen would be continued and money
for this would be obtained, among other sources, from
the existing stock markets.

Chernomyrdin said the government deemed it necessary
to continue the development of new military equipment
in order to “possess powerful and highly effective armed
forces". It also intends to expand the export of Russian
armaments.

In spite of the existing difficulties in the national
economy, Russian scientists were able to develop in
1995 several new models of air force equipment, new
types of "air-to-air" missiles, new anti-aircraft missile
complexes, as well as some efficient means for the
Strategic nuclear forces. The Russian army received
a new combat helicopter, developed by the Kamov
Designing Bureau, and several new warships, according
to Chernomyrdin.

Addresses Economic Situation
LD1310093595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0801 GMT 13 Oct 95

{By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Pavel
Kuznetsov]

{FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 13 Oct (ITAR-TASS)
— “The government has not, unfortunately, been able
to prevent the unfavorable situation regarding invest-

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

ments", said Viktor Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Rus-
sian Federation Government, reporting to State Duma
deputies today on the socioeconomic situation in the
country.

According to the prime minister, the volume of capi-
tal investments in 1995 has gone down by 15-17 per-
cent compared with last year. There is still an unfavor-
able situation with regard to nonpayments, Viktor Cher-
nomyrdin noted. The rate of growth of the mutual debt
of Russian enterprises has again started to increase, but
the government is doing everything to halt this trend,
he stressed.

At the same time, he noted, if one makes comparisons
with the past when dubious financial pyramids “blos-
somed" in the country, this year state revenue bonds,
in which the population has great faith, have started to

operate.

In Viktor Chernomyrdin’s opinion, the Russian banking
system "is now showing signs of improvement” and it
is moving toward the financing of long-term investment
in industry. According to a proposal by the president,
he noted, the government is now working out measures
which would help to strengthen Russian banks. This is
being done based on proposals by the Association of
Russian Banks, he noted.

Promises Investors’ Compensation Fund

LD1310103395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0931 GMT 13 Oct 95

[By Pavel Kuznetsov]

{[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 13
(ITAR-TASS) — Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin
today told the State Duma lower house of parliament
that the Russian government would set up a com-
pensation fund to make up for the losses sustained
by investors into banks and funds that went bust in
recent years. There are millions of gullible people
in Russia who succumbed to the charms of pyramid
funds and unreliabie banks promising quick returns on
investments.

As concerns financial plans, the Prime Minister said the
government would help financial companies operating
with the money from individual investors which will
meet the demants of the Federal Commission for
securities and the stock market.

Chernomyrdin also said that the law enforcement agen-
cies will intensify activity in this sphere.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Addresses 1995 ‘Production Slump’

LD1310091695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0825 GMT 13 Oct 95

[By Ivan Novikov]

{[FBIS Transcribed Text) MOSCOW, October 13
(ITAR-TASS) — Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin
today told the State Duma lower house of parliament
that the scale of public production slump this year was
not as wide as last year.

The Prime Minister was addressing a plenary session
of the house. He was speaking about the social and
economic situation in the Russian Federation.

Chernomyrdin said that the gross domestic product
output fell by only three percent in the first nine months
of this year as against 12 percent last year. He reported
that in September the gross domestic product output
was the same as in last year’s September, and signs of
growth appeared in some important industries.

The Russian head of government stressed that many
enterprises were actively looking for a niche of their
own on the market. He said enterprises of this kind
can be found in any sector, although there are still
enterprises which he described as "lying down."

Rejects Miners’ Wage Nonpayment Claims

LD1310104995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0941 GMT 13 Oct 95

[By Gennadiy Yezhov]}

([FBIS Transcribed Text) MOSCOW, October 13
(ITAR-TASS) — Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin
today told the State Duma lower house of parliament
that “all the money allocated to pay wages to the miners
is disbursed in strict compliance with the schedule."

He rejected accusations voiced by the miners that the
government was deliberately holding back the money
earmarked to pay their wages.

The Prime Minister said the situation with non-payment
in the country was the only factor impeding the full
payment of wages to the miners. "We intend to arrange
a mutual settlement between the debtor industries," he
said.

The Prime Minister also promised that the government
would release from the federal budget all the resources
owed to the miners, and "may be even more.”

The Prime Minister said the government had drafted a
resolution on material liability of the debtor enterprises.
He said the enterprises which have accumulated debts
to other enterprises or to their own employees would be
liable for their debts with their property.

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Says Russia Needs ‘Clearcut’ Land Laws

LD1310105295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1031 GMT 13 Oct 95

[By Pavel Kuznetsov]

(FBIS Transcribed Text) MOSCOW, October 13
(ITAR-TASS) — "The country must have clearcut laws
on land ownership," Russian Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin told the State Duma here today, report-
ing on the socio-economic situation in the country.

“Those who fear private land property," he stressed,
“must go away. Their time is over."

He also said that the government would shortly discuss
a programme for the development of the Russian agro-
industrial complex until the year 2000.

Duma Compromise Vote on Federation Council
Reported

MK1310100995 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 12 Oct 95 pp 1, 3

[Report by Yevgeniy Yurev and Veronika Kutsyllo:
"State Duma Plenary Session. Federation Council’s
Future Will Be Decided by President All the Same")

(FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday the State Duma
rushed, through three votes at once, the [draft] law
"On Formation of the Federation Council." It differs
substantially from the president’s draft: the latter pro-
posed that members of the Federation Council could
be representatives of executive and legislative bodies
of power in the regions, whereas the deputies have re-
placed representatives with [administration] heads. The
heads of [local] administrations in the Federation Coun-
cil should necessarily be elected by the population, and
those appointed by the president should face elections
within eight months. The [draft] law is most likely to
be turned down by Yeltsin in the same manner the pre-
ceding [draft] law was.

The situation surrounding the formation of the upper
chamber looked to be going nowhere after the president
rejected the [draft] law passed by the State Duma and
the Federation Council on the election of [Federation
Council] deputies. Attempts made by a conciliation
commission to reach a compromise between having the
deputies elected and the principle of appointing [them]
proposed by the president proved futile. The uncertainty
of the Federation Council’s further fate a little more than
two months before the powers of [the current Federation
Council] deputies expire and the prospect of having no
legitimate upper chamber at all pressured the [Duma]
deputies into accepting the draft law proposed by the
president.

rr report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination

is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

42 RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

The concession the Duma had to make is, in fact, condi-
tional. Amendments to the presidential variant suggested
by Vladimir Isakov, Duma Legislation Committee chair-
man, considerably alter its meaning. This is in fact anew
version of the (draft) law. If one reads carefully Isakov’s
amendments, which became law in no time, many curi-
ous things can be discovered. At first glance, the Duma
agreed with the president by deciding against the purely
elective principle. Compared with the president’s vari-
ant, the Duma made the law even tougher: Members
of the upper chamber cannot b« merely two represen-
tatives of a region’s executive and legislative author-
ity, but specifically the heads of a region’s authorities.
However, the provision that only heads of administra-
tions who were elected by the population can be Fed-
eration Council members clashes with Yeltsin’s famous
edict on "spacing" elections, according to which elec-
tions for governor were scheduled for December 1996.
Under the Duma law, elections for heads of administra-
tion are supposed to be held within eight months of the
law’s entry into force; that is to say, if the Federation
Council approves the [draft] law by the end of October
and the president signs it into law, the deadline for such
elections would virtually coincide with the presidential
elections in June 1996.

Furthermore, under the [draft] law passed yesterday, the
Federation Council might never go to work (at least it
will surely not go to work in December): The Federation
Council is regarded as competent if its members number
at least three quarters of the total number (three quarters
of 178 is 134). At the present time, there are in Russia
87 heads of legislative power (Chechnya and Ulyanovsk
Oblast have none); there are 10 or so elected heads
of administration (experts have doubts about Yuriy
Luzhkov, who was elected by the population as deputy
mayor, while it was Yeltsin who appointed him mayor);
and there are some 20 popularly elected presidents of
republics that are part of Russia.

The formation of [the next] Federation Council is being
made even more of a problem by modest notes to the
effect that its members can be heaus of legislative and
executive bodies of power “elected in correspondence
with the law." It is logical to assume that reference is
made to some laws defining a procedure for electing
bodies of local power. But chairmen of local legislative
assemblies in most oblasts were elected according to an
established procedure rather than according to a law —
that is to say, such laws need to be thought up, and then
elections can be held according to them.

It is not hard to predict the future of the [draft] law
— voting against it will be advocates of the original
election variant (90 deputies voted for it on 28 July),
and simply sober politicians who realize that such a law

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

would not make it possible to form a chamber that will
be able to work. The [draft] could become law if the
president agrees to elect all governors on 17 December,
but this is extremely improbable.

Equally improbable is that in thinking up his amend-
ments, Vladimir Isakov did not realize that the law
would not work. This must have been the only objec-
tive — to provoke the president into displaying a lack
of flexibility and into turning down the [draft] law. The
plan, if there was such, plays right into Boris Yeltsin’s
hands: According to KOMMERSANT-DAILY’s infor-
mation, no special hopes were pinned on the Duma,
and sending the president’s version to the deputies was
merely a goodwill gesture — the presidential edict on
the formation of the Federation Council has long been
awaiting its hour (in particular, definition by the Con-
Stitutional Court of the term "formation"). Incidentally,
it is possible that a seat for Vladimir Shumeyko may be
found in it — neither the president’s nor Isakov’s texts
provide for any Russian Federation representatives at
all.

Setting rather high standards for future deputies, the
current ones proved far too lenient toward themselves
and disagreed with a proposal on amending the law on
deputies’ status that too broadly interprets the deputies’
immunity: An attempt to narrow the limits of deputies’
immunity was rejected.

Duma Rejects Draft Law Limiting Deputies’
Immunity

MK1310114395 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
12 Oct 95 pl

[Report by Petr Zhuraviev: “The Majority of Duma
Deputies Are Not Yet Ready To Give Up Some of Their
Privileges"}

{[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, the State Duma
failed to pass amendments to the law on the status
of a deputy, envisioning a reduction in deputies’ level
of immunity. Only 180 parliament members voted to
approve the amendments on the first reading.

In accordance with the current law on status, a criminal
case against a member of the State Duma or the
Federation Council can only be initiated (or an arrest
or search can only be made) after the consent of
the chamber is obtained. Yesterday, Deputy Grigoriy
Bondarev proposed that the law be amended so that
the chambers would interfere at a later stage and give
consent not on the initiation of a case, but with its
transfer to a court. "A deputy’s office has become
very attractive for criminal elements," Mr. Bondarev
emphasized in his speech at the session. In his words, if

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

the amendments are passed, law-enforcement agencies
will only be able to interrogate a deputy; as regards his
search or arrest, everything will remain as it is now.

Mr. Bondarev was criticized by nearly everyone who
took part in the debate — some for the "rigidity,"
others for the “softness” of his approach. Among the
former was Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who accused the
proponent of distorting “the very essence of immunity.”
Viktor Ilyukhin, head of the Security Committee, in turn
emphasized that Mr. Bondarev proposed "a somewhat
limited version” of amendments to the law. In Mr.
Ilyukhin’s opinion, immunity should not be extended
to deputies who “have committed crimes not related to
their official activity.”

As a result, Mr. Ilyukhin’s committee was commis-
sioned yesterday to elaborate, together with Mr. Bon-
darev, draft amendments and submit them to one of the
next sessions.

Duma Urges Government To End State Pensions
Crisis

LD1310110895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1034 GMT 13 Oct 95

[By Ivan Novikov]

{FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW October 13 (ITAR-
TASS) — The State Duma has suggested that the gov-
ernment work out within two weeks a comprehensive
plan of measures to take the state pensions system out
of the crisis.

At a plenary meeting here on Friday, the Duma adopted
a Bill “On measures to ensure the timely payment
of pensions in the fourth quarter of 1995". The Bill
determines a procedure for urgent financial aid to the
Pensions Foundation in the fourth quarter in view of the
critical situation concerning the payment of pensions.

With a view to radically changing the situation, the
Central Bank has been advised to grant a non-interest
credit of 3,000,000 million roubles to the Pensions
Foundation in October this year for a term of six months
resultant of selling part of currency or gold reserve.

It is now up to the Federation Council to confirm or
turn down the Duma-adopted Bill.

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS 43

Regional Affairs
Chechnya Reportage: Negotiations, Politics,
Military

Yeltsin Pledges ‘No More War’

LD1310090795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0843 GMT 13 Oct 95

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

(FBIS Transcribed Text} MOSCOW October 13 (ITAR-
TASS) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin pledged on
Friday that there will be no more war in Chechnya
despite all provocations by militants loyal to separatist
leader Dzhokhar Dudayev.

“We shall not sidetrack from the peaceful path no matter
how Dzhokhar Dudayev pushes us to that", the president
told a meeting of regional governors.

“The political stability in the whole of Russia depends
on what the situation will be in the Chechen republic",
the president stressed.

Talks about a possible state of emergency in Chech-
nya began after assassination attempts were staged in
Groznyy on presidential envoy Oleg Lobov and federal
troops commander Anatoliy Romanov. Lobov escaped
unharmed, while Romanov is still in coma in a Moscow
hospital.

Russian top military officials backed the introduction of
the emergency situation which could have triggered the
resumption of combat activities, but Yeltsin refused.

"We shall help Chechnya materially, in the sphere of
construction, economic restoration, in paying pensions
which the population have not received under the
Dudayev regime for three years", Yeltsin said.

“We shall also pay wages and fight unemployment in
the Chechen republic", the president said adding that
Dudayev had brought Chechnya to a complete collapse.

Volskiy Thinks War Not To Be Resumed
MK1310061195 Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA
in Russian
No. 41, 12-18 Oct 95 (Signed to press 11 Oct 95) p 1
{Interview with Arkadiy Volskiy by Vitaliy Yaro-
shevskiy; place and date not given: “The Time of Sab-
otage")
(FBIS Translated Text] [Yaroshevskiy] Two months ago
you promised to name the representatives of the “party
of war" in the Kremlin and have not done so to date.
Can you do it now?

: may contain Shsed material Coovina and di ee
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

As RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

[Volskiy] The question is not about personalities. There
is a certain group, mainly the military, who believe
that first the Dudayevites had to be finished off and
then negotiations conducted. With whom? And where?
At the cemetery? And what does finishing off mean?
The local authorities say that a mere 1,000 Dudayevites
are left. Some even say 600. Even if they are 10
times as numerous, they can still be finished off. But
Dudayevism today has affected the entire republic.
Chechens sympathizing with Dudayev have spread
around in cities and villages. In daytime they plow the
land, and at night they take up arms. Who is there
to finish off? The Chechen people? Even according
to official figures, 26,000 civilians have already been
killed. And the local government cites figures three
times as high.

[Yaroshevskiy] After the attack on Lobov and Romanov
there is now talk about a mysterious "third force." What
is it?

[Volskiy] I would say this: There should be a will to
look for this force. The impression is that no one wants
to find the organizers of the attack. This worries me
more than anyihing else.

Here is one terrible example. In late July the Chapanov
family was murdered in a Groznyy suburb: four kids, a
woman, and an old man. This shocked all of Groznyy;
the negotiations were on the verge of collapse. Criminal
proceedings were instituted. The Russian president
stated that he would personally monitor the progress
of the investigation. My understanding is that once the
president has made such a statement, it is necessary
to set up a special group at the top level. In fact the
investigation of this monstrous crime was entrusted to
the local prosecutor’s office, which has no access to
either the Dudayevites or the troops.

The same happened with the attack on Lobov. The
Dudayevites swear that they stand to lose from this
assassination attempt. Maskhadov confirmed this, as
a military man: The leaves are falling; the forest is
becoming bare. The gunmen are clearly visible. Should
hostilities resume, they will simply be wiped out in their
mountain camps.

After the attack on Romanov, Maskhadov said that he
would personally execute those who had blown up his
friend. But nothing has changed. Therefore you can talk
seriously about a third force only when the investigation
is Carried on reasonably. But it has to be conducted in
the first place. There are clear-cut traces; the criminals
laid 250 meters of wire from the explosives to the
detonator. Shortly before the attack on Romanov, the
car of Mikhaylov, head of the Russian delegation at
the negotiations in Groznyy, came under fire — exactly

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

from the bridge on Minutka Square, under which the
general’s car was blown up. There was nothing about
this in the press, although the car had come under
serious attack. Thank God everyone lived. Mikhaylov
did not report the attack. After that armored personnel
Carriers and patrols were stationed on the bridge. Why
were they withdrawn several days before the terrorist
act against Romanov?

And the main thing: The pattern in Lobov’s and
Romanov’s cases is the same. Even the wires and
detonators are the same. What else is there to say?
Therefore I believe that no one is really looking for
the criminals.

[Yaroshevskiy] Romanov should have been given extra
protection. What has happened is yet another failure by
our special services?

[Volskiy] There is some prehistory to this. Some 40
minutes before the attack, Romanov had arranged to
meet with Khasbulatov. In all likelihood, somebody who
was very well informed and stood very near the general
in both a direct and a figurative way prompted him
toward this meeting in order to expedite the terrorist
act. Romanov could not have bypassed Minutka. This
was known. Someone did everything very expeditiously.
The charges were suspended under the bridge and it was
easy to install them quickly, especially if there was no
security.

The third force is rather powerful. Look at the
Khadzhiyev government. From the first day they
have said: We must control Russian troops. Romanov
categorically rejected that. Gantemirov, the mayor of
Groznyy, invariably objected to the participation of
OSCE officials in the negotiations. I saw him send
several warnings to the OSCE headquarters: You must
leave Groznyy. Romanov for his part supported the
European diplomats. He followed a reasonable policy
and as a result made enemies, even among those who
are sympathetic to Russia. Therefore the investigation
should be comprehensive.

[Yaroshevskiy] Is there a limit to the Russians’ pa-
tience? What about the Chechens?

{Vulskiy] The patience of the Russian people has run
out. I accidentally got aboard an aircraft carrying 16
coffins with dead soldiers to Samara. I know what
sorrow means; I saw it with my own eyes. But if a
large-scale war begins, there will be no fewer casualties.
Chechen society is divided, but the majority still want
the war to end.

[Yaroshevskiy] The Russian “delegates” in Groznyy
are not free people. There are guidelines for them to
follow from above; there is an action plan. But still:

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Have Moscow instructions always been in line with
your convictions? Has it ever happened that “ultimate
considerations" ran against your conscience?

[Volskiy] Probably not. I am not a flatterer. But I must
say that both the president and the prime minister are
clearly set on calming society down before the elections.

[Yaroshevskiy] The military agreements have been
put on hold. Minister Kulikov insists that a state of
emergency be imposed. President Yeltsin is thinking
about it....

[Volskiy] It was last December, when we were bringing
troops into Chechnya, that a state of emergency should
have been imposed. Now is not the best time. If a state
of emergency is imposed, the interior troops will not
be enough. Therefore, a state of emergency should only
be imposed in Groznyy, at most, in this one city, while
nearly half of the Chechen villages — approximately
400 — live a quiet life. These are zones free from the
gunmen. Should a state of emergency also be imposed
there? Russian presidential advisers divided 3:2. Three
are against the state of emergency and two are in favor.

[Yaroshevskiy] What is awaiting us after all? Will a
new war begin?

[Volskiy] I don’t think so, although a day before the
attack on Romanov [Defense Minister] Grachev actu-
ally advocated the resumption of war. A coincidence?
Possibly. Nonetheless, you should carefully watch the
moves of the power structures.

Service Warns of Dudayev Attack Plans

LD1310091295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0806 GMT 13 Oct 95

[By Nikolay Zagnoyko]

{(FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY October 13
(ITAR-TASS) — The Russian Security Service offi-
cially warned on Friday that Chechen separatist leader
Dzhokhar Dudayev was planning to stage provocations
against the local population and to put the blame for
that on the Moscow-backed Chechen police.

Local Chechens are to be kidnapped by militants
dressed in Russian police uniform and rumours about
an upcoming Stalin-style deportation of Chechens are
to be spread, according to the statement of an official
Security Service spokesman in Chechnya.

“According to information received by the Russian Fed-
eral Security Service in Chechnya, some field comman-
ders of unlawful armed units have received orders from
Dudayev to stage in the near future demonstrative ac-
tions and seize Chechens and members of their families
by militants dressed in police uniform. Dudayev also

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS 45

instructed to explain to the population that the seizures
are staged by the Chechen Interior ministry in prepa-
rations for an alleged mass deportation of the Chechen
people", says the document distributed among reporters
in Groznyy.

Chechen Gunmen Target Lobov

LD1210175195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1739 GMT 12 Oct 95

{(FBIS Transcribed Text) GROZNYY, October 12
(ITAR-TASS) — Unidentified gunmen on Thursday
{12 October] fired several shots at the windows of
the office of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's envoy
for Chechnya Oleg Lobov, ITAR-TASS correspondent
Nikolay Zagnoyko reported from the Chechen capital.

The office is situated on the second floor of the Federal
Administration building in Groznyy.

No casualties have been reported.

Presumably, the attackers were situated in the building
on the opposite side of the street. Guards of the Federal
Administration retaliated with fire. As of now, the
shootout is apparently over, the correspondent said.

Shkirko Said To Follow Same ‘Policy’

LD1210180595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1713 GMT 12 Oct 95

(By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Nikolay Sag-
noiko]

(FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy, 12 Oct (ITAR-TASS)
— "The appointment of Lieutenant General Anatoliy
Shkirko, the new commander of the Joint Group of
Federal Forces in Chechnya points to the fact that
the course of the Russian Government in relation
to ways of resolving the conflict in Chechnya will
remain unchanged,” Vladimir Zolin, first deputy head
of the territorial administration of the federai organs of
executive power in Chechnya said today in an interview
with the ITAR-TASS correspondent,

"General Shkirko, Romanov, and Kulikov, as far as I
know, are people of the same command, one approach,
and one policy, said Zolin. In their aim to guarantee
the unconditional implementation of the agreement
achieved earlier on the bloc of military issues the new
commander will meet with the full support of not only
the leadership of the territorial administration of the
federal organs of executive power but also, which is
very important, the organs of civilian power of the
republic and a wide section of the population."

