GE.23-04706 (E) 210923 220923
Human Rights Council
Fifty-second session
27 February–4 April 2023
Agenda item 4
Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention
Report of the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on Ukraine*
Summary
In the present report, submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 49/1,
the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine outlines its main findings
since the outset of its mandate. The body of evidence collected shows that the authorities of
the Russian Federation have committed a wide range of violations of international human
rights law and international humanitarian law in many provinces of Ukraine and in the
Russian Federation. Many of these violations amount to war crimes and include wilful
killings, attacks on civilians, unlawful confinement, torture, rape and the forced transfer and
deportation of children.
The Commission concludes that the armed forces of the Russian Federation have
carried out attacks with explosive weapons in populated areas with an apparent disregard for
civilian harm and suffering. The Commission has documented indiscriminate and
disproportionate attacks and a failure to take precautions, in violation of international
humanitarian law.
In addition, the Commission finds that the waves of attacks by the armed forces of
the Russian Federation, starting on 10 October 2022, on the energy-related infrastructure of
Ukraine and the use of torture by the authorities of the Russian Federation may amount to
crimes against humanity. It recommends further investigations.
The Commission has documented a small number of violations committed by the
Ukrainian armed forces, including likely indiscriminate attacks and two incidents that
amount to war crimes.
Lastly, the Commission recommends that all violations and crimes be investigated
and that those responsible be held accountable at either the national or the international level.
It calls for a comprehensive approach to accountability that includes both criminal
responsibility and the victims’ right to truth, reparation and non-repetition.
* The present report was submitted after the deadline so as to include the most recent information.
United Nations A/HRC/52/62
General Assembly Distr.: General
25 September 2023
Original: EnglishA/HRC/52/62
2 GE.23-04706
I. Introduction
1. In its resolution 49/1 of 4 March 2022, the Human Rights Council established the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations and
abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law and related crimes
in the context of the aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation. On 30 March
2022, the President of the Human Rights Council appointed Jasminka Džumhur (Bosnia and
Herzegovina), Pablo de Greiff (Colombia) and Erik Møse (Norway) to serve as independent
members of the Commission, with Mr. Møse serving as Chair.
2. On 12 May 2022, the Human Rights Council, in its resolution S-34/1, requested the
Commission to conduct an inquiry to address the events in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and
Sumy Provinces that had occurred in late February and in March 2022. The corresponding
findings are contained in the report submitted by the Commission on 18 October 2022 to the
General Assembly.1
The present report reflects the findings of the Commission since its
creation.
3. In line with its independence and impartiality, the Commission has assessed whether
the situation in Ukraine is an act of “aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation”,
as stated by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 49/1. In accordance with the
definition of aggression approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 3314 (XXIX),
the Commission has found reasonable grounds to conclude that the invasion and attacks by
the armed forces of the Russian Federation2
against the territory and armed forces of Ukraine
qualify as acts of aggression against Ukraine.3
4. To conduct its investigation, the Commission travelled eight times to Ukraine and
visited 56 cities, towns and settlements. It also travelled to Estonia and Georgia to meet
people who had fled from areas affected by the armed conflict. The Commission conducted
610 interviews with 595 persons (348 women and 247 men), in person and remotely;
inspected sites of destruction, graves, places of detention and torture, and weapon remnants;
and consulted documents, photographs, satellite imagery and videos.
5. The Commission is grateful for the access and written responses to its queries
provided by Ukrainian officials. It regrets that its attempts to establish meaningful
communication with the Russian Federation have been unsuccessful, its notes verbales and
letters remaining unanswered. A governmental institution of the Russian Federation referred
material to the Commission, which it has examined.
6. In its work, the Commission is guided by the principles of independence, impartiality,
objectivity and integrity. It has adopted a victim-centred approach and is committed to the
“do no harm” principle. Consistent with the standard of proof followed by most international
commissions of inquiry, namely “reasonable grounds to conclude”, the Commission has
reached determinations that, on the basis of a body of verified information, an objective and
ordinary prudent observer would also reach in concluding that the facts had taken place as
described.
7. Owing to the large number of relevant events, security and logistical constraints and
challenges relating to the investigation of certain issues, the Commission has concentrated
on samples of allegations and on cases that illustrate specific patterns.
8. The Commission expresses its gratitude to all those who shared testimonies and other
valuable information, responded to its call for submissions – including 38 teenagers who sent
letters – and facilitated its work. It appreciates the assistance provided by Governments,
United Nations agencies, other international organizations and non-governmental entities.
1
A/77/533.
2
For the purposes of the present report, the term “armed forces of the Russian Federation” is used to
refer to all combatants who have been identified as such or as directly affiliated with the armed forces
of the Russian Federation.
3
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), annex, arts. 1–4.A/HRC/52/62
GE.23-04706 3
II. Legal framework
9. Pursuant to resolution 49/1, international human rights law, international
humanitarian law and international criminal law constitute the law applicable to the mandate
of the Commission.
10. The Russian Federation and Ukraine are party to seven and eight core United Nations
international human rights instruments respectively. They are also bound by various
international humanitarian law instruments, including the four Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949. The situation in Ukraine is an international armed conflict, pursuant to
common article 2 of the four Conventions.
11. Neither the Russian Federation nor Ukraine is a State party to the Rome Statute of the
InternationalCriminal Court.However, theCourthas jurisdiction in Ukraine,pursuant to two
declarations lodged by Ukraine and referrals by States parties. The Rome Statute, and the
Elements of Crimes,4
provide detailed elements for some of the alleged crimes. Where the
Court was found to lack jurisdiction, the Commission has applied the elements of crimes as
set out in the Rome Statute, as long as they reflect customary international law.