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

ae RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

More on Shkirko as Troop Commander

LD1210210695 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1924 GMT 12 Oct 95

(FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Oct 12 (INTER-
FAX) — By order of the Russian interior minister,
Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Shkirko on Thursday was
appointed the commander of the combined contingent
of federal troops in Chechnya.

Shkirko has replaced General Anatoliy Romanov, who
is in a serious condition at the Burdenko military
hospital in Moscow following the attempt on his life
in Groznyy on October 6.

An Interior Méinistry’s Public Relations Center
spokesman told INTERFAX that Shkirko, 48, is the
chief of staff, first deputy commander of the interior
troops.

Shkirko was born in Groznyy. He graduated from the
higher military school in the city of Ordzhonikidze,
now Vladikavkaz. He served in interior troops in the
Baltic republics, in the Urals and in Western Siberia.
He graduated from the General Staff Academy in 1991.

According to the spokesman, Shkirko is an expert in
the problems of the North Caucasus. While first deputy
interior troops commander he often stayed in Groznyy
and knows the current situation in Chechnya well.

Meanwhile, sources in the federal troop command in
Groznyy told INTERFAX that the combined contingent
of federal troops in Chechnya had been renamed into
Russia’s provisional forces in the Chechen republic.
Correspondingly, General Shkirko will enjoy the status
of the commander of these provisional forces.

Federal Troop Contingent in Chechnya Renamed

LD1210212395 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian
2025 GMT 12 Oct 95

(FBIS Translated Text] The joint group of federal
forces in Chechnya has been renamed the Temporary
Joint Forces of Russia on the Territory of Chechnya
[Vremennyye obyedinennyye sily Rossii na territorii
Chechni], sources in the federal command in Groznyy
have told INTERFAX news agency.

Maslov Favors Limited Emergency State

LD1210195295 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1712 GMT 12 Oct 95

([FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Oct 12 (INTER-
FAX) — Pavel Maslov, deputy commander of Russian
Defense Ministry troops in Chechnya, spoke in favor of
declaring a state of emergency in several regions of the
republic.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

He told INTERFAX that the state of emergency need
not affect the whole of Chechnya. "It will be enough to
declare it in Groznyy and the Achkhoy-Martan region
(on Ingush border — IF Note),”" said Maslov. He said
that the measure is due to bustling terrorist activity in
Groznyy.

According to Maslov, should the state of emergency
be declared it will not hamper but will even facilitate
the work of the Special Supervising Commission. Given
the guarantees we provided to the Dudayev side at the
talks, we will be able to ensure their free movement by
issuing passes, warning check points, providing escort
and security, said Maslov.

He believes that the state of emergency would allow
troops to better tackle the issue of “the illegal armed
groups which Dudayev supporters characterize as the
third force" impeding the talks.

"Under the state of emergency we would have broader
powers in order to take more efficient measures against
such groups,” said Maslov.

Maslov: Dudayev Fails To Honor Accord

LD1210194795 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1712 GMT 12 Oct 95

(FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Oct 12 (INTER-
FAX) — Chechen unit commanders and Dudayev’s ne-
gotiators at the Special Supervisory Commission talks
are unwilling to fulfill the signed military accord, Pavel
Maslov, deputy commander of the Russian Defense
Ministry’s forces in Chechnya, declared in an exclu-
sive interview with INTERFAX on Thursday.

Chechen units, “using the agreement as a cover, have
considerably expanded the zones of their influence”
through territorial conquest, he added.

Maslov also reported that in western Chechnya all along
the confrontation line from Bamut to Tanga it was
Dudayev’s men who had provoked fighting.

"The so-called peace policy of Dudayev is expressed as
on litmus paper: It is he who has led these illegal armed
units and has blessed his field commanders,” Maslov
said.

Lobov Interviewed on Chechen Situation

LD1110233995 Moscow Russian Public Television
First Channel Network in Russian
1610 GMT 11 Oct 95

{Studio interview with Oleg Lobov, secretary of the
Russian Federation Security Council, by program an-

ppl te tai ighted al. C : and di : :
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

nouncer Dmitriy Kiselev on 11 October — live or
recorded; from the "Rush Hour” program]

{FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Kiselev]
Oleg Ivanovich, we received alarming news, reports
from Chechnya that Dzhokhar Dudayev who heads the
defense committee in the self-proclaimed republic of
Ichkeriya has announced that Chechnya is leaving the
military bloc of accords with Russia. A number of acts
of terrorism have previously been committed, including
attempts on your life and on General Anatoliy Romanov
who has still not regained consciousness according to
the most recent reports and is in a serious condition
in the Burdenko hospital. And this is despite the fact
that only a few weeks ago Arkadiy Volskiy, a member
our delegation at the talks, said in this studio that our
mothers, the soldiers’ mothers could sleep soundly. And
now what? Will there be war again?

{Lobov] I do not think so. If you look at the history of
the talks and the conclusion of military agreements, you
will not see a major role for Dudayev there. He did not
sign any document. And he also made many comments
which contradicted accords, and repeatedly. Completely
different people signed them. But unfortunately, of what
was signed, virtually no point in the agreement was
implemented. There have always been veasons why
the timetable for the surrender of weapous should be
reconsidered, why approaches should be reconsidered,
why there should be some question of a pause, and so
on. I think that Dudayev chose the worst moment for
his statement. A time when the main political figure,
and military figure, General Romanov is unconscious.

(Kiselev}] But nevertheless, the political situation and
the military situation are probably escalating because
reports are coming in every day about our troops being
shelled, our soldiers are being killed. One was killed
again last night. Who does this escalation of the situation
suit? IZVESTIYA put forward two versions yesterday.
The first was that the escalation of the situation suited
the Chechen leaders who are losing popularity on the
eve of the elections which are still planned. Do you
agree with this version?

{Lobov] I think that it is difficult to agree because there
has been no opinion poll on the popularity of the interim
government and the Committee of National Accord.
And we cannot speak about the people’s opinion. It
is better to speak about the opinions of individual
leaders and political figures. It is no secret that there
are several groups in the Chechen republic and several
political leaders who claim the role of leader. You
know that Khasbulatov has now actively joined in the
political process as has the former first secretary of the
Chechen-Ingush republic and the current party regional

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS 47

committee, Zavgayev. He is also the chairman of the
Supreme Soviet — a session was held recently and the
Chechen supreme soviet was again set up. These are
the real political figures who enjoy some confidence
among part of the population. I think that there is
also some confidence in Salambek Khadzhiyev’s interim
government and the Committee of National Accord. But
no one has the majority, just as Dudayev does not have
the support of the majority of the population.

[Kiselev] There is another version which IZVESTIYA
presents that there is a certain advantage to army circles
in Russia who use Chechnya as a stage post for the
arms trade — that is what IZVESTIYA says. Or, in
other words, it is like a black hole in which weapons
disappear without trace. What is your view on this?

{Lobov] I disagree completely. I think this version bears
very little resemblance to what is happening today.
This might have been the case in 1991, or in 1990,
when weapons started to go missing. The situation is
completely different now.

[Kiselev] [passage omitted) The irreconcilable
Chechens say: We will commit a number of acts
of terrorism, then we will blow up an atomic power
station. First Basayev seizes a hospital in Budennovsk,
then a number of acts of terrorism are carried out
successfully, they put General Romanov out of action
at least. Will they get to the atomic power stations,
what are we to expect in the future?

[Lobov] The problem of terrorism exists throughout the
world. And whereas terrorists earlier limited themselves
to seizing hostages, they then went on to aeroplanes and
they have no gone on to hospitals and so on. So the dy-
namics may not be favorable but nevertheless this route
is one without prospects. On the one hand Dudayev is
proclaiming, including during his last interview, that he
will never stoop to terrorism whereas we know of his
Statements and calls for Russia to be burnt down in an
atomic fire. What is that if not a call to terrorism. So
we must be ready to deflect attempts at terror, including
atomic terror. There is a statement by the Ministry of
Atomic Power Engineering on this subject. Of course
the law and order bodies are taking measures to prevent
acts of terrorism and no one should hope that terrorists
will go unpunished. I think that even Basayev should
understand that a second attempt to get out by talks
will, of course, end in failure for him.

[Kiselev] Well, the experience to date of combating
terrorism is on the whole not thoroughly in our favor.
Romanov is in hospital, and Budennovsk ...

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48 RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

[Lobov, interrupting] One certainly cannot tot up things
like this. This is not arithmetic or mathematics or a case
of what the score is on this or that side."

[Kiselev] Chechnya’s economic problems and the prob-
lems of Chechnya’s restoration are certainly no less a
headache than the military and political problems. Quite
a lot of money is now being expended. According to a
report in SEGODNYA you have put forward the slo-
gan: Proceed not from the possibilities of the budget,
but from the requirements of the republic. If one is to
believe the Ministry of Finance, about 2.5 billion rubles
[R] has been directed to Chechnya since the start of the
year, and in September Anatoliy Chubays spoke of the
need for a further RS billion. It seems that Chechnya is
indeed turning into an economic black hole for Russia,
and all this is happening in conditions and in a context
that IZVESTIYA has described. [passage omitted]

{[Lobov}] Well, I am not acquainted with the
IZVESTIYA correspondent nor know on what ba-
sis he drew the profound conclusion that everyoue
is engaged in theft. I think that it is an improbable
exaggeration to say that everyone is engaged in theft.
What then is the situation in actual fact? The financing
is taking place through three channels. The first channel
is the republic’s subsidized budget and about 25-30
percent of the funding is through that. The remainder
of the money passes through the two main contractors,
the Russian Ministry of Construction and the Agro-
Industrial Construction Agency. They are the holders
of the government’s money and the money of the
commercial banks. The Ministry of Finance, the body
allocating the money, is responsible for monitoring the
correct expenditure of the various funds. The relevant
machinery exists for this. Therefore in regard to the
claim that everyone has learned to steal, I would ask
that specific instances be cited.

Unfortunately, no one has been able to provide me with
specific instances. For this purpose there are specific
services to monitor the passage of the money. It is
another thing that the system of financing is not perfect.
It is not perfect, especially when the banks are located
in Moscow and their branches, say, in Pyatigorsk or
Vladikavkaz, while no branches exist locally. Now,
however, the passage of funds is being put into order
and going through the Central Bank and the field bank
of the Central Bank, which is a military bank. The safety
of the funds is being guaranteed. In this case the funds
are getting through in just one or two days or three at
the most instead of 10-12 days. The situation has in this
respect been rectified therefore.

As for whether much or little has been invested there, it
has so far been very little. At the same time the life of

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

the Chechen republic is already starting up, including its
industrial enterprises and agriculture. To my mind the
Chechen people comprise not only Chechens but also
Russians and other nationalities. They are an industrious
people and we must proceed on that basis. If there are
thieves among them, then there are thieves too among
other peoples. We must clearly separate the bandits,
thieves and mafiosi from the ordinary people, who
constitute the majority.

[Kiselev] Oleg Ivanovich, if one is to speak about
specific instances, I could certainly cite some, and
not just in these areas about which we have been
speaking. For example, take the latest instance that I
heard of. The Ministry of Health allocated R1.5 billion
for the purchase of 41 ambulances for Chechnya. Ten
ambulances were purchased, while the money for the
31 others vanished. Probably this is not ...

{Lobov, interrupting] Well, law-enforcement bodies
exist. The prosecutor’s office and investigators exist.
Things need to Se investigated and, if that is what has
happened, people must be held accountable under the
law. Is that not so?

[Kiselev] It certainly is, but that is what we have
been speaking about. [passage omitted] The well-known
human rights defender Sergey Adamovich Kovalev
expresses his own views, of course, and not everyone
shares them, but you are surely aware that statements by
Russian leaders do not always inspire trust. Moreover,
Sergey Adamovich Kovalev is prepared, he stated in this
Studio yesterday that he is prepared to defend in court
what he has said about the violation of human rights
in Chechnya, about torture, about the barbarity of our
special forces, and so on. Are you ready to face such a
court with him?

[Lobov] To attend a court with him? I have no intention
of attending a court with him because he is an important
person himself, he is evidently applying these things
to himself because he has got into situations where he
could be accused of lying. I think this kind of situation
occurs with the problem of Chechnya where he quite
clearly took one side — the violation of human rights,
which is difficult to deny. That is, there have been cases
of looting, there have been cases of theft and there have
been cases of brutality. But unfortunately this is not
happening on one side but on all sides. And this needs
to be seen, there must be an objective approach by all
leaders and all of those involved in this matter. So the
fault can be spread a little further than to individual
leaders on the Russian side.

[Kiselev] Of course. So you admit that during the
resolution of the Chechen crisis, quite serious, wide-
scale, global mistakes — perhaps even crimes — were

is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

(tr report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

committed. And if so, who bears the responsibility for
them and who will answer and how will they answer?

[Lobov] Some will answer with their jobs, some will
answer with their positions. You know from what
happened in Budennovsk, this was connected, that is
both ministers and deputy ministers answered as did
those of a lower rank. I think that the responsibility
also extends to other levels, including servicemen. I
have been told that 25 cases concerning crimes among
servicemen have gone to trial and the culprits have
been punished. That is to say, the information reported
in the mass media was just that 25 cases had been
instituted. This is not so. Those cases have indeed
ended, and a considerably greater number of cases have
been instituted. But this does not mean that all the
shortcomings have now been eliminated. Bad things
do happen, and work is now being stepped up by the
military prosecutor’s office, the general prosecutor's
office, the interregional prosecutor's office and finally
the local prosecutor’s office in the Chechen Republic.
The judicial system is being restored. So quite serious
measures are now being taken in this area.

[Kiselev) At present Chechnya is one of the sore points
in the presentday life of Russia, which is bigger than
Chechnya in the direct and figurative sense of the word.
You are the secretary of the Security Council. What are
your priorities in defending the security of Russia as a
whole?

[Lobov] When we formed the apparatus of the Security
Council — there was a fantastic report, you know, that
some 12,000 people work in its apparatus, but in actual
fact there are fewer than 150 — we selected three areas,
namely, military security, economic security and public
security. In addition 10 interdepartmental commissions
are at work in point of fact on a voluntary basis. They
cover ecology, public health, international affairs, and so
on. Of all these problems I would highlight the principal
task of preserving our statehood and the integrity of
Russia. The disintegration of Russia will not permit the
solution of ecological, economic or political problems
and could become a detonator in point of fact on a global
scale for the destabilization of the whole world.

[Kiselev] Is the president of the same mind?
{Lobov] I hope so.

[Kiselev] Thank you. Now it is the turn for questions
from our viewers.

The first question, please.

[Male viewer] I would like to ask what percentage of
people in Chechnya now support Dzhokhar Dudayev.

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS ae

{Lobov} An opinion poll was carried out by a newspaper
and it was estimated that the percentage of support
is about 18 percent. That was the estimate of a local

newspaper. [passage omitted]

[Male viewer] My question is as follows. What would
your attitude be to a scenario where we leave Chechnya,
all Russians are withdrawn from there and a rigid
frontier is established between Russia and Chechnya.
What would come of that?

{Lobov] Nothing good would come of it. On the
contrary, it would be a tragedy not only for the Chechen
people but for the Russian people too.

[Female viewer) Dudayev yesterday demanded that
international observers be sent to Chechnya. What then
are the OSCE representatives doing there?

[Lobov] In actual fact there are international observers
in Chechnya in the person of the OSCE. We have good
contacts with them. What is more, I known that they are
in contact with Dudayev’s side — in reliable and even
direct contact with Dudayev. There is therefore no need
at present, I think, to broaden the number of observers,
the more so since it would be fairly difficult for them
and constitute a certain amount of danger.

[Kiselev] Oleg Ivanovich, they are in contact with
Dudayev, but as far as I understand a decision has been
taken — well, Dudayev is considered to be a criminal
and it is intended, as it were, to arrest him. Well, are
we unable to arrest Dudayev, or do we not want to?

[Lobov] Can I decline to answer that question. It is more
for other people.

[Kiselev] Yes, of course. Today’s “Rush Hour" was
with Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Security Council,
who represents the Russian president in Chechnya. Oleg
Lobov is unwilling to answer the question of whether
it is possible to arrest Dudayev. Our guest in the studio
tomorrow will be the priest Mikhail Ardov. Till we meet
tomorrow then!

Air Raid Turns Residents Against Russia

MM1310102895 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Oct 95 pl

{Report by Igor Rotar: "Bombing of Roshni-Chu Is
Russian Army’s Gift to the Rebel Dudayev")

(FBIS Translated Text) Urus-Martan Rayon, Groznyy
— All the approaches to the village of Roshni-Chu
in Urus-Martan Rayon, the village hit by the recent
Russian air raids, have been blocked off by federal
troops. “We have an order not to admit journalists,”

prep : Eskaed analesial Clonminn anil dlasasskend’
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50 RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

men from the Irkutsk OMON [Special Purpose Police
Detachment] on duty at the checkpoint told me.

Nevertheless, I managed to get through to the scenes of
the recent bombardments. The air raid left one street
almost completely destroyed and around 60 families
homeless. As I was told at the Urus-Martan Rayon
Internal Affairs Department [ROVD], eight civilians
died. They included a six-year old girl. There were
19 people injured. “There are 15 air-raid victims in
hospital today, seven of them in a serious condition.
I hope that we will manage to save all their lives but
whatever happens many of them will be crippled. At
least two will have to have limbs amputated. Come
to the wards yourself and look at these ‘gunmen’ —
the majority of them are children of preschool age and
women," Ruslan Visarigov, chief doctor at the Urus-
Martan hospital, said.

This rayon was traditionally considered a stronghold of
the anti-Dudayev opposition. During Dudayev’s rule the
rayon’s inhabitants refused to recognize the authority of
the first Chechen president. It was here in summer 1994
that Beslan Gantemirov, now mayor of Groznyy, formed
his armed detachments to combat Dudayev.

What Dudayev failed to do, the Russian Army has
managed to do for him. During the first Chechen
president’s rule the inhabitants of the rayon refused to
hoist Dudayev’s banners over the rural soviet despite
coercion. Today, however, those same villagers are
voluntarily raising banners which they detested a year
ago in the most prominent places in their villages. Today
the green banner with a wolf, the symbol of the Chechen
resistance, can be seen everywhere and the walls of
buildings are daubed with the inscription: "We're with
you, Dzhokhar. Freedom or death!"

"In the elections people will vote for anyone who
is against Russia. When the Russian troops arrived |
convinced people not to be afraid of them. I said that
we had nothing to fear from our Russian Army. Now I
am ashamed to look my fellow-countrymen in the face,”
Eduard Mashakayev, superintendent of the Urus-Martan
ROVD, told your IZVESTIYA correspondent.

The bombing of Roshni-Chu was a marvelous free gift
to the supporters of war until victory in the Dudayev
camp — Russia is managing to turn the inhabitants of
recently loyal rayons against itself and the rebellious
president is being given new supporters.

Dudayev’s State Committee for the Defense of Chech-
nya has stated that, because of the air raid on the
Chechen village of Roshni-Chu, the talks and imple-
mentation of the agreement on military questions are
being suspended until the arrival of international ob-

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

servers and UN peacekeeping forces. But Chechen inde-
pendence rallies are continuing in Groznyy. The demon-
strators managed to raise Dudayev’s flag over the ruins
of the president’s palace. Has everything come “full cir-
cle"?

Explosion Destroys Chemical Plant in Sverdlovsk

LD1310113795 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1130 GMT 13 Oct 95

(FBIS Transcribed Text) YEKATERINBURG, Oct 13
(INTERFAX-EURASIA) — An explosion inside a shop
for mixing explosive substances destroyed haif of a
chemical plant in the Neviyanskiy District of Rus-
sia’s Sverdlovsk Oblast, the Sverdlovsk commission for
emergency situations told INTERFAX. The explosion
took place Thursday night.

There were no casualties in the fully automated shop
but a worker in the neighboring shop was badly burnt
and was taken to hospital.

The explosion inflicted 3.5 billion ruble damages.

An investigation team that brings together representa-
tives of the prosecutor's office «nd security officers, as
well as an expert commission, are looking into the case.

Economic Issues
Finance Minister Restates Stance on 1996 Budget

MM1210153395 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Oct 95 p2

{Report by Nikolay Gorokhov of the "Financial Infor-
mation Agency” especially for IZVESTIYA: “Govern-
ment Will Insist on Its Version of Budget-96 and Will
Try To Show Deputies the Feasibility of Its Forecasts
of Achieving 1-Percent Monthly Inflation Next Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Finance Minister Vladimir Pan-
skov said Wednesday [11 October] that the government
will submit a draft federal budget with what are now
well-known base indicators — expenditure of 414.421
trillion rubles [R], revenue of R332.573 trillion, and a
maximum deficit of R81.847 — to a plenary session
of the State Duma. The budget is based on a fore-
cast monthly inflation figure of 1.2 percent and GDP
of R2,100 trillion.

Deputies’ serious criticism of the government's draft
1996 federal budget over the last few weeks has failed
to put a damper on its desire to bring the batfle to a
victorious conclusion.

During a special briefing on Wednesday given by
Vladimir Panskov, who had returned from Washington a
day ahead of schedule evidently to properly prepare for

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

the battle with the Duma scheduled for 13 October, the
minister talked about the positions that the government
will be upholding.

“The government has no intention of recalculating the
draft 1996 federal budget in response to the parliamen-
tary commission’s request and the decision adopted by
participants in the State Duma budget hearings that the
monthly inflation level be raised from 1 to 3-5 percent,"
the minister said, thus once again reinforcing the grav-
ity of his position.

Panskov did not, however, rule out a compromise
solution, which presupposes a rise in the level of
inflation to 2 percent, but only “if deputies decide
to set up a conciliation commission in line with the
recommendations of the State Duma’s Budget and
Finance Committee, adopted by deputies Saturday 7
October."

According to the minister, the scenario proposed by the
budget committee, which presupposes constructive joint
work by deputies and the government on the proposed
budget projections, is also acceptable and gives rise to
hope that the budget will be adopted before the current
Federal Assembly’s term of office expires.

The minister confirmed the feasibility of the Finance
Ministry’s calculations based on 1-percent inflation,
stressing that computations based on a higher level
of inflation would entail insuperable difficulties with
the implementation of the economic reform policy in
Russia.

Should that happen, the finance minister pointed out, all
the government’s efforts during the talks with the Paris
and London Clubs to reschedule the former USSR’s
foreign debt would be “nullified.”

Agriculture Minister Cited on Grain Harvest, Prices

MMI1210134895 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN
in Russian 12 Oct 95 pl

(Report by Tamara Lezhnina: "Figures for First Phase.
State Has So Far Only Bought 500,000 Tonnes of Grain.
But There Should Be a Minimum of 8.6 Million Tonnes
in the Homeland’s Granaries"]

(FBIS Translated Text] Will we have our own grain?
We can report that at a recent press conference Russian
Minister of Agriculture and Food A.G. Nazarchuk
replied overall in the affirmative to this burning question
that concerns everybody. True, the expected grain yield
of 65-66 million tonnes is the lowest since 1965. But
the demand for bread grain of 24-25 million tonnes can
still be satisfied from domestic production.

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS 51

The agriculture department head did not conceal how
hard it would be to accomplish this task. The federal
food stocks have as yet only received 500,000 of a
planned total of 8.6 million tonrss of grain. The reason
for this is that the Ministry of A; ‘culture and Food and
the Federal Food Corporation are short of funds.

It is very likely that the peasants’ crops wili be bought
up by commercial structures, from which it will prove
necessary to acquire the grain later at world prices.
It seems that it will prove expensive to obtain the
necessary capital from commercial banks at a high
interest rate, which threatens to push the price of a
loaf of bread up to 5,000 rubles [R]. Therefore, it is
considered at the Ministry of Agriculture and Food that
the government should defray a portion of the outlay
and could arrange this credit as a budget loan at an
annual rate of 60 percent.

One thing is clear: We cannot run away from resolving
these problems. Either we purchase grain from our own
commodity producers today, or tomorrow we will not
only be forced to buy it from commercial structures,
but from abroad, the minister emphasized. At the same
time it cannot be ruled out that our own grain may in
the meantime go abroad, to Poland, which has already
requested it from us on more than one occasion. A.G.
Nazarchuk linked the present situation in the grain
market with the departure from the traditional method
of financing the agro-industrial complex, which has
had a negative effect by weakening the rural areas’
materials and technical base. Such a policy threatens
the agro-industrial complex with serious problems next
year as well. Of 12 million hectares of winter crops,
only 1.5 million have received fertilizer; what is more,
a significant proportion of them have been sown with
nongrade seeds.

It is simply essential for the rural areas to have
credit of the magnitude of R20-22 trillion and at an
affordable interest rate. It is in these precise terms
that the Agriculture and Food Ministry leader puts the
question. Otherwise, rebuilding capital assets, acquiring
equipment and other absolutely essential resources, and
construction work is out of the question.

In reply to a question about how he sees the land market,
Nazarchuk said: Until Russia becomes a stable state
with a solid legal basis, the question of the free purchase
and sale of land is premature.

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52 RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Chubays: Economic Growth Will Begin in 1996

LD1210095495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0850 GMT 12 Oct 95

[By Andrey Loshchilin]

(FBIS Transcribed Text] WASHINGTON, October 12
(ITAR-TASS) — Reporting to the annual meeting of
the Boards of Governors of the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank, Russian First Vice-Premier
Anatoliy Chubays pointed out that the Russian Federal
Budget’s deficit equalled to about three per cent of
the gross domestic product in January-September as
compared to the corresponding period of 1994. He
noted that “all the set tasks are on the whole being
implemented". The vice-premier’s report was issued
here as an official document of the meeting.

"The amount of official currency reserves has more
than doubled since the beginning of the year. The
introduction of the currency exchange band guaranteed
the rouble’s relative stability," the document says. "The
production slump slowed down simultaneously with
this, and economic growth was recorded in some sectors
of the Russian industry, primarily in its exporting
branches. The drop of the gross domestic product
equalled to four per cent during the first nine months
of this year as compared to 16 per cent last year. We
expect the country’s economy to grow next year, for the
first time since the beginning of the reforms in Russia."

Pre-Election Concessions Swell Money Supply

MM1210142795 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Oct 95 p2

[Article by Irina Savvateyeva: "Inflation May Be Falling
but More and More Money Is Being Pumped into the
Economy"]}

(FBIS Translated Text] Despite the recent record low
inflation figures (in the first week of October prices rose
by just 0.8 percent) October brought with it a note of
alarm over the stability of the monetary and financial
situation in the country.

The point is that the first highly unpleasant symptom
surfaced this month: One of the main indicators of the
government and Central Bank monetary program which
records the growth in the money supply — the so-called
Central Bank credit to broad government [rasshirennoye
pravitelstvo] — exceeded its target. In other words,
budget funding targets at all levels have been exceeded.

The “overspend” is not all that great at the moment:
300 billion rubles [R]. And according to Economics
Minister Ye. Yasin, there is no cause for panic — the
problem can be resolved in the normal course of events.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Nevertheless, the question of whether the "overspend"
was a one-off or the beginning of a new trend is highly
topical.

For example, it was suddenly discovered in October
that the local organs of power sharply increased their
spending. Is this a trend created by a rise in the
cost of electricity, tariffs, and municipal services or a
coincidence?

Oleg Vyugin, director of the Finance Ministry’s depart-
ment of macroeconomics, was in no hurry with conclu-
sions, noting that the ministry’s statistics need careful
study and verification.

Meanwhile, Sergey Vasilyev, deputy economics minis-
ter, is more anxious about the situation in general. He
believes that the R300 billion which “unexpectedly” ap-
peared is the perfectly logical consequence of the situa-
tion in the country: The government has "weakened" in
the face of very strong pre-election pressure.

In the deputy minister’s opinion, what we are seeing
first and foremost here are non-budget funds, grain
purchases, and the need to fund the Army’s food supply,
the cost of which was not included in the 1995 budget.
And of course Chechnya.

The overspend in terms of non-budget funds is primarily
due to the situation affecting the pension fund, where
actual revenue is falling catastrophically. On the one
hand this is a consequence of the sharp decline in the
proportion of wages in the population’s incomes which
has been noticed recently. This decline in turn is leading
to a significant reduction in the tax base — the source
of revenue for the pension fund.

As for grain purchases, the state is actually having to
fund them once again. The situation in this area is as
follows. This year the countryside’s debt was dealt with
by means of bills of exchange. The assumption was that
these bills of exchange would be sold in the market. But
under pressure from the agrarian lobby, which has made
skillful use of the election situation, what has happened
essentially is that another credit line has been opened up
for farmers. Generally speaking the sources of finance
that the government still has for plugging the various
gaps are certainly not without their down side. The
Central Bank can buy state securities and gold from the
Finance Ministry. The latter can also sell hard currency
to the Central Bank, among others.

"Essentially we are talking about additional money
supply," Sergey Vasilyev notes. "If the pre-election
attack on the government is sustained and this kind
of funding is not halted," the deputy minister stressed,
"it could all end fairly badly: The monetary program
will disintegrate before our eyes, Russia will have great

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

problems obtaining credits from international financial
organizations, and generally speaking a country which
has grown accustomed to an average inflation rate of 3
percent a month will find it quite difficult adapting to a
7 percent rate."

EBRD Provides $303 Million for Small Business
Loans

MM1210133895 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Financial
Section) in Russian 12 Oct 95 pl

[Report by Vladimir Kovalevskiy: "Western Loans
Arrive in Moscow. But Only for Small Enterprises"]

{FBIS Translated Text] The European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development [EBRD] has begun provid-
ing small business loans in Moscow. This project is be-
ing implemented in conjunction with the Russian Fed-
eration Savings Bank. The EBRD is allocating a total
of $303 million.

The EBRD has been providing support for small busi-
ness in various parts of Russia for 18 months now. In
this time around 1,000 loans have been issued. They are
being provided in rubles in amounts not in excess of
$20,000, at 140-150 percent annual interest. According
to EBRD spokesperson Anna Peters-Freitag, the scheme
has proven its viability in Russia — there have been vir-
tually no defaulters. During the first phase, loans will
be issued in Moscow via a branch of the Savings Bank.

The main condition for the provision of credit is that the
client must be solvent. His financial solvency is not only
checked out on the basis of documentation submitted
(the enterprise balance sheet, for instance), as is usual in
our country. Experts especially recruited to the Savings
Bank staff visit the borrower’s home without fail, study
his family and financial status. Anna Peters-Freitag
thinks that these studies make it possible to obtair
an objective idea of the borrower’s entrepreneurial
capabilities and potential and to be certain that the loan
will be put to use and will be repaid.

Similar loan schemes have been operating in countries
with high inflation for about 15 years now. The EBRD
has now extended a hand to Russia’s small enterprises.
World experience shows that recovery from crisis and
the rebuilding of the economy always occur via the
intensive development of small business. In Japan and
Germany, for instance, small enterprises of this kind
now account for around 80 percent of all jobs.

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Central Bank Money, Credit Policy Examined

MM1210132595 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Financial
Section) in Russian 12 Oct 95 p 1,2

[Article by Yevgeniya Pismennaya: “Bank of Russia
Promises To Fight Inflation Without Forgetting Interests
of Economy as a Whole")

(FBIS Translated Text] The Central Bank has elaborated
the draft basic guidelines for monetary and credit
policy for next year. When it was forming them the
Central Bank proceeded from the need to further reduce
inflation. The slowing down of inflation will lead to a
reduction in inflation expectations and will allow real
interest rates on deposits to reach positive amounts.

The Central Bank rejects direct credit for the federal
budget deficit and the granting of centralized credits to
economic sectors. The envisaged budget deficit should
be financed from noninflationary sources — through
loans on the market.

One of the Central Bank’s main tasks next year is
to curb the growth of the money mass in circulation.
For that it is essential to increase the reliability of the
banking system and to increase citizens’ confidence in
it.

The Central Bank's currency policy provides for two
main goals. The dynamics of the currency exchange
rate must be brought into line with the development
of inflation and the dynamic of the main components
of the money mass. It is essential to ensure a currency
exchange rate regime which complies with the require-
ments of monetary and credit regulation and the main-
tenance of a balanced balance of payments and a high
level of liquidity for the Russian Federation to ensure
payments on its international commitments and the sta-
ble functioning of the system of foreign economic rela-
tions.

The Central Bank will regulate market fluctuations
in the ruble’s nominal exchange rate. The policy of
consolidating currency control over export and import
operations and the full return of the currency profit from
exports to accounts in fully empowered Russian banks
will continue.

The Bank of Russia plans to improve the system for
monitoring the country’s currency market, extending it
to the short-term currency market. The bank intends to
smooth over and equalize exchange rate fluctuations on
various segments of the currency market and its regional
and institutional sectors.

In determining monetary guidelines for the end of 1996
the Central Bank has proceeded from the premise that
with a substantial reduction in inflation the trend toward

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

4 RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

the slowing down of the production slump will persist
or this slump will be successfully halted. So restrictive
monetary policy principles must be retained. But at the
same time in the Central Bank’s opinion conditions are
already ripe for an increase in the money mass in real
terms.

But because of the uncertainty in the development of
some characteristics of the monetary sphere (like the
degree of dollarization of the economy and the structure
of the money mass) the bank cannot unequivocally
predict the dynamic of the turnover velocity. So an
alternative approach toward the elaboration of monetary
and credit policy is topical now.

The Central Bank has elaborated three options for
guidelines for a unified state monetary and credit policy
for the end of 1996 based on two scenarios. Scenario A
proceeds from qualitative changes in the formation of
the money supply. Scenario B includes existing trends
in monetary and credit policy.

Operational procedure for the Central Bank’s monetary
and credit policy will be based on monitoring of target
indicators for the money base in the broad sense (cash
in circulation and in the commercial banks, assets in
the compulsory reserves fund, and reserves in banks’

correspondent accounts).

The Bank of Russia will support the stability of interest
rates in the economy. In its short-term policy the Central
Bank will consider changes within the year and changes
within the month in the banking system’s demand for
reserves (liquid assets), helping to smooth out excessive
fluctuations in interest rates on the money market.

Next year as in the past the Central Bank will not grant
new direct centralized credits to commercial banks and
re-form existing debts on centralized credits and interest
on them.

The Ministry of Finances in conjunction with the
Central Bank considers it necessary to examine the
question of transferring in 1996 to the state internal
debt under the guarantee of the organs of executive
power of the components of the Federation the debts
to commercial banks as of 1 January next year owed on
centralized credits and interest on them by enterprises of
the fuel and energy complex and other sectors totaling
about 1 trillion rubles [R], extinguishing these debts
over the next 10 years in equal shares. These debts can
be included in the Russian Federation state internal debt
within the framework of the upper limit set for 1996 for
the state debt through the Ministry of Finances’ issue
of promissory notes to the Central Bank to be paid off
in 10 years as of 1998 in equal shares with an interest
rate of 10 percent per annum.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Alongside the placement of credit resources through
credit auctions which have been held every month since
January 1994, the Central Bank intends to introduce
methods of refinancing commercial banks like Lombard
credits and the second discounting of promissory notes.

It is also planned to introduce a new instrument for re-
financing commercial banks — operations of the REPO
type on the open market (the redeemable contract) with
the use of state securities issued on market terms.

The Central Bank is examining the question of granting
centralized credits to reliable commercial banks experi-
encing temporary financial difficulties.

To regulate the volumes of money in circulation the
Central Bank intends to expand the instruments of
monetary and credit policy by carrying out operations
to attract the funds of commercial banks into deposit
accounts on a contract, paid basis at a rate lower than
the interbank deposit rate. At the same time the Central
Bank ensures the 100 percent guarantee of the prompt
return of deposits and the interest on them.

The Bank of Russia intends to establish a single
rate for all assets attracted (in national currency) for
compulsory reserves as a percentage of the credit
organization’s liabilities (compulsory reserves norm).
This will simplify the procedure for accounting and will
make it possible to determine more objectively the size
of the sum of compulsory reserves.

It is proposed to reduce the period of regulation of
compulsory reserves and to make it the same and
compulsory for all commercial banks. This will prepare
conditions for the gradual transition to a daily regulation
of compulsory reserves.

To establish a single methodology for compulsory re-
serves it is planned to transfer institutions of the Savings
Bank to a common procedure for depositing assets in
the compulsory reserves fund. Here it is planned to ex-
pand the base for the formation of compulsory reserves
of the Savings Bank institutions by transferring to the
reservation of all funds attracted and not only the in-
crease in the population’s investments.

With a view to increasing the commercial banks’
liability for observing reserve requires the law “On
the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of
Russia)" adopted 26 June 1995 provides for tougher
sanctions for the delayed and incomplete deposit of
the assets attracted in the compulsory reserves fund.
The Bank of Russia has been granted the right to the
undisputed levying of unpaid sums and also the use
of fines within the established limits but at not more
than double the rate for refinancing. The procedure for
implementing these rights will be set out in the provision

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

which is being elaborated on compulsory reserves for
credit organizations deposited in the Central Bank.

Next year the Bank of Russia in implementing mon-
etary and credit policy intends to continue to use the
mechanism of regulation that is the interest rate on its
operations. It is planned to maintain the rate for refi-
nancing commercial banks and the rates for the second
discounting of promissory notes and for Lombard credit

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS 55

at the level of existing quoted interbank rates designed
for credits with comparable repayment deadlines or at
a level in excess of these rates.

In establishing the rate for refinancing the Central
Bank intends also to consider the influence of interest
policy on the formation of expenses on production and
consequently the inflation of costs.

Nominal GDP, trillions of rubles

Real GDP, peicentage

Average monthly prices growth rate,
percentage

M2 Money Mass, trillions of rubles

295-313

261-277

M2 Money Mass average monthly growth
rate, percentage

3.3-3.6

2.2-2.8

M2 growth rates for the year, percentage

148-157

131-139

Turnover velocity

7.8

Nominal GDP, trillions of rubles

Real GDP, percentage

95

Average monthly prices growth rate,
percentage

4.5

M2 money mass, trillions of rubles

316-332

250-276

M2 money mass average monthly growth
rates, percentage

3.9-4-3

2.5-2.8

M2 growth rates for the year, percentage

159-166

134-139

Turnover velocity

8.9

Nominal GDP, trillions of rubles

Real GDP, percentage

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198

56 RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS 13 October 1995
Scenario A Scenario B
Average monthly prices growth rate, 6 6
percentage
M2 money mass, trillions of rubles 360-374 339-356
M2 money mass, average monthly growth 5-5.4 4.5-4.9
rates, percentage
M2 growth rates for the year, percentage 180-187 170-178
Turnover velocity 78 8.2

Source: Bank of Russia.

ioe report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination

is prohibited

without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

International Affairs
CE President Views Organization’s Principles

AU1210151495 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY
in Ukrainian 7 Oct 95 pp 6,7

{"Exclusive interview" with Miguel Angel Martinez,
president of the Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly, by Volodymyr Skachko Kiev-Strasbourg-
Kiev; date not given: "I Already Relish the Beauty of
Shevchenko’s Testament..."]

(FBIS Translated Text] There is no doubt that Ukraine’s
joining the Council of Europe is the most significant of
recent external political events. It is an indubitable suc-
cess for Ukraine’s Supreme Council and, in particular,
for its leadership and for Borys Oliynyk’s commission
(for Foreign Affairs and Ties With the CIS]. To a large
extent, this event is associated with the name of Miguel
Angel Martinez, president of the Council of Europe Par-
liamentary Assembly, who has held this post for the last
few years. Next January, Mr. Martinez will resign after,
as he says, the tasks he was given have been largely
fulfilled.

In May 1995, during his visit to Kiev, Miguel Angel
Martinez, an ardent advocate of Russia’s admission
to the Council of Europe, acknowledged that, in the
aftermath of the events in Chechnya, he was among the
first to speak against this and switched his attention to
Ukraine, thereby recognizing the democratic character
of the transformations that are under way here.

{Oliynyk] Senor Martinez, are you pleased with the
results of your work as president of the Council of
Europe Parliamentary Assembly?

{Martinez} I belong to the school of realistic thinking
that proceeds from the fact that only what is possible
may be achieved. I tried to act accordingly, clearly
realizing what we can achieve and what is unachievable
today.

Of course, I am pleased with what we have achieved,
but I am trying to look at it objectively. This is an
encouragement for what has been achieved and a source
of self-esteem and continued progress. This supports us
in striving to achieve what we have failed to accomplish.

Speaking about the results of work over the last four or
five years, nobody expected or even dreamed about what
we managed to do over this period of time. Just four
years ago, huge numbers of people looked on European
values as a dream. Now, they have been introduced to
them and have become, so to speak, their consumers.
This is a historic success.

I am not a very reserved person and believe that, to
a large extent and in some aspects to an even greater

UKRAINE 57

than large extent, I also have something to do with
this. I am more aware than anyone what problems
lay on the road to the admission of these countries,
problems both obvious and hidden. Of course, I am
very pleased to see how many new people have passed
from one category to another. How many countries have
become upgraded from candidates to full members of
the Council of Europe and how many countries have
become candidates, for example, Russia.

Much has been done apart from a simple expansion
of the Council of Europe. We have achieved greater
progress in modernizing and expanding the doctrine of
human rights by including into it the right to culture,
economic rights, a qualitative improvement of relations
between men and women, and an improvement in ethnic
minority rights.

We also work in previously little known but no less
important spheres. Such as, for example, bioethics and
more extensive use of satellite television. The main
thing is that we have brought these concepts into line
with contemporary requirements, which they lacked
four years earlier. This, incidentally, explains why such
countries as the United States and Japan, which had
previously lived quietly for 40 years, never strived to
join the Council of Europe and ignored its activities,
turned to us a few weeks ago and asked to be given
observer status.

[Skachko] Are there any mechanisms for control over
compliance on the part of new countries that have
become members of the Council of Europe with the
organization’s requirements? Do they not change in
connection with some unusual situations that emerge
within these countries?

{Martinez} I do not generally like the word “control.”
We do not even have such a category as “new member.”
There are candidates and full members, and there
must be confident and amiable relations between them.
We proceed from the assumption that every country
that joins the Council of Europe takes upon itself an
obligation to achieve a certain progress. We want to
help it cope with this task. I would rather speak in
terms of monitoring. It is not some police system or
imposing one’s own principles. The Council of Europe
is the choice made by each country, and it does not
need to please or displease anyone. A particular country
must act in such a way as to fulfill its obligations, first
and foremost, before its own people and not to please
the Council of Europe. We are like a joint venture that
helps you, for example, to proceed along the path you
have chosen for yourselves. Besides, | do not quite
understand what “an unusual situation” means.

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58 UKRAINE

[Skachko}] For example, the Council of Europe set
additional requirements for democratization in Turkey.

{Martinez} Greece is a better example. There was a
military coup there, the parliament was disbanded,
and Greece was compelled to leave the Council of
Europe. In Turkey, there was also a military coup in
the past, and its membership was suspended until the
situation changed. We advance the same requirements
for democratization for everybody. This is not a problem
for new members of the Council of Europe, because
Turkey is a founder country. We do not have rules for
new or old members, but we simply have common rules
for everybody.

[Skachko] Will not Ukraine’s joining the Council of
Europe change the political balance on the continent,
especially in view of what is said in Moscow about the
creation of a new Eastern European political alliance?

{Martinez} I do not think so. We are like a table where
every European country has its chair that will, sooner
or later, find its master. I always look at the political
map of Europe. Before Ukraine occupied its position at
the common table, the map looked like an incomplete
crossword. It had a big white gap that had to be filled in
so that there would not be a bigger whole through which
water and European values would leak out. Our mosaic
must be complete, otherwise it wil! not work. Ukraine’s
place in this mosaic is quite significant and I believe
that, in a few weeks, we will fill it in completely. When I
was in Kiev, one of your people asked me at the airport:
"Do you believe that next year Ukraine will become a
member of the Council of Europe?" I answered that I
would not yet be too old when Ukraine joins us. It was
a very risky statement on my part, but today I may say
that I won the bet — two bottles of champagne, and I
hope that it will be Crimean champagne.

[Skachko] Senor Martinez, what do you mean by the
concept "democratic security" which is increasingly
spoken of in Europe?

[Martinez] It is the expansion of democracy to all parts
of the world. Expansion in depth rather than in breadth
{ne vshyr, a v hlyb). It is a cultivation of democracy that
is determined by two factors. First, without democracy,
there is no security or genuine stability. When there is
no democracy in a country, it may seem to be stable.
However, this is a very illusory impression. Democracy
is the only thing that guarantees stability for the people,
because it is the only system that enables all problems to
be resolved with the participation of the people and for
their benefit. At any rate, for the benefit of the majority
of people. History has shown that if this is the case, less
mistakes are made.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Second, democracy is something that can never be ul-
timately achieved. Like at the Olympic Games where
the prevailing motto is "Faster, higher, and stronger."
Democracy also comes from one’s neighbors. Demo-
cratic security implies consolidation of democrats in the
whole world.

{Skachko] After the decision on Ukraine was adopted,
Viadimir Lukin, head of the Russian delegation, said at
a news conference that “Russia’s resentment increases
over the double standards" and accused the Council of
Europe of engaging in political games that, according to
him, take place during the admission or nonadmission of
new candidate countries. What is your attitude to this?

(Martinez) I can understand him, but I do not agree
with what he says. Of course, they are disappointed.
They hoped that Russia would be admitted in May 1995,
but the events in Chechnya had changed the situation
entirely. It is not our fault that we could not admit
Russia. It is their problem. I am personally all for
admitting Russia to the Council of Europe as soon as
possible. This would be to everybody’s advantage and I
hope that it will take place. Incidentally, 1 am also very
disappointed that such a great candidate country could
not join us during the period of my presidency.

I have two great disappointments. They concern Russia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Two black pages in the bulky
book of my presidency. However, I am an optimist:
Perhaps, I will no longer be president and will not be the
father when these "babies" are born, but everybody will
remember that I was there when they were conceived.
Generally speaking, the process of conception is much
more gratifying than birth proper.

[Skachko] Perhaps, Ms. Lennie Fischer, your successor
at the post of president, being a woman, understands
this better?

{Martinez} I hope that she will be a better "father." I
know, however, that I will still have to put in much
effort to have these two questions resolved positively.
One of the most unpleasant aspects of my work is that I
have to exert pressure. Incidentally, until last Monday, I
kept wondering whether Ukraine would or would not be
admitted. Once this happened, we immediately switched
our attention to Macedonia. Macedonia was admitted,
and now I must turn to Russia. Of course, this is very
tiring. This has continued throughout the 1,359 days of
my presidency and will continue for about another 100
days.

However, now, when my tenure is expiring, I already
relish the beauty of Shevchenko’s "Testament" ["Za-
povit" — poetry]. I am getting ready for a visit to Kiev.
When I was there, the weather was very nice, it was

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

spring. Now, I want to visit Ukraine and look at it in
January, in winter, when it has become a full member
of the Council of Europe. Ukraine is the largest country
that has joined us during my tenure. Of course, I wish
you every success!

Kiev Asks G-7 for $3.2 Billion To Close Chernobyl

LD1210204795 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1850 GMT 12 Oct 95

{[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev 12 Oct — Ukraine has
asked the G-7 countries for a grant of $3.2 billion to
fund the closure of Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric
power station], Nur Nihmatullin, first deputy chairman
of the Ukrainian State Committee for the Use of Nuclear
Power, told UNIAN after two days of talks with G-7
experts.

The money will be used to fund projects to guarantee
safety during the closure of the nuclear plant, improve
safety provisions at the third power unit that will
remain in operation until the year 2000 and the Shelter
facility [a containment structure over the crippled fourth
reactor], and ensure the safe disposal of radioactive
waste.

Ukraine expects $2.5 billion from the West to finance
profit- making projects involved with the closure of
Chernobyl AES. These include the completion of two
new power units at Rovno and Khmelnitskiy nuclear
power plants and the restructuring of the nuclear indus-

try.

Czech Official Does Not Discount NATO Nuclear
Deployment

WS1210132795 Kiev INTELNEWS in English

0215 GMT 12 Oct 95

(FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Kiev, Oct. 10 — The de-
ployment of NATO nuclear weapons on Czech territory
following the country’s admittance to the organization

is not out of the question, the Czech Republic’s Foreign
Minister Yosef Zieleniec said this week.

On an official visit to Kiev, Zieleniec on Tuesday [10
October] said, "The Czech Republic wants to be a
member of NATO with all the rights and obligations
including this question."

Zieleniec said "NATO is a democratic organization that
constitutes a danger to nobody.” [passage omitted]

Udovenko: Sanctions Against Belgrade ‘Ineffective’

WS1210120795 Kiev INTELNEWS in English
0215 GMT 12 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Oct. 11 — Economic
sanctions against Yugoslavia have proved ineffective,

UKRAINE 59

Foreign Affairs Minister Hennadiy Udovenko said
Tuesday ‘** October) at a regular ministry briefing.

"The shatter economy was created and fights against
these sanctions," he said.

According to Udovenko, Belgrade “has all kinds of
goods, including weapons."

If you would come to Belgrade today, you would not
find any evidence of sanctions, Udovenko said.

Regarding a continued Ukrainian contingent in U.N.
peace-keeping operations in the former Yugoslavia.

"I can’t imagine that we would shoot somebody,"
Udovenko said. "It doesn’t meet our interests. Even
if we continue to participate in UN peace-keeping
operations, we would take part in those operations that
do not require using weapons," he added.

“Up until now, nobody has asked Ukraine" to take part
in U.N. peacekeeping operations under NATO control.
"But the question of participation in such operations
by non-members of NATO is under examination,"
Udovenko said.

Udovenko also emphasized that Ukraine has not yet
worked out its political decision on this matter.

According to Udovenko, this political decision is one of
Ukraine’s priorities. However, "Shmarov and I did not
yet have a meeting on this matter," Udovenko said.

Kuchma Meets German Officials, Views Russian
Relations

LD1210205195 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1805 GMT 12 Oct 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature}

{[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ukraine is interested in a
normal relationship with Russia and the continuation
of stability in the eastern neighbor country, President
Teonid Kuchma declared during his Thursday meeting
in Kiev with a delegation of state secretaries from
Germany.

The deputy head of the presidential press service Andrey
Chirva told Interfax that the process of building new
Ukraine and new Russia is a lengthy one.

Kuchma stressed that Russia is and will remain the
main partner for Ukraine. Speaking of the Black Sea
Fleet problem he said he sent a letter to President Boris
Yeltsin calling to step up efforts at the level of prime-
ministers instead of communicating through the media.

"There is actually no work. If the situation continues, I
do not see how it can resolve the problem. And this is
not Ukraine’s fault,” he said.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination
is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

60 UKRAINE

Kuchma was critical about the idea of a referendum
on the unification of CIS Slavic countries. In his opin-
ion, Russia and Belarus, for instance, should observe
the terms of a customs union in order to cooperate nor-
mally. "We should cooperate and understand each other
without dragging peoples into that," he remarked.

He voiced satisfaction with the approval of the govern-
ment program by parliament and stressed that Ukraine
will follow the road of reforms approved by parliament
last year.

Kuchma was Satisfied that the agreement on regular
exchanges of delegations with Germany reached during
his visit to Bonn last July is taking concrete form.
He spoke of the special relationship between Kiev and
Bonn and voiced the opinion that Germany could play
a special role in Ukraine’s life.

Kuchma also expressed his idea of the Chernobyl
problem. He felt that the final decision on the closure
of the nuclear power station should be made by the end
of the year. "We need a program, not a concept,” he
stressed.

(Last spring the Ukrainian leadership announced inten-
tions to shut down Chernoby! by the end of the century,
if the West helps build substituting power stations and
resolve personnel problems.)

IF Note: The German delegation is in Kiev to analyze
and assess the state of bilateral relations, study their
prospects and prepare the visit of Chancellor Helmut
Kohl planned for next year.

It should also complete work on an agreement on
military cemeteries, the restitution of cultural valuables
and the migration of ethnic Germans from other CIS
countries to Ukraine.

Joint Ukrainian-U.S. Military Exercises End

LD1210101995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0849 GMT 12 Oct 95

[By Ninel Kiselevskaya]

([FBIS Transcribed Text] LVOV, October 12 (Itar-Tass)
— Soldiers from the 82nd airborne division of the
United States and a mobile air detachment of the
Pre-Carpathian Military District are over. [sentence as
received] They were held in the Ukrainian townlet of
Khyrov in keeping with the NATO "Partnership for
Peace" programme.

A platoon of American paratroopers from North Car-
olina exchanged tactical experience and acquainted
themselves with the equipment, weapons and exercise
methods used by the Ukrainian detachment. The Ameri-

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

cans lived according to Ukrainian army rules. They have
passed practically the entire training course, used to
drill young Ukrainian soldiers, have studied the designs
of the parachutes they use, practised some parachuting
methods, 2nd took part in firing exercises. The Ameri-
cans did “ot take part in parachute jumping exercises,
since this would have required an at least one week
longer training course. Hence, they have only watched
the actions of their Ukrainian colleagues, who made
more than 160 parachute jumps during only one day of
the joint exercises. Most of them were jumps with a 15
seconds parachute opening delay. In turn, the Ukrainian
servicemen were able to watch the landing of an Amer-
ican air assault group.

Officers of a Romanian mobile air battalion attended the
joint exercises as observers. Noting the excellent train-
ing of Ukrainian paratroopers, Colonel Serban Kantu-
niari expressed readiness to invite Khyrov paratroopers
for joint training in Romania.

Kiev Expects To Import Kuwaiti Oil in ‘Near
Future’

AU1310095795 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY

in Ukrainian 10 Oct 95 p6

{Report by Valeriy Druzhenko: “A Breakthrough to the
East")

(FBIS Translated Text] Ukraine’s interparliamentary
ties are gradually expanding. This is also promoted
by Ukraine’s Supreme Council Commission for For-
eign Affairs and Ties With the CIS. Last week,
Borys Oliynyk, head of the commission, and the
deputy chairman of Kuwait’s National Congress,
who headed a Kuwaiti delegation to Kiev, held a joint
news conference.

Ukraine’s interparliamentary activity is gradually ad-
vancing to the east. Of course, this does not signify our
politicians’ desire iv abandon ihe iargeiy expiored Wesi-
ern regions. However, the “breakthrough at the East-
ern front" has opened up new potential possibilities for
Ukraine.

By contrast to bilateral relations at a governmental level,
interparliamentary ties are just gaining momentum. The
visit by the delegation of Kuwait's National Congress
is the first meeting of our people’s deputies with
parliamentarians of a friendly state.

Kuwait is primarily known in the world for its crude
oil. Ukraine also expects, in the near future, to import
Kuwaiti “black gold.” During the meeting between
Salekh Yussef al-Fadal [name as transliterated], head
of Kuwait's National Congress, and Ukraine's Supreme
Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz, they discussed a

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

possibility of oil deliveries by tankers to Odessa where
an oil terminal is under construction.

Kuwait is perfectly capable of helping Ukraine avoid a
crisis situation with regard to energy sources, consider-
ing that its explored oil reserves account for 10 percent
of world ones. The price of oil is $17.5 per barrel. Alto-
gether 920 oil wells work for the economy of this Near
Eastern country. Kuwait extracts 800,000 barrels of oil
a day. More accurately, it used to extract... As a re-
sult of the Iraqi aggression, Kuwait’s national economy
complex was virtually totally destroyed. According to
official estimates, the total volume of losses amounts to
between $60 billion and $100 billion. The oil sector suf-
fered the most. Seven hundred and thirty oil wells were
put on fire. The operation on extinguishing the fire alone
cost $2 billion. Despite protests and resolutions passed
by the UN Security Council that recommended that Iraq
return to Kuwait the looted material values, compensate
for losses, and release prisoners of war, this has not been
done to this day. Six hundred and twenty-five Kuwaiti
citizens are still held in Iraqi prisons.

During the Kuwaiti delegation’s visit, the Ukrainian side
undertook to support this state within the framework of
the activity of the International Parliamentary Union,
help in release of imprisoned Kuwaiti citizens, and insist
that Iraq fulfill all international resolutions. Kuwait, in
turn, will make efforts to secure the release of Ukrainian
POW’s held in Afghanistan. Supreme Council deputies
got an invitation to visit Kuwait. Not bad for a start.

National Affairs

Prime Minister Marchuk on Government Program

LD1210232595 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1710 GMT 12 Sep 95

[Report on news conference with Prime Minister
Yevheniy Marchuk by correspondent Oleksy Havrysh
in Kiev on 12 October; Marchuk’s remarks recordcdj

(FBIS Translated Excerpt) [Havrysh] Most of the news
conference was devoted to the government’s program
of action — which was approved in parliament on 11
October — the debate on the program, and various
issues that were raised during the debate. [passage
omitted]

The left-wingers failed to convince the government as
they put forward their main argument: The Cabinet
of Ministers cooperates with international financial
institutions that allegedly want to buy Ukraine in bulk
and by retail. We have been cooperating and we will
be cooperating [with international financial institutions],
the prime minister retorted.

UKRAINE 61

(Marchuk] We have been cooperating and we will be
cooperating with international financial institutions, in
spite of any criticism and no matter where it comes
from. One of the reasons for this is the fact that Ukraine
has found itself, as a result of previous management,
in an extremely difficult situation. Without attracting
serious, rich foreign investors, it will be very difficult
for us to get out of the deep crisis we find ourselves
in, especially in some industries. There should be no
illusions here. There is another question. There are fears
that they [international financial institutions} will buy
{Ukraine}, plunder it and so on. Of course no one will
ever allow this to happen. Although, at a time when our
budget deficit for next year is planned at the level of
6 percent, when our debts stand at $8.8 billion — and
these are heavy and complicated debts — and when
we are facing a reform of the entire power engineering
system — I would not like to take your time, but if
you are interested to know I will tell you that dozens
of billions of dollars are required. We cannot afford to
spend that amount of money.

The coal industry, the power engineering industry as a
whole, and a closed-cycle production of fuel for nuclear
power stations require more than $1 billion. We do not
have monetary resources for this. There are many other
spheres [that need investments}: the reform of the agro-
industrial complex is one of these. It is clear that, first
and foremost, we will definitely cooperate and obtain
credits so as not to neutralize or suppress the domestic
producer but, on the contrary, to create production
cycles in the country. However, this should be done by
means of attracting foreign credits and foreign investors.
[passage omitted]

{Havrysh] Marchuk also shared his views on a number
of other urgent problems. This is what he thinks about
progress in the talks with the G-7 leaders on the closure
of the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station [AES]:

[Marchnk! The issne is not a simple one, and ta some
extent we have complicated it ourselves. By now, we
have rectified most of our mistakes. For example, there
was a Situation when the minister would say one thing,
the committee another, and the plant director something
different. By now we have developed a state policy on
the matter, which is being outlined in the president's
statements.

I think the figure of 4 billion [dollars] should not have
been mentioned. The closure of Chernobyl AES may
cost more or may cost less, but the figure of 4 billion
will scare off anyone. I had a long talk with U'S.
Vice President Al Gore, as well as with the European
Union leaders. As you know, the Ukrainian president
has written to the G-7 leaders stressing that we are

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

62 UKRAINE

prepared to do it, but we cannot face the problem alone,
we simply do not have the resources.

However, I think that very soon we will have a reaction
from the G-7, one which would be acceptable to us.
We are familiar with the amount the G-7 is allocating.
It is quite a large amount. It may not conform to certain
requirements, but Gore, as well as other G-7 leaders, and
the experts who come here, are telling us: Why haggle
about amounts now? Give us projects and schedules. We
have prepared such projects and we will see what you
are proposing, and the G-7 is proposing several ways
of dealing with the problem. Then we will calculate.
But if we say from the start, $4 billion and no less,
this is no way to do serious business. Therefore, I think
the problem will begin to be resolved, may be not 100
percent, but there will be a breakthrough in terms of
G-7 aid. [passage omitted]

{Havrysh} This is how the prime minister explained this
fall’s leap in inflation:

(Marchuk] We have not been able to analyze the
September inflation factor by factor because these
indices will be not available before the end of October,
and only then will we be able to give an absolutely
accurate account of the causes. But the general cause is
clear. If you monitored the pattern of inflation in the last
three years, you would see that this used to happen every
year. There was a leap in inflation every October and
November. This is a major sign of the need to greatly
speed up the structural reform in the economy. No
matter what we do at the top, at the fiscal and monetary
level, if we fail to achieve radical restructuring at the
level of individual enterprises, at the level of material
production, if we fail to change its structure then the
factors generating these occurrences will remain.

As to whether this was expected or not, I was asked
recently why the government did not risk monetary
reform. ies we veatured into monetary — -

of ‘inflation, “would this ‘have ‘been a annie diihets
for the introduction of a new currency? Plus the internal
debt. So this did not come as a big surprise. The only
thing I can say is that we did not expect this particular
rate. But, again, a factor by factor analysis will be made
later, although we are familiar with the main elements
of the cause.

[Havrysh] What is the state of the 1996 budget and how
is the 1995 budget being implemented? Marchuk says:

(Marchuk] The previously drafted version of the budget,
signed by the president, was submitted to the Supreme
Council in due time. It was repeatedly discussed in the
{Supreme Council] standing Commission for Budget

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Affairs led by Mykola Azarov and in other commis-
sions. The thing is that there exist different methods of
calculating the gross domestic product [GDP]. After the
above version of the budget had been submitted, the
Ministry of Economy — as a matter of fact, I myself
had to take the decision, to commit a sin, as they say,
in order to make the budget more realistic — let them
criticize us for the delay. Therefore, instructions were
issued to...[pauses] On the basis of new, more progres-
sive calculation methods the GDP was estimated at 7.8
trillion karbovantsy. In connection with the fact that the
GDP was recalculated — it differs from the previous
one by 500 billion karbovantsy, and this is essential —
the Ministry of Finance was obliged — and it was right,
I am again saying that I am to be criticized for this —
to recalculate the whole budget on the basis of the new,
more realistic GDP. The budget was made on the prin-
ciples set out in the budget resolution by the Supreme
Council: The budget deficit of six percent in relation
to the GDP. What ministries and departments submit-
ted, exceeded the GDP by at least 400 to 500 percent.
Therefore, the first version of the budget provided for
the budget deficit at a leve! »f approximately 12 per-
cent; and after the budget ha. been updated, the budget
deficit was planned at a level of 6 percent.

As regards the implementation of this year’s budget, it
is Clear that the most serious problem here is that of the
revenue, expenditure also being [word indistinct]. I said
this yesterday and I will repeat it now: The situation
with taxes is catastrophic — almost 40 percent of
taxes fail to reach the budget. There are many different
reasons for this; however, the main and the most serious
reason is the absence of budget discipline. This is a sign
of a weak state and weak central authorities. Faults or
shortcomings of this kind are corrected in a very tough
manner, as you know, and they will be corrected in
the near future. There are regions that allow themselves
to manipulate the budget easily, I mean taxes, first

are acne 4 aa Th.
and foremost: there ave enterprises, anG 30 via. ALU

aciivilics uf ministries and ministers personally will be
assessed according to top priorities proceeding from
the following: How a minister or ministry ensure the
implementation of the budget; above all, the budget
revenue; and then other parameters will be taken into
account. The same will apply to chairmen of regional,
district, and city state administrations.

{Havrysh]} Ukraine has made great steps toward improv-
ing the investment climate. However, for some reason,
in other countries they know very little about this.

(Marchuk] Well, as far as the investment climate
in our state is concerned, Ukraine’s information and
propaganda activities are rather poor, although some
work toward that end is being done. When I happened

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FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

to speak at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in the
presence of representatives of over 100 large firms,
banks, and so on, and when the presenter introduced
Ukraine, the businessmen were very skeptical because
the preliminary information — although it was not
negative — was presented in an exaggerated manner.
Then on the 10th minute of my report, which lasted
approximately 30 to 40 minutes, when they heard what
was going on here [in Ukraine]...[pauses] Many of
them just did not know whether it was already possible
to transfer profits from Ukraine, that the land under
facilities could be formally [word indistinct] for a term
of up to 90 years, or 99 years with subsequent extension,
that the exchange rate of the karbovanets against the
dollar was stable — within the limits that we set of
course — that any foreigner had access to the currency
exchange — nobody knew anything about this.

Therefore, creation of the investment climate, to say
nothing about all legal parameters...[pauses] There are
two most important issues — stability of the tax policy
and payments for land. Well, there are also issues of
protecting investments and so on. On behalf of the gov-
ernment, two structures have been set up, as you know:
Derzhkominvest [State Committee for Investments] led
by Borys Sobolyev, which will concentrate, correct, and
coordinate investments, and the department for techni-
cal assistance led by esteemed Lada Pavlikovska, which
is also tackling and will be tackling these probiems,
although from a somewhat different aspect. In other
words, two specific departments were formed in Ukraine
in order to provide foreigners with access to informa-
tion and assistance. [passage omittec' }

A tax code has been drafted. At present, it is being
examined at the president's administration. This is a
complicated book, as they say, and next year we will
probably be ready to adopt the tax code. However, we
had submitted the program of the tax policy fundamen-

tals to the Supreme Council back on 11 September this
year.

{Havrysh] One of the painful issues is the provision of
Ukraine’s national economy with energy. Marchuk told
the news conference about the state of the negotiations
with the Russian Federation on gas deliveries. He
also said that the huge fuel debts made by previous
governments wer being paid off. The prime minister
also told the journalists about the work being done in
Ukraine to create alternative energy sources.

(Marchuk] First of all, this is the development of
Ukraine’s own deposits, especially those in the Black
Sea — the Sea of Azov shelf. These deposits are rather
promising. Besides, this is the use of wind-powered
generators for the production of electricity. These are

UKRAINE 63

already functioning at Donuzlav [a harbor used as a
naval base in Crimea]. There is a rather large testing
ground there for wind-powered generators. They are
functioning well enough and rather effectively. The
generators are manufactured in Dnepropetrovsk. This
also has good prospects for the future, although it is
clear that one should not count on them [generators] as
the main substitute for other sources of electric power.
However, this is a good supplement in conditions of the
shortage of electricity here in Ukraine.

We held a tender several days ago; to be more precise,
it has not yet been completed — we are creating our
own closed-cycle production of fuel for nuclear power
stations. This is a very large-scale and expensive project.
We invited various firms, including Russian firms, the
well-known U.S. firm Westinghouse and others to take
part in the tender. We will not be able to implement the
project independently; howevez, we will have our own
cycle for the production of nuclear fuel for our nuclear
power stations.

As regards other trends — solar energy and so on
— work is being done toward that end. However, the
most important, as I have already said, is nuclear power
engineering, which now accounts for 30 percent of the
total volume of electricity produced. We are planning to
increase this figure to 40 percent. Next go thermal power
stations and hydroelectric power stations. While in the
United States, we signed an agreement with the World
Bank on granting Ukraine a credit of $115 million on
favorable terms for the modernization and rehabilitation
of our hydroelectric power stations. Their potentials
have not yet been used here in Ukraine.

(Havrysh] Prime Minister Marchuk also answered other
questions from journalists.

Kuchma Hails Parliament’s Approval of
Government Program

VII 1N290S28S Mascaw INTERE
ERPS LEVLUE IIMS PEOSCOW LEVI LAS

1805 GMT 12 Oct 95

{From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by
Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by
Viadimir Shishlin]

{[FBIS Transcribed Text] The parliamentary approval
of the government program is a very positive step
that in some sense gives confidence to the whole
country, President Leonid Kuchma told the press in Kiev
Thursday, the day following the parliamentary decision
which he described as fateful.

In Kuchma’s opinion the resolution demonstrated that
there is a majority capable of decision-making in
parliament. On the whole Kuchma called the approval

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

oad UKRAINE

a major event and a holiday for Ukraine, a day when it
became clear to everyone that the country will continue
advancing along the road of reform.

IF Note: On Wednesday evening the Ukrainian parlia-
ment approved the cabinet program of action on the
whole. It instructed the government to take into account
the proposals and remarks made during the debate and
submit a plan of concrete steps simultaneously with the
draft of the 1996 budget.

During the roll call on the resolution submitted by eight
groups and factions it was supported by 234 deputies.
61 out of 323 attending deputies voted against and 17
abstained.

In an exclusive interview with Interfax Wednesday
Kuchma was optimistic about the upcoming resolution
and assumed that the program would have the general
approval and the cabinet would get a chance to imple-
ment it.

However, in his opinion the mixed and politically
unstructured parliament would not be content with any
program. Kuchma called absolutely impermissible the
actual delivery of an alternative program by Natalya
Vitrenko during the program debate.

IF Note: On the pretext of expressing a special opin-
ion, as speaker Oleksandr Moroz put it, Vitrenko made
a Statement in which she actually described the funda-
mentals of an alternative economic program worked out
by the Socialist Party.

According to her, the main difference of the Socialist
program was the renunciation of privatization in indus-
try. The maximum profit tax should not exceed 45 per-
cent. Besides, the Socialist program implied a tax recess
for priority productions.

Vitrenko was convinced that the Socialist program
would triple company profits, double actual earnings in
industry and reduce prices by one third.

In the president’s opinion the parliamentary debate also
demonstrated the unacceptability of Moroz combining
the posts of parliamentary speaker and leader of the
Socialist Party.

IF Note: At the Wednesday evening session Moroz
said he was categorically opposed to making land a
commodity. In his opinion the government program
contains an ill-disguised assumption of that.

Moroz called trade in land a crime against Ukraine.
"I would insist on dropping these paragraphs from the
program because they are a threat to the future," the
speaker said.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Prime-Minister Yevheniy Marchuk calied Vitrenko’s
speech a planned provocation against the government.

After the speech he told deputies that the announcement
of an alternative program at the session is not provided
for either the constitutional agreement, or the regulations
of parliament.

Before the government program was put to vote
Marchuk made his final speech and described as
the objectives of his cabinet a balanced budget and
support for production. The prime-minister described
the program as a foundation for guaranteeing true
advancement.

He stressed that settlements with Russia have been or-
ganized during the past year and the Russian positive
attitude has helped restructure the debts for gas deliver-
ies.

According to the prime-minister, Ukraine’s foreign debt
amounts to $8.8 billion. "The IMF is helping us in
settlements for the debts and thus working for the
government,” Marchuk declared.

He gave a news conference in Kiev Thursday where he
announced that the cabinet would immediately pass a
resolution to enforce the program after finalizing it.

He said the enforcement mechanism would contain a
concrete schedule and a list of responsible ministers.
Marchuk stressed that the enforcement of the program
largely depends on its implementation in the provinces.

The prime-minister announced that cabinet members
would meet Thursday the leaders of eight parliamentary
groups that supported the program. He also intended
to propose the formation of a government alliance in
parliament. He specified that it would be an alliance
supporting economic reforms.

In reply to a question whether he would head the
alliance, if elected to parliament (Marchuk has been
nominated candidate in Poltava region - IF), the prime-
minister said he has aot met voters or decided whether
he would run in elections.

Presidential economic advisor Anatoliy Halchinskyy
told Interfax the parliamentary resolution is a confir-
mation of the course of amending economic reforms
proclaimed by Kuchma last April. According to him,
the government program is a concentrated reflection of
this course aimed at an active industrial and social pol-
icy on the basis of financial stabilization.

The support of the IMF for the efforts of the government
to carry out the course is an indicative fact, the advisor
said.

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

"All that proves that the presidential course is balanced
and optimal and meets the political as well as economic
realities of the day,” Halchinskyy said.

Deputy Prime-Minister in charge of economy Roman
Shpek named as the main distinctive feature of the cab-
inet program its concentration on achieving economic
growth on a realistic basis.

In an interview with Interfax he said the program is
built on the foundation of financial stabilization and the
transition of the emphasis to the micro level. In Shpek’s
opinion industrial growth could be achieved in 1996.

"We count on financial stabilization. This will result in
a decline in lending rates. Companies will get a chance
to accumulate profits and turnover capital will not lose
its value due to inflation. This will give an impetus to
economic activities," the deputy prime-minister said.

Shpek also said that in 1996 the government intends
to draw about $2.5 billion in loans from international
financial organizations as well as loans on a bilateral
basis.

Kuchma Rejects Cooperation With Supreme
Council

LD1210190395 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1700 GMT 12 Oct 95

{[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — There will never be
any cooperation with the Supreme Council majority,
said Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma at a meeting
with representatives of Ukrainian youth organizations.
The president was commenting on the parliament’s vote
earlier today to raise the low-income threshold.

Ukrainian Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk told the
Supreme Council yesterday that such a move would
require 500 trillion karbovantsi, more than the state
could afford. According to President Kuchma, today’s
resolution was a populist act designed to discredit
executive authorities and show off the parliament as the
only one concerned about people’s well-being.

Economic Issues
Marchuk Presents Economic Program

LD1210144095 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1915 GMT I1 Oct 95

[Address by Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk to
Ukrainian Supreme Council session in Kiev on 11
October — recorded]

(FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with the consti-
tutional treaty, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has
submitted a program of its activities to the Supreme
Council. The analysis of the socioeconomic situation in

UKRAINE 65

the country reveals its exceptionally complex and con-
tradictory nature. On the one hand, there are grounds
for stating, cautiously, that there have been certain im-
provements for the better connected with the initial and
the most difficult stage of reforms. I have in mind, first
of all, the practical steps toward the establishment of a
market economy as a functionally complete system and
a Strategic aim of the policy that is being implemented.

The non state sector of the economy is developing. The
creation of a diversified structure of privatization has
given it more dynamism and helped to make the process
more manageable. Budgetary relations are being formed
through the delimitation of powers at the centre and at
local levels and the state budget is being freed from
the functions that are not characteristic of it. The rate of
increase in the country’s foreign trade turnover is rising.
Exports are on the increase despite the general decline
in Output. The structure of foreign trade and interstate
economic relations is improving. The exchange rate has
been unified and the currency market is developing. The
establishment of the banking system and a network of
financial agents is nearing completion. About 60 general
state and sectoral programmes are being drawn up and
implemented. They are aimed at resolving important
economic tasks, above all energy conservation and the
construction of airplanes, missiles and shipbuilding, the
production of Ukrainian electric locomotives, trams,
trolleybuses and buses. On the whole, it is possible to
say that we have created a framework for stabilization,
and for the first time this has been achieved by economic
means of regulation.

However, we have not succeeded in strengthening the
positive tendencies and making them irreversible. More-
over, notable signs of economic and social instability
continue to exist against this background. That which
we have achieved has had little effect on the health
of the national economy and, first of all, production as
its main component, and, in the long run, on the liv-
ing conditions of the people, on their well-being. The
reality of the present moment is the continuing, albeit
slowing down considerably, decline in output, the wind-
ing down of business and investment activity, the de-
teriorating situation in the fuel and energy complex,
the growth in the negative balance of payments, the
criminalization of the economy and the administrative
spheres. The insufficient feedback from the measures
taken to restructure the market economy was caused by
the fact that attention was usually concentrated on indi-
vidual issues without a properly synchronized approach
to their resolution, taking into account their priorities,
mutual relations, possible consequences and the over-
all effect on the socioeconomic situation on the whole,
and, apart from that, the degree of the economy’s readi-

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66 UKRAINE

ness to accept these or those innovations. Thus, price
liberalization, being a forced measure to a great extent,
came ahead of the establishment of a competitive en-
vironment. The currency exchange regulation was im-
plemented in the absence of an established legislative
framework. Changes in the tax policy were not fully
backed with a single system of taxes, duties and manda-
tory payments and clear procedures for their collection
into the budget. State subsidies were a common prac-
tice, along with the funding of expenses without taking
into consideration the available budget resources.

Without the required minimum conditions and, first of
all, the radical reforming of ownership relations, the
state and its institutions were increasingly removed from
the regulation and control of the most important com-
ponents and factors of the national economy. Unfor-
tunately the processes that were taking place in many
aspects of the economy were not heeded and this pre-
vented us from making a clear forecast of develop-
ment scenarios and the socioeconomic consequences,
but most importantly, from making appropriate and
timely adjustments.

This runs counter to the generally accepted and proven
world experience, which teaches that the management
of macroeconomic processes during transitional periods
and crises cannot be carried out without strong, firm and
resolute state power. Ukraine has suffered a significant
economic slump and losses and has been almost con-
stantly in a state of hyperinflation. According to some
estimates, this period for us has been the longest in
the 20th Century. The economy has been highly defi-
cient while there have been virtually no nonemissionary
sources of covering the deficit. The investment shortage
has forced our country out of the world market of highly
technical and scientific goods and left it to consume its
own national wealth.

Because of these conditions we have tried to devise
the government action program not as a compilation of
generally known tasks but as an action instrument for
choosing the priorities, ways and means of stopping and
overcoming the crisis, creating the necessary conditions
for further transformations in the economy and improv-
ing people’s lives. In a wider scope, the program, as I
said, provides a practical basis for the implementation
of the conceptual principles of the Ukrainian president’s
economic policy, announced in October 1994, and the
correction of reforms, the need for which was stated in
the president’s later statements.

The ideology of this document is based on the constitu-
tional treaty, specifically, Article 31, which defines the
range of the Cabinet of Ministers’ duties and powers.
In the course of its finalization, we also considered the

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

recommendations put forward by the all-Ukrainian con-
ference of economists held in September this year.

The program is aimed first of all at the comprehensive
integration of urgent practical tasks and the development
of a single anticrisis strategy on that basis.

The government sees its main task in ensuring economic
growth as a crucial condition of improving the situation
in the country, first of all, in the social sphere. A system
of the following mutually related economic measures is
designed to achieve that aim:

1. Substantial reduction in the rate of inflation from 7.5
percent on average a month this year to 2.4-2.5 percent
next year. Among other things, it will make access to
credit resources considerably easier.

2. Boosting of the investment process and, most impor-
tantly, encouraging long-term capital investment into the
production sphere.

3. A structural and industrial policy which would ensure
the priority development of the industries working for
the domestic as well as the outside market and providing
a fast capital turnover.

4. Overcoming the payment crisis. A package of mea-
sures, outlined by the instruction of the president of
Ukraine, has been developed for that purpose. In par-
ticular, it is envisaged to improve the circulation of
promissory notes and the state regulation of prices for
the products of monopoly enterprises.

5. Relieving the general tax pressure to encourage an
increase in business activity. The rate of GDP redistri-
bution through the budget, together with payments to
the pension fund, will be decreased to 45-47 percent.

6. Improving the balance of payments, first of all, by
stimulating export, and introducing changes to the fuel
import and payment procedure and the implementation
of energy and resource saving programs.

In the long run, our aim is to stabilize the gross domestic
product, ensure its growth and, on this basis, improve
the living standards.

Later I shal! speak about it in greater detail, but now
I would like to draw your attention to another special
feature of our program. Its content and general tone
is determined by the premise that reforms should not
be excessively costly or achieved at any price. The
price of reform in general, and the social price in
particular, is a category which determines our entire
future. We should be realistic and clearly see the
main contradiction which adds to the difficulties of our
transition, that is the imbalance between the limited
resources of the state, especially the financial ones,

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FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

and the scale and complexity of the problems at hand.
Given such conditions, the maximalist principle of here
and now is unrealistic. It cannot be sustained even
by more stable and regulated economic systems. In its
program, the government did not strive to squeeze life
into abstract, preconstructed schemes, much less to play
up to potential opponents. Its essence is an effort to
achieve a concrete and real practical result.

In the overall context of macro-economic stabilization,
the primary significance is attached to the growth of
real GDP. It is an integral factor which characterizes
the efficiency of the economic system on the whole
and crucially affects all spheres of social life. Its
improvement is the subject of all sections in the
economic part of the program, in this way or another.
This affects, first of all, the budget and taxation policy.
The government is placing the main emphasis on
achieving an increase in budget revenue. This does not
mean increasing the tax pressure, but ensuring that all
contributions payable to the budget are received on time
and in full. Of no less importance is the reduction of
excessive, unreasonable expenditure which the state is
not able to sustain. The government will propose a
temporary freeze, for a year or two, on some of the
programs we are unable to fund properly.

I should add that the government is working together
with the Supreme Council on the reform of the entire tax
system. We want to make it more simple and, mainly,
stable, ensuring an equal burden on all taxpayers and a
more favourable climate for business activity. We are
also considering the possibility of introducing, where
justified, a tax payable in kind, or in a mixed form.
With regard to the relation between this problem and
the production sphere, there is a direct connection. The
growth of production, together with an increase in sales
results in more revenue to the budget.

At the same time, the government will work to achieve
a steady and smooth procedure for the payment of taxes
into the budget, so that those evading this duty to the
State would not be merely getting off with a fright. Such
measures will be tough but inevitable. I shall quote just
a few figures. Almost two-thirds of businesses which
underwent inspection in the first eight months of this
year were found in breach of the tax legislation. As a
result of inspections, some 50,000 billion karbovantsi
were collected for the state budget. This is 150 percent
more than the budget expenditure for science, or half
the entire spending on defence. This is the price of the
Situation. And this is only what has been uncovered.
On the whole, some 40 percent of payable budget
contributions are not being received. Think of how many
problems, including social ones, could be solved if these
funds were received by the state treasury. Unfortunately,

UKRAINE 67

there is only one new law enacted in this field so far,
the Law on Enterprise Profit Tax, and it already requires
amendment. Other acts from the tax package are still at
the drafting stage, having formed the basis of the state
budget for the second year in a row.

The core of the work to cure the economy is moving to
the regions and the workforce. That is why the reform
of budgetary relations will continue with the division
of power between the center and the local authorities.
This is an important aspect of regional economic policy,
the concept of which was approved by the Cabinet of
Ministers. At the same time, the government will treat as
especially unacceptable and intolerable any incidents of
high-handedness in the local distribution of the budget.
Since the budget is the main financial plan of the state,
stretching the budget will lead directly to its fall. And
this will affect not only the economy but the politics
as well. This is where the state treasury system comes
in, which we hope will start working this year. One of
its important functions will be control over the use of
budget funds. This will prevent the spending of budget
allocations at will. Such tendencies, unfortunately, do
exist. An inspection, carried out by the Cabinet of
Ministers, revealed that one trillion karbovantsi worth
of credits and loans were spent on purposes different
from those for which they were issued.

The payment crisis is also having a negative effect on
production and the process of financial stabilization. It
has turned into a real plague for our economy, hav-
ing reached truly astronomical proportions. Accounts
receivable by Ukrainian enterprises stood at 1 Septem-
ber 1995 at nearly 1.7 trillion karbovantsi and accounts
payable exceeded 2 trillion karbovantsi, which is larger
than the entire gross domestic product [GDP]. For that
reason the budget failed to receive on time nearly 80
trillion karbovantsi. In accordance with a relevant in-
struction by the president of Ukraine, the Cabinet of
Ministers is introducing a procedure under which enter-
prises will sell their goods only to solvent customers,
who can guarantee payment or who can provide secu-
rity such as property. For this purpose we will activate a
mechanism of the mandatory issue of promissory notes
to settle debts, including the debts accumulated earlier,
with the actual use of bankruptcy procedure and con-
version of financial obligations into property liabilities.

I believe this constructive outline of problems and tasks
gives an idea about the extreme complexity of the
situation in which the government is setting out to step
up the financial stabilization, the structural changes, the
slowing down of the decline, and increasing production
and the GDP. Next year, we expect to maintain the GDP
virtually at this year’s levei. The itcrease in industrial
output is planned within 0.6 percent, that of agricultural

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68 UKRAINE

production within 0.2 percent. These targets should not
be seen as excessively modest. First of all, we clearly
see and would like to use the opportunities for their
achievement, that is, do what we have been unable to do
in the past four years. Second, it is such improvements,
although gradual and not always noticeable, that are
incomparably more valuable than the torrents of ritual
economic rhetoric which has been the background for
the continuous decline of these indicators.

The certainty and the feasibility of this task and the fu-
ture increase in GDP are based on calculations and fore-
casts. We are talking about real support for Ukrainian
producers. The government will make available the nec-
essary conditions for the normal functioning of the pro-
ductive sphere through improving the legislative base,
perfecting the budget and taxation policy, and protec-
tion from unfair competition in the domestic market.

The resolution of specific economic issues is now being
placed on the businesses themselves. They should take
charge of expanding the market for their output, set-
ting payments with suppliers and consumers, looking
for sources of investment in production instead of ex-
pecting traditional injections, subsidies, and preferential
credits and tax benefits from the budget. Obviously such
a reorientation cannot be painless. It requires a break
with old- fashioned psychological stereotypes. There is
no turning back. This is a necessary precondition for
adapting to market realities. We are also proceeding
from the need to reduce the volume of nonindustrial
consumption which at the moment is excessively high
and at the expense of this increasing industrial consump-
tion. To put it more simply, we must not consume most
of what is created but channel it into the productive
sphere for its dynamic development and strengthen the
financial base for economic reforms.

It is worth adding that according to valuations, the vol-
ume of GDP is now at the level it was in the mid-1970s.
Meanwhile, the appetite of distribution and especially
consumption continues to increase as if nothing hap-
pened. Realization of the importance of this problem
at the micro level, that is, at the enterprises themselves,
will be insured not by administrative intervention nor by
directives from above. The government intends to make
use of such conditions and stimuli that would realisti-
cally interest workers’ collectives not only to increase
their income but first and foremost to channel a crucial
part of it to generating working capital, to expand and
technologically restruct output.

In addition, a routine has already been established which
links the volumes of the consumption fund at enterprises
with the results of their activities. By no means does this
signify the freezing or reductions in salaries. On the

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

contrary, collectives that work efficiently will increase
the amount of goods sold and receive an opportunity
to increase their salaries. It is necessary to note that
the need for adjustment is dictated today by the low
level of salaries which is caused first and foremost by
the unprecedented low level of output. The permanent
deficit in the investment of capital in the productive
sphere, as well as most other difficuities in the economy,
is caused by inflation and we have succeeded in
completely overcoming it. Calculations demonstrate that
its reduction to at least 30 percent a year, although even
in our conditions this is for the time being very difficult,
would enable us to normalize the financial state of
enterprises and increase investment activity and output.

In its program the government did not restrict itself to
the traditional view for the reasons of inflation which
is based on excessive demand for money. The main
means of fighting inflation is to reduce state expendi-
ture, obtain additional stabilization credits from interna-
tional financial organizations, and expand the securities
market. It was also taken into account that inflation in
Ukraine was caused by the technological backwardness
of production, the high material, labor, and energy in-
tensiveness of output, and its corresponding low quality
as well as by the monopolism of producers and the low
level of use of productive capacities. To counteract this
exclusively by means of restricting aggregate demand
is not effective because, unfortunately, enterprises fa-
vor reducing output and continue to raise the price of
their products. What you have is a closed circle. The
decline in output is one of the reasons for inflation and
in turn it increases inflationary pressures itself because
it Causes price rises. On the other hand the reduction in
budget revenues compels us to print more money.

In order to break this chain the main stake is made
on stabilization of prices as a precondition of further
increase in production and investment. The develop-
ment of an optimum corridor in which a strict finan-
cial policy would unite with priority financing of the
most promising investment projects, including at the
cost of the budget within emissions, although planned
ones, is also at issue. Rational substantiation of direction
of these resources to the material base of the economy
and modern technologies will also lead to expansion of
volumes of sales and thus to speeding up the move-
ment of commodities. This will stimulate not a primi-
tive feudal barter system but highly organized effective
economic activities along the classical market principle
with a civilized process of buying and selling in the cen-
ter and not a primitive barter exchange. These measures
will have in their essence and consequences a clearly
defined antiinflationary nature. We attribute fundamen-
tal importance not to a total financial rescue of enter-

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FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

prises, to which some people are calling us now, but to
a selective purposeful investment. However, the state is
short of funds to provide fully even for such a selective
approach. The government will not and cannot support
ineffective enterprises which are effectively bankrupt.
The main criteria in the selection of objects for invest-
ment will be the following: Solving the issue of energy
saving, energy production, and alternative sources of
energy supply; production of export-worthy and import-
replacing goods and also production of goods of special
social importance, that is, medicines, food, and other ba-
sic goods; the ability of producers to find and to expand
markets for their goods in the country and abroad, and
to increase accordingly the volumes of sales; possibil-
ities for speeding up production in adjacent industries,
in the entire manufacturing complex and for stimulat-
ing full cycles of production cooperation. Intensifying
the processes of investment will create favorable condi-
tions for the introduction of a regime which will insure
that credits reach their addressees directly without mid-
dle men, without loan agencies, and will insure their
likewise direct and unconditional return.

Private capital and new forms of mixed investment,
that is, state and private, are a prospective reserve
which the government plans to involve in the investment
sphere. I will also draw your attention to the fact
that because of the current relatively high rate of
inflation the government, with the help of the National
Bank, developed a mechanism of encouragement of
investment activities of commercial banks. In particular,
if the share of long-term credits makes up at least 25
percent of the total volume of the credit portfolio, such
banks will obtain credit support and they will benefit
from more favorable norms of economic activities.
It is planned to remove restrictions on direct bank
investments at the cost of private capital. The complex
of tasks for development of securities market includes
creating conditions for participation in it of commercial
banks.

We are turning, effectively for the first time, to the prac-
tice of crediting projects by consortiums mostly through
concentrating resources of several banks on the condi-
tions of joint responsibility. Insuring implementation of
such projects reduces at the same time the risk that cred-
its will not be paid back. It is clear that strict control aud
a system of economic sanctions are always necessary in
the case of purpose-linked credits in order to insure that
the allocated funds should be used exclusively for their
specified purpose. Such a mechanism is already being
developed.

Our special attention remains focused on the substantial
drop in labor productivity. This on is, one hand, a re-
sult of the economic crisis and on the other hand it is

UKRAINE 69

a negative factor which aggravates it. Unfortunately, it
seems that this problem has not particularly interested
anybody. It was believed that it was not especially im-
portant from the point of view of macroeconomic sta-
bilization. Meanwhile, over the past four years labor
productivity in Ukraine has almost halved. The most
obvious reason for that is that the production slump
was not followed by an adequate reduction in the num-
ber of employees. However, it is not just due to simple
arithmetic. There were a whole range of interconnected
factors, the most crucial of which was the implementa-
tion of structural transformations, effective conservation
of old cooperation links because of new more effective
ones, the spending nature of the economy, the objective
unfavorable conditions for restoring production and in-
creasing its technological, organizational, and rational-
ization level.

I should talk separately about the labor legislation
and the system of payment for work. The balance
between the real results of work and payment for it
has been distorted. Even those imperfect levers which
made it possible to maintain that balance on a more
or less acceptable level have been discarded. One can
speak in general about the ruining of the whole system
of payment for work. An unacceptable disproportion
has formed not only between industries but within
those industries too. The gap between the levels of
income from different types of activities is growing, for
example, in banking and intermediary spheres on the
one hand and in the manufacturing and public spheres
on the other. Such deformations and distortions have
virtually destroyed work motivation and are intensifying
social tension. On final analysis, wages do not provide
for normal regeneration of labor and on the other hand
they also continue to grow outside the context of the
real production effectiveness.

For those reasons the government aims to increase the
role and importance of tariffs in the structure of wages,
to regulate the impact of the main and additional wages
on the cost of goods and services. We plan to sort out
the procedure for paying wages in the next few months
and to raise Le level of responsibility of administration
for delays in the payment of wages. From 1996 onward
the reform of the entire system of wages will begin and
conditions for increasing real income of the population
will be created. In simpler terms, people will have a
chance to work normally and earn adequately. And to
those who have no such chance, that is, pensioners,
disabled people, and other categories of the population
who are not able to work, the state will guarantee real
support. The reforms in the system of pension provision
and social insurance are geared toward that.

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70 UKRAINE

The government is now preparing proposals to introduce
relevant changes to the legislation on pensions. I would
like to dwell separately on those problems that not a
single member of the government as well as all of you,
esteemed people’s deputies, can ignore. I have in mind
the poverty level, more precisely its size. Last week
this again became the focus of intense discussion in
parliament. We are also in favor of every person being
able to satisfy his more important requirements. But
again we must proceed from the real possibilities of
the state. One could make a separate speech on this but
I will only dwell on the individual and most obvious
results which could lead to approval of the poverty level
at 4.8 million karbovantsi a month.

First, by the end of the year we would need in
excess of 690 trillion karbovantsi just for salaries for
state financed institutions and pensions. Second, the
enterprises’ wage fund would increase by 200 trillion
karbovantsi. Where can we obtain these funds if we
often do not even have enough money for now?
Calculations show that however hard we try to make
ends meet we would still need to shed about 5 million
workers. Third, cash in circulation would increase by
almost 600 trillion karbovantsi thus creating a new wave
of inflation owing to which prices in December this year
would increase by 64 percent compared to September.
Fourth, even if we stop all other expenditures from the
budget then after this we would not have the funds to
finance expenditures connected with these increases.

This is not simply theory and not an attempt to frighten
somebody. Let us remember what the numerous mea-
sures in the social sphere in recent years have led to.
They were adopted with the best of intentions but with-
out sufficient economic grounds. As a result of this,
people spent more than they received. The government
cannot, should not, and has no right to deceive itself or
the people. We see a way out elsewhere: a consistent
but real, that is, an economically well grounded way
of raising people’s incomes. These are not simply in-
tentions. A package of government decisions has just
been published on wages, pensions provision, payment
of compensation, and assistance. Wages for a consider-
able section of workers in the state financed sector have
increased from 1 October by 22 percent. We hope that
the Supreme Council will support the government's pro-
posals with regard to increasing average aggregate in-
comes which would enable people to receive assistance.

In addition, decisions are being prepared that would
give the badly off a one-time cash payment for the
fall-winter period. This is roughly what was done last
year. Obviously, all of this is not yet a great deal of
money. But it is reai money and it will give the people

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

something rather than being burned up without trace in
the inflationary fire.

I would also like to add that a system of targeted help
and subsidies exists in the state which the government
will continue to improve. Through it we are now
helping families whose expenditures on utilities exceed
15 percent of their incomes.

There is one more extremely important socioeconomic
aspect to this work: an increase in the people’s real
incomes raises solvent demand and provides a tax
impulse and an additional impulse to output.

In this context special significance is attributed to
qualitative changes in the pricing policy. A system
of issuing every three months for enterprises price
guidelines that take into account forecast dynamics of
inflation and retail prices will be introduced already by
the end of this year.

The focus of particular attention is on the financing pro-
cesses in basic industries that remain monopolists: the
fuel and energy complex, the metallurgy, the machine-
building, the power engineering, and the transport. The
margins, formed there, can be felt everywhere down the
production chain. To avoid [word indistinct] dispropor-
tions between industries and other unpleasant surprises,
preliminary coordination of terms and levels of those
prices in the specified industries is being introduced.
This should have a positive effect on the overall price
situation in the country. Counteraction to incidents of
monopolist and discriminatory prices in the production,
supply, and trade sphere remains to be a topical task. It
is the price dictate of monopolists and ungodly profits
from resale of goods through a chain of intermediary
structures that attack the pocket of a customer most of
all. Fighting this is one of the main functions of the An-
timonopoly Committee. As for the free price creation,
its sphere will expand mostly among non-monopolized
sectors of economy, where excessive price appetites will
be restrained by competition.

The government is prepared to cooperate with trade
unions and public organizations in the field of price
control, like in other issues, which are connected with
the interests of consumers. I would like to illustrate
the complexity and diversity of the tasks that the
government has to solve by the example of the energy
supply, which is one of the most painful problems and
directly affects the interests of our national security.
The shortage of energy resources is caused not by the
fact that there is nowhere to buy them from but by the
chronic deficit of funds. Today it is one of the most
exhausting items of our import, which represents the
main burden on the payment balance and increases its
negative balance.

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FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

It is generally known that the main reason for excessive
energy consumption lies in the deformed structure of
the Ukrainian economy, which preconditions its loss
making. The adequate structural changes that are aimed
at removing such deformations, inherited from the old
economic system, have been outlined in the program as
one of the strategic directions of the activities. At the
same time one should understand that deep structural
changes will take more than one year to implement,
and they also require astronomical financial expenditure.
Therefore we will work actively on what is possible and
necessary already today.

We can identify three components of this issue. First,
fuller use of Ukraine’s own energy resources, which can
satisfy up to 20 percent of the need for natural gas and
up to 13 percent of the need for oil. To do that there
are plans to expand geological exploration, in particular
on the Black Sea-Azov Sea shelf, and to use fuller the
deposits that have been decommissioned earlier.

As for the increase in production of coal, reserves of
which meet the needs of our economy, besides purely
technical and economic measures there are plans to
reform the management system of the industry and to
restructure actively its enterprises.

There is another unforgivably forgotten reserve — the
use of local fuel resources, for example, peat. While
thinking in global terms one should not forget about
what is immediately under one’s feet.

Second, search for additional financial sources of pay-
ment for the import of energy carriers and improvement
of the organization of mutual relations between the par-
ticipants of this process. To rely only on foreign cred-
its, which are so far sufficient for just about payment
for energy carriers, would be shortsighted and danger-
ous: these credits can disappear tomorrow. It is also ex-
tremely unprofitable to live in debt because these debts
do not just have to be returned but one also has to pay
large sums to service them. Hence it is absolutely im-
perative that one should earn as much as possible hard
currency by any means. This is one of the main motives
to stimulate production of export worthy and import re-
placing production.

To improve the balance of payments the government
has drawn up a new system of economic and organi-
zational relations connected with gas deliveries, settling
for it and its transit through Ukrainian territory. It will
be based essentially on centralization and providing con-
sumers and sellers with the freedom to chose relations
between themselves. In other words, within this sys-
tem the state will stop being a monopolist that was in
charge of everything and that almost completely was
responsible for all the debts. The establishment and de-

UKRAINE 71

velopment of market relations between the suppliers and
consumers of electric energy and competition between
generating companies will benefit from the restructured
management in the power engineering sector, which is
basically already completed. The government, together
with the Supreme Council, will draw up a draft national

energy program.

Third, with regard to the importance of the above-
mentioned tasks, energy conservation will be the main
focus of this work. This will be implemented both
through long-term future measures in the form of re-
structuring as well as through operational and organi-
zatioxO To the latter, we include the setting up of ac-
counting methods and control over the use of energy
resources in the productive and domestic spheres by
means of introducing relevant systems and instruments.
The tariff policy should become an active instrument
in the introduction of the conservation program. Enter-
prises are entirely responsible for paying for energy,
and tariffs and prices for fuel, housing, and utilities are
gradually getting closer to their real value.

Obviously this is an unpopular step, but it is necessary
and, what is more, inevitable. It is better to pay more
for heat and light than not to have it at all. In addition,
as I have already said, the government will make use
of warning measures mainly through the mechanism
of targeted assistance to the most vulnerable strata of
the population. The structural and industrial policy is
important not only from the point of view of the fuel
and energy complex. It is an all-embracing problem that
determines the future of our economy. From what has
been said I would like to focus on several aspects that
describe the unconventional vision of resolving them as
seen by the government.

What I mean is to transfer the emphasis onto the
sphere that for a long time seemed to remain in the
shadows of powerful basic sectors: the light and food
industries. In the meantime these sectors that make the
final product have a considerable export potential, work
directly for the consumer market, ensure a quick return
on their capital, provide considerable revenues into
the budget, and contribute to lowering unemployment.
Unfortunately, such potential advantages as yet remain
unfulfilled. Moreover, statistics prove that precisely
light industry and the output of consumer goods have
suffered the biggest decline. In connection with this we
set ourselves the tasks of not only stopping the rate of
decline but also to turn these sectors into locomotives
that would speed up the process of pulling the economy
out of the crisis. World experience is proof of the
expediency of this approach.

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72 UKRAINE

Here we must also include those sectors that used to be
mentioned in government documents at best through a
colon and which in terms of their economic efficiency
now possess one of the most important places. I am re-
ferring to tourism, which, with relatively small expen-
ditures, is capable of consistently and quickly providing
considerable funds, including hard currency; new jobs;
and gives an impulse to a range of related sectors, par-
ticularly with regard to the infrastructure. The inclusion
of such spheres among the government's priorities ob-
viously does not mean that attention to other sectors
is being weakened, especially the basic and scientifi-
Cally intensive sectors as well as machine and instru-
ment building, metallurgy, the chemical industry, trans-
port, and so on. The program mentions this in detail. In
the agro-industrial sector of the economy, which gener-
ates one third of national income, the government will
promote the creation of new socioeconomic relations
and forms of management of the market type. At the
center of this work are the interests of agricultural pro-
ducers and the need to raise motivation to increase and
efficiently use the productive potential. We regard !and
and economic reform and increasing support for private
farming as an important precondition for the formation
of a mixed economy in the agricultural sphere.

Cooperative processes, the organizational and techno-
logical integration of output, procurement, transport, and
sales will continue to develop. To reduce and then in
the future overcome dependancy on imports we will im-
plement the national program of developing agricultural
machine-building. The production of our own mineral
fertilizers and pesticides will be speeded up.

A combination of free and regulated price formation will
be the backbone of the price policy in the countryside.
The system of state contracts for some produce required
to satisfy the needs of the budgetary sphere will be
preserved. The produce purchase and sale infrastructure
will be improved along with the formation of specialized
markets of grain, sugar, vegetable oil, etc. The specific
features of the agrarian sector, as a seasonal branch
with the slowed-up circulation of invested funds, will
be taken into account, to improve financial and credit
relations in the sector. Export potentials of the sector
will be used more effectively.

Taking into account the special urgency of the problem,
I would like to dwell on the progress of the formatioa
of state grain resources and on measures taken by
the government to accelerate the process. This year
[1995], the bulk yield of grain crops in Ukraine is
expected to be about 37.3 million tonnes; in other
words, it is expected at the level of last year’s harvest.
As regards wheat, which is the main food crop, 16.4
million tonnes of wheat have been harvested; that is

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

26 percent more than last year [1994]. However, it is
better to calculate the amount of grain that has already
been stored. The government believes that the volume
of grain produced, including wheat, makes it possible
to form resources required to meet the needs of the
population, set up a state reserve, and form a seed
stock. As at 6 October, 4.7 million tonnes of grain were
procured under the state contract. The government has
allocated funds to pay for the 832,000 tonnes of grain
supplied by farms for storage under the responsibility of
the state. An additional reserve for grain procurement
is being effected — purchases of grain for the money
allocated by local authorities. Thus, over 300,000 tonnes
of grain have been purchased. In line with the decision
by the Cabinet of Ministers, the state will continue to
purchase grain at the expense of redeeming the budget
loan — as of 1 September, the debt stood at 20.6 trillion
karbovantsi; and also at the expense of redeeming the
loans issued by credit banks and at the expense of the
procurement organizations’ own circulating assets.

The government’s resolution on measures to develop
the market of agricultural produce in Ukraine should
play a special role. Under the resolution, the procedure
of introducing quotas and licenses is not applied to
the produce sold through agricultural exchanges; the
provision of rolling stock to transport this produce will
be a priority. The state will take part in trading sessions
on a par with other buyers. Besides, the procedure
speeds up the process of obtaining funds by farms,
which are required to finish autumn field work.

In present-day conditions, foreign economic activities
acquire ever greater importance as a system-forming
element. A whole number of difficulties and obstacles
are still to be overcome in this sphere. The foreign trade
and inter-state economic relations infrastructure, which
ceased to exist with the disintegration of the USSR,
is being set up virtually from scratch. The majority,
if not all of our exporters, turned out unprepared to
act independently on the world market with its strong
competition.

The government has to fill these gaps fast, because only
an increase in exports can somehow make up for the
losses caused by the economic crisis, particularly the de-
Cline in output and the shrinking of the domestic market.
This does not mean that exports will be given free rein.
We will work to improve the product structure of our
exports, moving away from the domination of raw ma-
terials to the sale of finished products and overcoming
the barterization of foreign trade. Here we are already
witnessing a positive trend. The measures envisaged to
stimulate the process include the implementation of a
long-term comprehensive program for providing sup-

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FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

port to exporters, due to be approved by the beginning
of next year.

Another and no less important aspect of the work
that is strategically aimed at improving the balance
of payments is, we believe, the implementation of
a flexible import policy. It should be pursued by
means of economically justified tariff regulation and the
introduction of specific, combined, and serious import
duties. Ukraine as a sovereign state has every right
to take these and other measures, which, incidentally,
conform to universally accepted international standards.

In line with the task of pursuing a flexible import policy,
work is in progress to step up the output of import-
replacing products. The fact that, despite our poverty,
hard currency is being wasted on noncritical imports —
that is, things we can do without or produce ourselves —
is peculiar not only from the point of complex economic
calculations but even from the point of common sense.

The program presents in detail our view on the status
quo, the tasks, and the prospects of development in the
field of foreign economic relations, including those with
the CIS and Russia. While we are in favor of building
economic bridges with all countries, we believe that this
process cannot remain a one-way route. The government
will stand firmly and consistently in favor of symmetry
and equality in foreign economic relations.

Another important section of the program has to do with
institutional transformations, the ownership reform, the
development of enterprise, and provisions for the man-
ageability of the state sector of the economy. It en-
visages better organization of privatization processes,
meaning that they should not develop on their own. The
restructuring of ownership is aimed at finding an effi-
cient Owner, increasing competition among producers,
and improving the feedback from production in general
on this basis. In the first instance, the acceleration of pri-
vatization will affect enterprises that bear no strategic
significance for the country’s economic development.
Their privatization is to be completed in the first half

UKRAINE 73

of next year. Here, the most burning problem is the
privatization of unfinished construction projects, where
enormous furds remain frozen. We are ready to hand
over a number of such projects at a symbolic price to
those who will be able to bring them to completion.

The privatization of medium-sized and large enterprises
requires particular consideration. It is envisaged to pro-
ceed by sale of shares in open joint-stock companies es-
tablished on the basis of these enterprises’ assets. This
will enable people to use their vouchers issued for the
purpose of privatization, purchase of property, and in
compensation. To protect state interests, the privatiza-
tion of enterprises that are of special significance to
economy and security will proceed according to individ-
ual schedules. By the end of this year, we will improve
the system of control over the involvement of financial
agents in the process of privatization, specifying leg-
islative grounds for their establishment and operation.
We will consider the possibility of extending the con-
trol powers of local authorities.

By the end of this year, Ukraine will have largely
formed a mixed economic system, along with the
necessary means of state influence on its operation.
While we are focusing attention on the long-term
problems of national importance, ours is not a bird's eye
view of the subject, overlooking the everyday problems
and concerns of individual sectors, work collectives,
citizens, and their families. The logical structure of
government activities also envisages urgent day-to-day
measures required to ensure the normal functioning of
the national economy as well as housing and utilities
during the autumn and winter period; food provision;
and the regular payment of wages, pensions, student
grants, and cash benefits. The government regards the
current state of economy and the actions planned as
the basis for its policies in the humanitarian, science,
and technology spheres. The tasks envisaged here, as in
other areas, are strictly coordinated with the actual state
resources available.

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74 WESTERN REGION

Belarus

President Lukashenka Addresses Trade Unionists

WS1310103195 Minsk BELAPAN in English
0806 GMT 13 Oct 95

(FBIS Transcribed Text] "Administration in the Repub-
lic of Belarus will be on toughening trend," President
Alyaksandr Lukashenka said while speaking at the Sec-
ond Congress of the FTUB [Federation of Belarusian
Trade Unions). He said, however, that he did not pretend
to the role of the author of a dictatorship. Admitting the
fact that in the country there are different branches of
power — the Supreme Soviet, the Constitutional Court,
the press, as the so called ‘fourth power’, and even trade
unions to a certain degree (as five million people are
behind them), Alyaksandr Lukashenka reminded those
present that “all these branches of power are attributed
to the trunk of one tree and people elected the President
as this trunk.” He also stressed that he did not want to
turn the Federation of Trade Unions into a pro-President
organisation. However, the consolidation of all forces of
society is vitally necessary at the present time. Only un-
der this condition the Republic can be lifted out of crisis
levels.

In his speech the President touched on his last decrees
and orders concerning the abolition of social privileges
and pensions for working pensioners. The head of state
tried to persuade the delegates of the Congress that
"economic progress is impossible without overcoming
social parasitic smugness,” and that "we must not turn
the state into a social security organisation.” In addition,
the President stressed, the initiators of these decrees
were common people themselves who demanded that
young people should be given an opportunity to find
jobs. The President admitted that issuing these and other
unpopular decrees he may have intruded upon others’
spheres of activities. But nobody but he can take upon
himself the solution of pressing problems. As for the
social privileges, according to Alyaksandr Lukashenka,
basically high-ranking bureaucrats, in particular, the
MP’s of the old parliament, enjoyed them. That is
why after this presidential decree appeared, they started
fighting against the President so zealously.

Mr. Lukashenka also dwelt on relationships between
him and the Constitutional Court. He said that on
the morning October 12 he had a conversation with
the Constitutional Court Chairman during which they
reached a mutual understanding. As for the activities of
the Free Trade Union of Belarus, which were suspended
by Decree No. 336, the President’s position remains
unwavering here: "I will not allow them to destabilize
the situation in the country. 100 metro drivers must not
disturb the 2-million city."

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Speaking about problems concerning the financial
sphere he said that at the present time three special
commissions are inspecting the activities of the Na-
tional Bank, the Savings Bank and commercial banks.
The President promised that in the near future large
sections of the public will be able to get acquainted
with the results of their work. In conclusion the
President shared his opinion about the Programme of
the Economic Development of the Republic in the
period until the year 2000, which is being worked out
now. Mr. Lukashenka considers that such a programme
should have ideological and political sections. "Why
have we given up the state ideology?” the President
asked. "Before January 1, 1996 the government plans
to work out an integral and complex programme to
outline ideas according to which, in my opinion, society
must live,” Mr. Lukashenka said. But he immediately
added that the draft of this document will also appear
in the press and be discussed by the general public.

Balloonists’ Death Investigation Previewed

MM1310100495 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 12 Oct 95 p 3

{Report by Valeriy Kovalev followed by comment by
Colonel Valentin Dudin, honored military navigator of
the USSR and candidate of military sciences: “In the
Sky Over Bereza"]

{[FBIS Translated Text] Minsk — The state commission
created by the Belarusian president to investigate the
incident involving the air balloon as a result of which
two U.S. sportsmen died near the city of Bereza did
not need the time allotted (through 1 October) to
answer the question of the reasons for the incident.
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has written about the incident
several times. And now, speaking on national television
recently, Alyaksandr Lukashenka has stated that the
results of a medical examination of the remains of the
dead pilots which will become known in about three
weeks’ time should clear up the matter completely. But
he said that it is already clear that the incident was
the result of bureaucratic confusion between Belarusian
officials and the organizers of the international air
balloon competitions. The military, the president said,
“acted absolutely correctly” and they dealt with the air
balloon as an ordinary violator of the border and should
not incur any liability for the tragic consequences which
ensued. In the very near future, the president noted,
we shall inform the public of the final results of the
investigation of this incident.

Let us add to what Alyaksandr Lukashenka has said that
the order to destroy the balloon was given personally
by Lieutenant General Valeriy Kostenko [name as

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

transliterated], commander of the republic’s air defense.
The president and the commander in chief of the
Belarusian armed forces were in Moldova at the time
and he was not informed of the incident. [Kovalev report
ends]

Specialist’s Commentary

Since the tragedy involving the South Korean Boeing
whose “deviation” from its route ended 1 September
1983 over Sakhalin, and Matthias Rust’s landing in Red
Square, the incident in the Belarusian sky leading to the
death of two Americans in the car of the air balloon
that was shot down is perhaps the first serious test of
air sovereignty in the post-Soviet space.

The U.S. side’s responses are understandable — the in-
cident has been called an extremely serious occurrence.
Our own mass media, grown skilled in journalists’ snap
investigations, did not remain aloof either, stating that
back in May the “chief Belarusian border guard” had
received a letter announcing the planned flight by for-
eign air balloons into the republic. I do not know how
reliable this fact is but as a specialist I can assert that
all airborne vehicles — from air balloons to ballistic
missiles — cross the border not on the basis of letters
giving advance notification but of applications made in
the approved form and within the deadlines approved
by international law. And it is not the border guards
who should track airborne vehicles, but the air defense
facilities. The long-suffering air defense forces who, if
they shoot something down, are abused on all sides but
if they do not shoot it down far even worse. After the
Rust story a dozen generals were dismissed.

But let us return to the events in Belarus.

It will be annoying if the investigation into this incident
takes place only under pressure from a “great power.”
Of course much will depend on the investigation com-
mission. Will its members be able or to be more precise
will they want to clarify the main issues: What applica-
tions were made by the organizers of the international
air balloon competition, “nai safety measures did they
develop and agree with the countries on the route, was
there a radio on board the balloons, and so forth? The
situation is aggravated by the fact that the balloon which
was shot down was by no means the only one there.
A whole squadron crossed Belarus’ air border and the
crews acted in different ways: Some landed after orders
from other helicopters, some flew away across the bor-

But the main question, of course, is whether it was
necessary to open fire. The supporters of a negative
reply assert that the balloon presented no danger.
But what if an aircraft had collided with it, a large

WESTERN REGION 75

aircraft, even, carrying tourists from one of those
civilized foreign countries? Who would have been the
“scapegoat” then? International law has a clear reply
to this question: He who controls the air space. And
control, you will agree, implies interception. And not
only for us. For instance, the Americans controlled
the air in the region of their cruiser Vincennes which,
moreover, was not off U.S. shores but thousands of
miles away, in the Persian Gulf, and instantly shot down
an Iranian airbus taking it for an enemy. More people
died than on the South Korean airliner. And nothing
happened. The Israelis shot down a lost Libyan airliner
over Sinai when the aircraft was turning to correct an
error. And it was shot down in broad daylight, when all
the inscriptions on its chassis could be read.

So that such incidents are by no means our Slav
“prerogative.”

An in-depth and fundamental investigation of all the fac-
tors which led to the emergence and development of the
situation and not just the dramatization of its denoue-
ment are very desirable. That this investigation will be
international is obvious. But will it be independent?

And I should also like an official report to be published
after the investigation and not just that the incident
should be arbitrarily retold by an official anxious, as
often happens, to remaini anonymous.

Moldova

Snegur Opposes Merger With Romania, Joining
NATO

LD1210202495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1916 GMT 12 Oct 95

[By Gennadiy Temnenkhov]

(FBIS Transcribed Text] BONN, October 12 (Itar-
Tass) — President of Moldova Mircea Snegur, who
is currently on an official visit to Germany, spoke
against Moldova becoming a part of Romania at a press
conference held in Bonn.

“If we talk of economic and cultural integration between
the two friendly states of Romania and Moldova, we are
in favour of such an integration", he said, replying to
an Itar-Tass query. "However, if it concerns a territorial
union with Romania, then our position is clear — the
present state in Europe and principles of security on
the continent are sealed in official documents of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) and the Paris Charter, and we are in favour of
strict compliance to provisions of these documents”, he
said.

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

76 WESTERN REGION

Moldova does not aspire for entering NATO, Mircea
Snegur hinted. The country’s constitution states that
Moldavia cannot become member of military alliances
and cannot permit the presence of foreign troops in its
territory. At the same time, Moldova was one of the first
to sign NATO’s “partnership for peace" programme,
since it regards that it can prove useful not only in the
sphere of military, but also in economic and political
spheres, the president said.

As far as NATO's eastward expansion plans are con-
cerned, according to the Moldovan leader, “they do not
harm security in Europe", however, they should be sub-
jected to a careful multilateral analysis, seriously taking
into consideration its "Russian component”.

Dniester Leader Supports Yeltsin’s Decree on CIS
Policy

AU1310090995 Chisinau INFOTAG in English

1930 GMT 11 Oct 95

{[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tiraspol, October 11 (INFO-
TAG) — Dniester leader Igor Smirnov has expressed
full support of Yeltsin's Decree on Russia's strategic
course with CIS states.

“The Dniester administration is satisfied with practically
every provision in the document,” Smirnov said over the
Dniester radio on Tuesday night.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

The Decree envisages a considerable toughening of
the Russia’s policy towards CIS states and a series
of measures aimed at the countries’ integration in
all fields, including in political and military ones.
In particular, the document envisages “strengthening
of integration processes in the CIS, expanding the
Customs Union, deeper cooperation in joint defending
of state boundaries around the CIS perimeter, and active
explanation to third countries that the CIS states are, first
and foremost, the zone of Russia’s interests.

The Decree meets Dniester’s vital interests, for we have
always struggled for our integration with Russia and
other CIS states, in which we observe our own security,"
Smirnov said.

Analyzing Dniester’s economic cooperation with Rus-
sia, the leader spoke for establishing joint ventures and
selling shares of local enterprises to Russian partners. As
Russia is the main market for most Dniester enterprises,
they may become the main instrument in obtaining Rus-
sian credits so badly needed by Dniester, Smirnov said.

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Tajikistan

Government Claims Rebels Accelerating Conflict

LD1I210141595 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network
in Tajik 1700 GMT 11 Oct 95

(FBIS Translated Text] At a briefing for local and
foreign correspondents on 11 October, Igor Sattarov,
deputy of the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs Infor-
mation Department, announced the following statement
of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan:

On 10 October 1995 at 1720 one of the units belonging
to the die-hard armed Tajik opposition group located
in the Afghan village of Barchid fired on a vehicle of
the Khorog border detachment. The vehicle was car-
rying soldiers of the Russian Federation Border Troop
detachment, as well as civilians from the Republic of
Tajikistan. According to preliminary information, five
soldiers died and four others were wounded as a result
of this action.

The Government of Tajikistan has made a strong protest
to the authorities of the Islamic State of Afghanistan
because this provocation was committed from that ter-
ritory. This shameful action also shows the extent to
which the Tajik opposition leaders respect the agree-
ments they have signed with the Government of Tajik-
istan. According to these agreements, peaceful negotia-
tions are recognized as the sole means to attain political
aims. In this respect also, there is no doubt that the
actions undertaken by the opposition are aimed at frus-
trating the crucial and decisive fifth round of inter-Tajik
negotiations.

The leadership of Tajikistan, by expressing its protest
against the violation of the agreements, once again
States its resolve that peace and tranquillity should be
established on the unfortunate Tajik land, and calls on
the Tajik opposition leadership to chose a judicious path,
to halt the senseless bloodshed, and to sit down at the
negotiating table.

There have been increasingly frequent armed actions of
late by the Tajik rebels on Tajik territory, according
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs employee. These
have entailed the death of two soldiers and the serious
wounding by gunshot of two other Russian soldiers on
28 September in Dushanbe; the hostage taking of four
policemen — whose fate is unknown to this day —
on 9 October in Tajikabad District; and provocative
actions on the Tajik-Afghan border. These all show that
the die-hard groups of the Tajik opposition, despite the
agreement between the Government of Tajikistan and
the leadership of the Tajik opposition, are increasingly
descending down a path of armed terrorism and are
departing far from their political opponents.

CENTRAL ASIA 77

Russian Border Guard Commander Threatens
Retaliation

LD1210152795 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network
in Russian 1000 GMT 12 Oct 95

(FBIS Translated Text] After a certain lull the situation
on the Tajik-Afghan border has sharply deteriorated
again. This statement was made at the start of a news
conference given yesterday by Lieutenant General Pavel
Tarasenko, commander of the group of Border Troops
of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Tajikistan,
on the latest provocation by the Tajik armed opposition,
which took place on 10 October and, according to the
latest clarified data, resulted in the killing of seven
Russian border guards.

Pavel Tarasenko drew the attention of the Tajik and
foreign journalists present to reliable facts indicating
the accumulation of large armed forces on the Afghan
border in the Pyandzh and Shuroabad areas covered
by the Moskovskiy border detachment and the Kalai-
Khumb, Vanch, and Yazgulem areas under the Khorog
border detachment.

As the commander announced, the investigation into
the tragic incident, when fire was opened on a vehicle
transporting foodstuffs from one observation point to
another, shows that the militants had prepared for the
attack beforehand, because small-arms and grenade-
launcher fire was carried out simultaneously from 20
points in Afghanistan. It is already the second case since
the beginning of the year when fire was opened against
unarmed groups of border guards.

What happened illustrates clearly once again that there
are some forces in the republic and beyond its bor-
ders who are obstructing in every possible way the
establishment of peace in Tajikistan and whose inter-
ests are served by the maintenance of tension on the
Tajik-Afghan border, the commander of the group of
Russian Border Troops stated. He placed responsibil-
ity for the attack on armed groups of the irreconcilable
armed Tajik opposition and stated emphatically that, if
such acts are repeated, the Russian border guards will
take appropriate measures. In future, if fire is opened on
the border guards from Afghan territory, fire will also
be opened from Tajik territory, Pavel Tarasenko stated.
Afghan border commissioners have been informed of
this.

Concluding the news conference, Lt. Gen. Tarasenko
answered numerous questions from the journalists.

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

CENTRAL ASIA

Uzbekistan
Ceremony Marks Aid Agreement Signed With
Germany

LD1210170395 Tashkent Radio Tashkent Network
in Russian 1300 GMT 12 Oct 95

{[FBIS Translated Text] The signing ceremony of an
intergovernmental agreement on financial cooperation
between Uzbekistan and Germany took place today at
the Uzbek Cabinet of Ministers.

The agreement was signed, for the Uzbek side, by
Deputy Prime Minister Utkir Sultanov and, for the
German side, by Dr. Karl Heinz Kuhna, ambassador
extraordinary and plenipotentiary .

The agreement envisages that the German Government
will allocate a preferential loan of 4.7 million German
marks to Uzbekistan. This credit will be spent on im-
proving Uzbekistan’s civil aviation, providing agricul-
ture with modern equipment and developing enterprises
engaged in these areas.

Foreign Minister on Relations With Mideast

MM1210143495 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT
in Arabic 12 Oct 95 p4

{Interview with Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov by
Sawsan Abu-Husayn in Cairo; date not given]

([FBIS Translated Text} [Abu-Husayn] Some political
circles have remarked on the expansion of Israel's
activities in Asia along the lines of its known activities
in the Horn of Africa. What stage has been reached as
regards your relations with Israel?

{Kamilov] Our relations with Israel are primarily eco-
nomic. We welcomed these relations in view of the his-
toric changes taking place in the Middle East arena. We
also welcomed having an Israeli embassy in Tashkent,
in view of these changes and for the sake of our coun-
try’s economic interests, in addition to what we see hap-
pening, namely Yasir ‘Arafat shaking hands and mak-
ing peace with both Israeli Premier Yitzhaqg Rabin and
Israeli Foreign Minister Shim’on Peres. Therefore, we
welcome this historic step aimed at settling the Arab-
Israeli conflict on the basis of international laws and
principles and resolving an issue which has lasted more
than 40 years. We are also willing to cooperate in the
economic field with all world states and to strengthen
this aspect with any state that wishes to do so.

[Abu-Husayn}] Does this mean that the Republic of
Uzbekistan is giving priority to the economy over
politics?

[Kamilov] Yes. This aspect is at the heart of our foreign
policy's political foundations for numerous reasons, in

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

the first place to guarantee stability — which is a
Strategic aim — in order to establish a democratic state
through a free-market policy, because we believe, not
that democracy is the basis of a good economy, but
rather, that the economy is the first safety valve to
protect any state from threats and to propel it toward
achieving security, stability, and development.

[Abu-Husayn] This principle contradicts, however, what
is being reported about attempts by Iran to polarize the
independent Islamic states of the former Soviet Union
to form an Islamic power in Central Asia.

{[Kamilov) First of all, Iran is a neighbor, in the same
region, and a major state.... Second, one does not choose
one’s neighbors, because the presence of neighbors is
in the hand of God. That is why it is in our interests
to develop relations between Uzbekistan and Iran. With
regard to rumors of the formation of an Islamic axis,
observers can say what they want and are entitled to
indulge in political fantasies. As far as we are concerned
we believe that our foreign policy is based on our
country’s national interests first and foremost.

[Abu-Husayn] What about your relations with the King-
dom of Saudi Arabia?

{[Kamilov] Our relations with Saudi Arabia are good and
based on continued consultations. We have an embassy
in Riyadh, and I intend to make an official visit next
November, for further coordination with officials there
over major issues of common interest, and we hope
that in future we will have special relations. There are
great prospects for cooperation in all fields, political,
economic, cultural, and commercial.

[Abu-Husayn] Among the issues that you addressed
in your meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister "Amr
Musa was the concern over the Afghanistan problem.
What threats does this problem pose to your country?

[Kamilov] First, there are great threats for the region as
a whole due to the prevailing situation in Afghanistan,
inherited from the first war. Consequently, we do not
consider it Central Asia’s problem only, but a problem
which concerns the whole world. There is for example
the issue of drugs, terrorism, arms, and many other
issues. When I visited a European state [not identified},
experts there said that the chemical analysis of the
drugs in Europe indicate that 70 percent of them
are Afghan-made [sina’ah afghaniyah]. This problem
requires international efforts to combat it.

[Abu-Husayn] Another of the issues you discussed was
how to iron out the obstacles facing the peace process.
Will Uzbekistan use the leverage of its economic
relations with Israel to that effect?

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

[Kamilov] We support the Arab position with regard to
resolving the Palestinian issue. It is not possible for us
to have a position different from the world’s position on
the necessity to establish peace and end the conflict. We
started our independent foreign policy four years ago,
and today we reaffirm our participation in international
efforts to achieve a comprehensive and just peace based
on international principles, that is peace for all.

[Abu-Husayn] During his visit to Cairo two years ago,
President Islam Karimov met with the Arab League
secretary general, with a view to boosting relations
with this Arab regional organization. Are there any
developments in this area?

{[Kamilov] We call for cooperation with all Arab orga-
nizations in the Middle East and also all regional or-
ganizations. Soon, Uzbekistan will acquire membership
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference as an ob-
server, because of our Islamic and cultural heritage; we
share many common denominators with the Arab states.
At the same time, we want to improve our relations on
the basis of mutual respect and we declare that our po-
sition and principles are against the control of any state
by any other state by force or other means and that we
are against violence, extremism, and terrorism.

[Abu-Husayn] What is your position regarding Iraq, and
do you intend to establish relations with it?

[Kamilov] We do not have any relations with Iraq! That
is all that I will say.

[Abu-Husayn] Do you have any interests in the Central
Asia region in the near future?

{[Kamilov] Yes. There are some positive developments
in the work toward reorganizing conditions in this
region and uniting the ranks to establish the foundations
of an economic union between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Kurdistan. We must take advantage of our open borders.
We do not impose any customs tariffs or taxes, in order
to encourage investment and boost economic and social
life. We also attach great importance to the CIS states in
our foreign policy, especially as Russia is a superpower
and our relations with it lasted 70 years, but we prefer
however our relations to be based on mutual respect,
equality, and noninterference in internal affairs. We
also wish to develop our relations with Europe and the
United States.

CENTRAL ASIA 79

Karimov Builds Himself New Summer, Winter
Residences

MM1210102595 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 11 Oct 95 p 3

{Report by Aleksandr Ivanov under "Dacha" rubric:
"Uzbek President Parks Himself Next to Puppets"}

(FBIS Translated Text] Tashkent —- Uzbek President
Islam Karimov’s summer residence near Tashkent has
been erected in an unprecedentedly short space of time.
It is hard to believe that only six months ago there was
no trace of this magnificent three-story residence. Work
went on round the clock in five (!) shifts. Anybody
who has seen this construction site will confirm that
it resembled old movie shots of the construction of the
Dnepr Hydroelectric Power Station. The interior was
finished by Yugoslav builders.

The decorating materials and furniture were obtained
from distant foreign countries. A few minor things were
entrusted to local craftsmen. For example, the crystal
stair balusters were made at Tashkent’s “Mikond" plant.

As of today all that remains to be done at the estate is to
apply the finishing touches: The pond with swans and
a footbridge over it is not functioning at the moment.
Some cages of the "domestic" zoo are also empty. For
example, the cage of the spiral-horned goat. But this is
not the builders’ fault: It is not easy to catch such goats
because there are only a handful of them left in the wild.

Meanwhile a plot for the president’s winter residence
has also been selected — a lovely children’s park in
downtown Tashkent. Another hitch emerged here — in
the form of the adjacent puppet theater. It was built with
the intention that after a show children would run around
in the park and play on the swings and merry-go-rounds.
Somebody advised the house builders to demolish the
puppet theater completely. But then they thought better
of it and erected a tall solid fence near the theater,
cordoning off what is now the president’s park. Evil
tongues, however, are inclined to consider the fence
a forgivable architectural excess at such an important
facility.

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

CAUCASUS

Armenia
European Council Ready To Cooperate

NC1210213795 Yerevan SNARK in English
1553 GMT 11 Oct 95

{(FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, October 11
(SNARK)—Hans-Peter Fuhrer, Director of the Euro-
pean Council’s Department on Political Issues, met
with Armenia’s Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan. He
told Papazyan that the European Council is ready to
negotiate with Armenia on cooperation. Mr. Fuhrer
also said that the European Council is interested in
establishing peace in the region.

SNARK was informed by the Press Office of the
Armenian Foreign Ministry that by Fuhrer’s request,
Papazyan touched upon such issues as some principle
aspects of Armenia’s internal policy, its relations with
the CIS countries, as well as the European aspect of
Armenian foreign policy.

Papazyan also discussed the negotiation process on
political settlement of the Karabakh conflict within
the framework of the OSCE Minsk group, explaining
Armenia’s position on the key issues to be discussed in
the future round of negotiations.

Ministry Demands Extending ARF-Dashnaktsutyun
Suspension

NC1210215095 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English
1349 12 Oct GMT 95

(FBIS Transcribed Text] On October 9, Armenian
Justice Ministry addressed Armenian Revolutionary
Federation [ARF]-Dashnaktsutyun an official response
in connection with September 13 appeal to President
of Armenia, by which ARF-Dashnakstutyun requested
to allow it to hold General Assembly of the Party in
Armenia.

In an interview to NT [expansion unknown] journalist
Deputy Justice Minister Tigran Petrosyan said that
during six months after the January 13 Supreme Court’s
resolution on suspension of the activities of ARF-
Dashnaktsutyun, the Party has not eliminated violations,
which served as a basis for passing such a resolution.
According to him, the Party has violated Article 7 of
the law on public political organizations.

Deputy Justice Minister reminded that taking into ac-
count the aforementioned facts and proceeding from Ar-
ticle 7 of the law on public political organizations the
Armenian Ministry of Justice passed a resolution, de-
manding expansion [extension] of the suspension term
for ARF-Dashnaktsutyun.

Petrosyan also reported that in compliance with Article
5 (part II) of the Armenian Constitution, all state estab-

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

lishments and officials must act within the framework of
the law in effect. According to the Armenian legislation,
Ministry of Justice or any other state establishment or
any Official are not entitled to decide whether to allow or
prohibit party to hold General Assembly. Deputy Justice
Minister added that from available documents of ARF-
Dashnaktsutyun it is clear that foreigners-members of
the Party will also participate in the General Assembly.
Consequently, in case of convocation of the General As-
sembly of ARF-Dashnaktsutyun Article 1 of the law on
public political organizations and Article 25 (part III) of
the law on legal status of foreign citizens in Armenia
will be violated.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Says Nation Putting End to Terror

MK1210133595 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7 Oct 95 p 3

{Interview with President Eduard Shevardnadze by
Nodar Broladze: "Eduard Shevardnadze: ‘Georgia
Is Saying Farewell to Terrorism.’ Communism Is A
Cesspool of Conservatism and Crime" — place and
date not given]

(FBIS Translated Text] [Broladze] Eduard Amvrosiye-
vich, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, which has finally
resumed publishing, wishes to thank you for your readi-
ness to answer questions that interest our readers once
again....

[Shevardnadze] Thank you. I have always treated this
newspaper with respect not only for its bold and inde-
pendent judgments, but also — which, to my mind, is
most important of all — for the accuracy and exactness
of assessments that do not mislead the reader and pro-
vide him with correct information about events taking
place in our hard days so as to steer people’s attitudes
and views to the choice of democratic principles. In this
connection, I can recall August 1991, October 1993...
I can recall acrimonious critical publications, including
against the democratic forces as well. This is, however,
natural in our conditions: A surgeon, too, involuntar-
ily causes pain to the patient, but without this he cannot
cure him and bring him back to life. Therefore, I wish to
congratulate NEZAVISIMAYA [GAZETA] on its sal-
vation and preservation, and I am counting on having,
as diplomats say, our mutually beneficial cooperation
continue...

{Broladze] It is not by chance that we have come to you
again precisely at this moment. The point is that when
the Constitution of Georgia was adopted there was a
general feeling that political life in the country started
to regain the long-awaited harmony. And then, all of

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

a sudden — a terrorist act, an attempt on the head of
state’s life! What happened?

[Shevardnadze] Do you know what the difference is
between normal, benevolent people and their opposites?
A normal person seeks order as a natural state. He
detests chaos — an accomplice of evil. Just as night
shrouds crime, a state of permanent anarchy, bloodshed,
and conflicts, on a varying scale, provide a very
convenient backdrop and safe cover for social outrages,
mean intrigues, robberies, and glaring and disgusting
insinuations, the logic of which can never be understood
by a civilized person. Please excuse me, but I would
like to allude to a metaphor, although probably a rather
harsh one. I have in mind the promiscuity of a pig. It
feels comfortable when it finds the dirtiest puddle.

[Broladze] This comparison is not only vivid — it is
a rather convincing one. The people who attempted to
remove you could not imagine themselves thriving un-
der conditions of restored public order. What, however,
were they threatened by?

(Shevardnadze] I recently signed an edict abolishing the
so-called Rescue Corps, "Mkhedrioni." This put an end
to an era of legalized gangsterism, which started several
years ago. Some people wanted to legitimize this organ-
ization and tried to force such a decision on me, so as
to commit large-scale crimes using "state interests and
needs" as a shield. A mafia of a completely new type
was molded in Georgia, which brought together peo-
ple with completely dissimilar philosophies — former
communist apparatchiks; leaders of the criminal world;
the new military, both high- and low-ranking; and some
others. They found a common language, based on an
immoral aspiration to profiteer from a unique oppor-
tunity — to make fortunes off the country’s hardships
and to use any chance for social looting. Well indeed,
happily seizing any opportunity, they have been shame-
lessly picking these “apples of death" with impunity for
several years. “Mkhedrioni" (although it should be ad-
mitted that many members of this paramilitary organ-
ization honestly fulfilled their duty by defending the
territorial integrity of the country) has become a hide-
out for criminals — including those who can knot a
neat tie and talk big about democracy and dictatorship,
at the same time encouraging gangsterism in its most
undisguised form. I wish to inquire: Why should Jaba
loseliani — whom I, alas, once entrusted to head the
Georgian delegation at the talks with the Abkhazian side
— suddenly need to arrange a sinister hiding place in
his private office, located within the premises occupied
by the government and the head of state’s staff? Why
should he keep there machine guns, thousands of bul-
lets, electric-shock torture devices, and hundreds of am-
poules of narcotic substances? After all, this is no arms

CAUCASUS 81

depot or hospital! And why did he oppose the idea of
the federal structure of Georgia so ardently? Was it be-
cause this could prevent his “protigis” from indulging in
large-scale racketeering? I] am sure he would not have
protested had I appointed his people as my envoys in
the provinces!

When the Constitution, envisioning a strong presidential
power, was approved and passed by the parliament —
with the support of even some opposition forces that did
not refuse our offer to cooperate — the deputies were
on their feet applauding this victory. A feeling of joy
and relief swept everyone who did not fear his past or
future. The only people not applauding were either our
orthodox political opponents, who voted "against" out of
conviction but who are not involved in any state or other
crimes, or those who have a trail of criminal misdeeds
behind them. These are not peacocks, who take pride in
the marvelous feathers of their tails. Those tails cannot
be exposed, but it is hard to hide them, especially if the
“tail” is rather long. Therefore, these pseudo-politicians
took the adoption of the Constitution as a great threat.
They came to realize that the trap had started to unload
its spring and was about to shut. In addition, it turned
out that the good-for-nothing “professionals” from the
security service, who missed the mark on 29 August —
those on whom the state had been counting for the past
three years — were the main protectors of the mafia and
an integral part of it.

{Broladze] It turns out that even you made a mistake,
despite your experience...

{Shevardnadze} After I came back from Moscow and
lent a helping hand to my people, I was sincere in my
readiness to be useful to people, to bring relief, and
to restore the good reputation of the country. Everyone
knows what the legacy was thai I received. Possibly,
however, I experienced good feelings toward some
people who seemed loyal and was unwatchful in my
trust in them.

[Broladze} Igor Giorgadze, former head of the Georgian
Security Service, declared a political and psychological
war against you, blaming you for very serious things.
How do you feel about this, and why, in your opinion,
despite the sanction given by Georgia’s General Prose-
cutor, does Giorgadze feel if not wonderful, then rather
at ease in Moscow?

[Shevardnadze] Let us start with the accusations. It
seems that I personally own two oil wells in Kazakhstan.
I can probably feel rather offended: Why only two?
Does that implies I am inept at business? Joking apart,
however, it is very easy to find out what I actually
own, and such a primitive and straightforward method
of discreditation only shows that the criminal is in

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

82 CAUCASUS

agony and is clutching at straws. Igor Panteleymonovich
(Giorgadze], better than anyone else, realizes that he is
doomed and is aware of how much evil was done by
him.

He will go down in the annals of Georgian history as
the spiritual successor to Cain, the first murderer in the
history of mankind. Therefore, he is trying to break out
of the legal trap in which he has found himself through
his own fault. If he is alleging that Shevardnadze has
several other passions such as, say, selling weapons to
Iran or regularly extracting millions of dollars from the
International Monetary Fund’s safes to somehow pull
through the election, then, accordingly, he expects to
make a fairly strong impression — strong enough for
the Lord and justice to forgive all his wrongdoings right
away and then to deal immediately with Shevardnadze.
If | am found guilty — this I declare for the first time
on the pages of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA — I am
prepared to be held responsible by the people. This is
neither acting, nor posing, I assure you. It is a chance to
prove once again my resoluteness to participate in the
democratic transformation to the end, for principled, not
personal considerations, or, let's say, not for reasons of
political egoism. I am prepared for this. As for Igor
Giorgadze, a terrorist on an international scale and,
unquestionably, an agent for a bloodthirsty, I would
say, ideology, a dismal end awaits him in any case.
This depends not on whether corpus delicti is found
in Shevardnadze’s actions. Because when one and the
same person has staged at least five attempts on people's
lives, of which three have ended in homicide, and while
this person, being the security service head of the whole
State, acts, though crudely and primitively, sending
virtually the same gang of assassins for different people,
but at the same time, with some mystical and demoniac
ruthlessness, all of these cannot remain a concern of
one single country. The prosecutor general’s warrant
to arrest an out-and-out criminal — no less a coward
than he is a criminal (at least, in his appearance on
Russian television he iooked frightened and pitiful) —-
as well as the list of his crimes, proven by investigation
and indisputable, cry for justice and common sense:
The assassin and traitor Giorgadze must be delivered
up to justice. I am sure that the Russian authorities will
never help a criminal, especially one such as this, escape
punishment. To the same degree, however, I am not sure
that his former colleagues in the KGB of the USSR will
deny him their assistance. With a still greater degree of
certainty, | can maintain that Russian politicians of a
communist persuasion, for whom Giorgadze and his like
used to be pivotal figures in launching destabilization
trends in Georgia, will go out of their way to see
to it that no court in the worid passes sentence on
Giorgadze. The obscene political storerooms of the

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Bolshevist associations hold too many things that can
arouse the indignation of the world public.

According to the information at my disposal, another
“secret service man,” Timur Khacheshvili — he was
the deputy head of the security service — when interro-
gated, let slip the names of a number of Russian politi-
cians involved in organizing the 29 August terrorist act
and other crimes.

The last of the exposed crimes of Giorgadze is no less
blasphemous and cynical than the others: On board
the plane by which Generals Giya Karkarashvili and
Paata Datuashvili were going to Moscow, a bomb was
planted. Had this not been revealed in time, all of
the people on board would have been dead. After that
Giorgadze decided to do away with the two directly
in Moscow. Datuashvili was killed, and Karkarashvili
was crippled. That was revenge for the fact that, a year
and a half before, then-Defense Minister Karkarashvili
told him the truth: Giorgadze had clearly evaded combat
engagements on the territory of Abkhazia, and it was he
who withdrew his 450-strong detachinent from combat
action, leading it through the Svanetian Mountains at
a time when Sukhumi was bleeding under a fearsome
barrage of hundreds of guns. Thus, Karkarashvili’s
discontent is easy to understand.

I do not find it possible to say anything concrete about
the citizens of other states, but regarding Giorgadze,
and the problem on the whole, the point is as follows.
As I see it, the proponents of conservative political
views, positions, conceptions, and doctrines that are
dying off, and which once seemed absurd, are still alive
and kicking in all the provinces and countries of the
former CIS. It is only by tradition that Moscow remains
a magnet for these forces, while Russian communists
and socialists have kept the ranks of the leading and
guiding force [the Communist Party]. Accordingly, they
still remain the main protectors of those who share their
views and directions.

I believe that an escape plan for “their people” to be
guarded safely in the event the plot was frustrated had
been worked out in advance.

{Broladze] You are being accused of doing away with
your rivals, and carrying out a wide-ranging purge under
the banner of cracking down on the criminal mafia clans
in order to secure yourself a favorable alignment of
forces in the elections...

{Shevardnadze} Among all those considered to be my ri-
vals, only Jaba loseliani has withdrawn his candidature,
and he was quick to do it in due time in the wake of a
series of incontrovertible “Mkhedrioni" disclosures. As
far as the purge is concerned, I admit it, if you please,

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FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

but let me put it right. The seeds sown will not grow if
the field has not been weeded. It is time for cleansing.
Georgia will emerge cleansed of what it has endured
through these five or six horrible years. However, a
catharsis is only possible on condition that all moral
ules are strictly observed. Therefore, it is not an elec-
toral alignment of forces, favorable solely for me, that I
am seeking, but a situation whereby blackmail, threats,
armed intimidation, and the use of huge sums in for-
eign currency for bribery, will be absolutely out of the
question. Georgia is parting from terrorism. Forever, I
hope. At least, this I wish to believe and this I wish to
work for as zealously as possible.

[Broladze} You took the initiative in appointing Gior-
gadze as head of the security service. Did you trust him?

[Shevardnadze] I had no reasons for distrust back then.
However, a year or a year and a half passed and I began
to have my doubts. After the assassination of Georgiy
Chanturiya, chairman of the National Democratic Party,
a person with an undoubtedly brilliant political future,
who had been elected leader of the Eastern Europe In-
ternational a day before the attack, some members of
the National Democratic Party’s board, and, above all,
Deputy Irina Sarishvili, Chanturiya’s widow, openly ac-
cused me of conniving with the assassins and demanded
that Igor Giorgadze be removed from his post for his
inability to expose the terrorist acts. How could anyone
know at that time that it was not a question of "non-
exposure,” but of staging an assassination, and later on,
a series of assassinatior3. It is noteworthy, though, that
the National Democrats also called for the dismissal of
Internal Affairs Minister Shota Kviraya. In actual fact,
however, it was under Kviraya’s leadership that the In-
ternal Affairs Ministry not only was firmly established,
but gave decisive battle to the mafia. The offensive con-
tinues.

Shevardnadze Issues Directive Abolishing Rescue
Corps

AU1210154795 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA
in Russian 5 Oct 95 pl

("Directive of the Georgian Head of State on the
Republic of Georgia Rescue Corps"}

{FBIS Translated Text] As one of the components of the
system of state administration, the Republic of Georgia
Rescue Corps was specially created in an extreme
situation to render help to the population and maintain
public order. It united, first and foremost, young people

CAUCASUS 83

who had taken an active part in fighting for Georgia’s
territorial integrity. Many of them deservedly received
State decorations for their bravery. The nation and
the country will never forget but will remember with
gratitude those members of the Mkhedrioni [Horsemen
— former paramilitary organization] who laid down
their lives in the struggle for the territorial integrity of
the motherland. Everything will be done to help those
who were maimed in battle and also while carrying
out their duties during natural disasters and in other
emergency situations.

At the same time, it is necessary to point out that
people with a dubious reputation joined the Rescue
Corps, people who not only changed the aims of this
association as laid down in its charter but also, as
competent bodies have established, finally transformed
the Rescue Corps into a haven for representatives of
the criminal world. Many members and heads of the
Rescue Corps, with the help of various clans and mafia
groups created with their assistance and patronage, have
committed illegal acts, involving the use of weapons,
violence, and blackmail. Many members of the Rescue
Corps have been convicted for committing various
serious crimes.

Some of the leaders of the Rescue Corps, who are
now under arrest, has been incriminated in the planning
and execution of terrorist acts. All this is hindering the
struggle for the establishment of strict public order in
the republic and is furthering the antistate and antisocial
activities of destructive forces.

Proceeding from this:

1. The Republic of Georgia Rescue Corps is to be
abolished.

2. In connection with the abolition of the Republic of
Georgia Rescue Corps, the Republic of Georgia Cabinet
of Ministers is to create a liquidation commission.

3. The liquidation commission is entrusted w. _ making
final payments to senior officials in the central apparatus
of the Rescue Corps and subunits subordinate to it in
accordance with the precedure provided for in Republic
of Georgia legislation.

4. The liquidation commission is to complete its work
within one month of its creation.

[Signed] E. Shevardnadze

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

BALTIC STATES

Estonia

Meri Cancels Malta Trip Due To ‘Tapes Scandal’

WS1210115795 Tallinn BNS in English
1300 GMT 11 Oct 95

{[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Oct 11, BNS —
Estonian President Lennart Meri on Wednesday [11
October] said he was canceling his visit to Malta over
the so-called tapes scandal, which has led to the sacking
of the interior minister and to calls from leading parties
for resignation of the government.

Meri was scheduled to fly to Malta on Friday for
the annual Crans Montana Forum of politicians and
busiréss leaders.

The visit was canceled "because of serious problems in
the interior policy,” the presidential press office said.

Foreign Minister on ‘Constructive’ Meeting With
Kozyrev

LD1210204695 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1712 GMT 12 Oct 95

{FBIS Transcribed Text] TALLINN, Oct 12 (Interfax)
— Foreign Minister Riivo Sinijary has described as
“constructive” the meeting in Helsinki Wednesday with
his Russian counterpart Andrey Kozyrev.

Sinijarv told reporters in Tallinn Thursday that he had
informed Kozyrev about preparations in the Estonian
parliament to ratify agreements on pulling out Russian
troops and on social guarantees to Russian military
pensioners living in Estonia.

The documents signed in Moscow on July 26, 1994,
were later ratified by the Russian Duma and the Feder-
ation Council.

Sinijarv believes that “a certain degree of progress has
been achieved" in normalizing the Estonian-Russian
relations: the agreements on customs cooperation and
border representatives, and the protocol on cooperation
between the two countries’ foreign ministries have been
signed.

The two sides also reached understanding on another
neeting of teams of experts to draft an agreement on
the Russian-Estonian border, which is to be held on
October 23-24 on Russian territory. The venue has not
yet been set.

Sinijarv visited Finland where he discussed bilateral co-
Operations with Finnish Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen.
Kozyrev stayed in Finland on October 10-11 for an of-
ficial visit.

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

Defense Minister Comments on NATO Membership

LD1210210995 Tallinn Reklaamitelevisioon Network
in Estonian 1830 GMT 12 Oct 95

{[FBIS Translated Text] NATO Secretary General Willy
Claes stated that there is no longer any doubt about
Estonia joining NATO. Claes said that talks with NATO
may begin immediately.

Besides the subject of joining NATO, aid to Estonia
for setting up a control system for monitoring airspace
was discussed. According to Defense Minister Andrus
Oovel, NATO will support Estonia on the issue of
tuning the radars, on issues of funding, and training
staff.

[Begin Oovel recording] Proceeding from the fact that
one of the principles of the make-up of Estonian defense
forces is not the Estonian defense forces’ capability
to break and destroy but first and foremost to help
and save, our very first meeting was with General
Herbert van Foreest, the NATO's director assistant
secretary general for infrastructure, logistics and for
civil emergency planning. [end recording]

The present moment's preparedness was also under dis-
cussion. During a meeting with the Belgian Defense
Minister Jean-Paul Poncelet possibilities were discussed
for sending our officers for training to Belgium and the
admission of Estonian observers into the Belgian peace-
keeping mission. General George Joulwan, Supreme Al-
lied Commander Europe, emphasized in particular that
joining the Partnership for Peace program does not en-
sure full NATO membership. It is, however, an oppor-
tunity to develop a partner country’s cooperation ability.

[Begin Oovel recording] Whatever the security situa-
tion, we will always be able to approach the North At-
lantic Council as a partner country, as a country which
wants to proceed along the path leading to full NATO
membership. [end recording]

A new NATO peacekeeping mission will be undertaken
in the former Yugoslavia within the next month. In
November, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry and
NATO Secretary General Willy Claes will be arriving
in Estonia for familiarization.

Latvia

Government Approves Application To Join EU

LD1310122295 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1200 GMT 13 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] An extraodinary session of
the Latvian Government today unanimously approved
Latvia's application to join the European Union. The

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners

FBIS-SOV-95-198
13 October 1995

application is being submitted to the Council of the
European Union, which in turn will approve it for
review by the Commission of the European Union. On
the basis of the viewpoint of this European Commission,
the EU will decide on commencing talks on joining it
between Latvia and the European Union. The length of
the talks will depend on Latvia’s degree of readiness for
acceptance by the EU.

Ministers Terms Russian NATO Pressure
‘Blackmail’

LD1210150395 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1040 GMT 12 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] RIGA, Oct 12 (INTERFAX)
— Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis “srkavs believes
that Russia's attempts to exert pressure on the Baltic
states not to join NATO, verges on interference in
their internal affairs and can be likened to international
blackmail.

Such attempts are absolutely hopeless, he told Interfax
in comments on the information published by the
Komsomolskaya Pravda in late September to the effect
that Russia's General Staff is working out a new defense
doctrine in accordance with which Russian armed forces
will invade Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, if they join
NATO.

Russia's behavior will even strengthen Latvia's resolve
to be integrated into NATO, Birkavs pointed out.

Unfortunately one has to admit that Russia does not
wish to understand NATO's essence as a union of
democratic nations and states following the road of
democracy, like Russia itself, Birkavs said.

Integration into NATO is a top priority in Latvia's
foreign policy concept adopted by the parliament and
government last March, he noted.

Ulmanis Postpones 3-6 Nov Visit to Krasnuvyarsk

LD1210151795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1455 GMT 12 Oct 95

{BY Galina Kuchina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, October 12 (ITAR-
TASS) — Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis postpones
a trips to the Krasnoyarsk ( crritory planned for Novem-
ber 3-6, ITAR-TASS learnt from the president's office
on Thursday. Guntis Ulmanis intended to go to the Kras-
noyarsk territory to meet Latvians residing in Siberia
and to open a consulate in Krasnoyarsk to facilitate the
procedure for Latvians getting visas for trips to Latvia.

BALTIC STATES 85

The president changed his plans because of the political
situation in the country resulting from the recent parlia-
mentary elections. The president also cancelled plans of
visiting and addessing a UNESCO conference in Paris.

However, Ulmanis’ planned visit to Sweden to begin
on October 16 is of special importance in the present
politicial situation, Ulmanis believes. He associates this
trip with forming Latvia's image. “If I gave up this visit
it would be regarded as a confirmation that things are
out of order in Latvia,” the president said.

Ulmanis is expected to speak on the forming of the
future cabinet on the local radio on Friday.

Foreign Minister Assesses Visit to U.S., UN

LD1210171695 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1000 GMT 12 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Foreign Minister Valdis
Birkavs returned from a week-long visit to the United
States on 11 October. The Latvian foreign minister met
several U.S. government officials and made a speech at
the United Nations Organization. An hour ago, Birkavs
was telling journalists about his visit.

{Begin Birkavs recording] We have submitted our aide-
memoire on Russia's recent activities in connection with
NATO enlargement. We believe that if the situation con-
tinues to become more complicated, Latvia will propose
the start of consultations envisaged in Article 8 of the
Partnership for Peace agreement. The agreement gives
us the right to start consultations if Latvia's security,
sovereignty, or territorial integrity are threatened. The
United States believes — in the person of Strobe Talbott
— that Latvia has a correct understanding of the Rus-
sian Federation's attitude. It is very important to note
that Russia's complaints, anxiety, and criticism are Rus-
Sia’s sovereign rights, but Russia's threats to the inter-
national community are not its rights, and it is necessary
to react to them. Practically, the elections that are ap-
proaching in the Russian Federation are a process that
burdens NATO expansion, but NATO expansion will,
nevertheless, continue.

Therefore, we are expecting a range of very important
visits to Latvia — which will be prepared: first of
all, the arrival of NATO experts; second, on the 18th,
I will return earlier from a visit to Sweden to meet
(von Novski), deputy secretary general of NATO; then
as planned [word indistinct) NATO Secretary General
Willy Claes and U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry will
afrive.

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is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners

FBIS-SOV-95-198

86 BALTIC STATES 13 October 1995

With the Singaporean foreign minister, the main thing
was that we asked Singapore’s support on our issues
of payments to the United Nations, Latvia’s candidacy
at [word indistinct] elections, and we discussed our
bilateral relations, also expressing gratitude for — you

remember — Singaporean Ambassador (Tommy Scott)
played a very important role here when we were
working on the withdrawal of Russian Armed Forces.
[passage omitted] [end recording]

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