III. Background
A. Political and military context
12. On 24 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin,
announced his decision to conduct a “special military operation” in Ukraine to seek its
“demilitarization and denazification”. On the same day, Russian troops crossed various
border points into Ukraine, including through Belarus, and launched attacks by land, air and
sea.
13. International and regional bodies and States condemned in the strongest terms the
invasionandimposedfar-reachingeconomicsanctions.5
They alsoexpressed seriousconcern
about the risks of spread or escalation of the armed conflict and the unacceptable nuclear
rhetoric used by Russian officials.6
Condemnation of Belarus, which allowed the Russian
Federation to use its territory and infrastructure to conduct hostilities in Ukraine, was also
voiced.7
14. Ukrainian cities and localities became the scenes of heavy warfare. Humanitarian
relief teams had great difficulty reaching the areas most affected by the fighting, leaving the
basic needs of civilians unmet. Mariupol was one of the worst-hit cities, with thousands
estimated to have been killed and large sectors of the city destroyed. Some attacks, including
thosetargetingthecountry’scriticalinfrastructure,haveaffectedtheentirecountry,including
areas far from the front lines.
15. Populations under occupation reported grave human rights violations. Amid
widespread condemnation of the events in Bucha, in Kyiv Province, the General Assembly
adopted a resolution calling for the suspension of the Russian Federation from the Human
Rights Council.8
16. In September, the authorities of the Russian Federation9
in the occupied areas of
Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia Provinces held so-called referendums on the
incorporation of those provinces into the Russian Federation. On 30 September 2022,
Mr. Putin and the de facto authorities of the four provinces signed “treaties” regarding their
4
ICC-ASP/1/3 and ICC-ASP/1/3/Corr.1, part II.B
5
See, for example, General Assembly resolution ES-11/1.
6
See https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15036.doc.htm and https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/11/1130722.
7
See https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-belarus.
8
General Assembly resolution ES-11/3.
9
For the purposes of the present report, the term “authorities of the Russian Federation” is used to refer
to military and civilian occupying authorities of the Russian Federation and all associated de facto
authorities, armed groups and private military and security companies.A/HRC/52/62
4 GE.23-04706
“accession” to the Russian Federation. 10
The General Assembly found the attempted
annexation illegal and called for its immediate reversal.11
17. On 10 October 2022, Mr. Putin announced attacks on the energy infrastructure of
Ukraine. Since then, waves of missile and drone attacks have affected the gas, heating and
electricity infrastructure of the country.
18. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant remains under the control of the armed forces
of the Russian Federation. The deployment of military personnel and assets at the facility, in
addition to shelling in close proximity, has sparked fears of a major nuclear accident.12
19. Attempts to engage the Russian Federation and Ukraine in meaningful negotiations
have not yielded success, with each party rejecting the conditions put forward by the other.
B. Impact on the civilian population
20. In one year, the armed conflict has taken a devastating toll on the civilian population.
As at 15 February 2023, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR), 8,006 civilians had been killed and 13,287 injured in Ukraine
since 24 February 2022. Of adult civilian casualties whose sex was known, 61.1 per cent
were men and 39.9 per cent were women. OHCHR believes that the actual figures are
considerably higher.13
In addition to the human losses, the armed conflict in Ukraine has
caused a population displacement not seen in Europe since the Second World War. As at
21 February 2023, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) had reported approximately 8 million refugees from Ukraine across Europe, of
which approximately 90 per cent were women and children.14
In addition, approximately
5.4 million people are currently displaced across Ukraine.15
Nearly 18 million people in
Ukraine are in need of humanitarian assistance, and endured particularly harsh conditions
during the winter months.16
The conflict has affected people’s right to health, education,
adequate housing, food and water. Some vulnerable groups, such as older persons, children,
persons with disabilities and persons belonging to minority groups, have been particularly
affected. No region of the country has been spared by the conflict.
IV. Violations of international law
21. The Commission’s aim was to ensure broad thematic and geographic coverage in its
investigation. It focused on behaviour during the conduct of hostilities and violations of
personal integrity, including summary executions, torture and ill-treatment, detention, and
sexual and gender-based violence. The Commission also looked into violations of the laws
addressing occupation and the transfer of children. It found that violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law and related crimes had been committed across Ukraine
and in the Russian Federation.
22. In all the cases examined, the Commission sought to identify individual perpetrators
of violations and crimes, the units deployed in the areas concerned and their chain of
command. It attempted to determine whether the crimes had been committed in furtherance
of orders or policies at a higher level. The Commission developed a separate list of
perpetrators and military units identified as responsible for crimes and violations.
10
See http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465.
11
See General Assembly resolution ES-11/4.
12
See https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/11/1130857.
13
See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/turk-deplores-human-cost-russias-war-against-
ukraine-verified-civilian.
14
UNHCR, “Ukraine refugee situation”, Operational Data Portal. Available at
https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine (accessed 21 February 2023).
15
International Organization for Migration, “Ukraine”, Displacement Tracking Matrix. Available at
https://dtm.iom.int/ukraine (accessed 20 February 2023).
16
See https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-situation-report-10-feb-2023-enruuk.A/HRC/52/62
GE.23-04706 5
A. Violations committed during the conduct of hostilities
1. Overview
23. The Commission investigated 25 individual attacks with explosive weapons in
populated areas in nine provinces of Ukraine, in both territory controlled by the Government
of Ukraine and areas controlled by the authorities of the Russian Federation. All those attacks
involved weapons that predictably cause civilian harm in populated areas and affect civilians
or civilian objects. Many of the attacks were determined to have been indiscriminate as,
among other things, they entailed a method or means that could not be directed at a specific
military objective or their effects could not be limited as required. The armed forces of the
Russian Federation launched or likely launched the majority of the attacks. Several attacks
were disproportionate, as they were initiated with an apparent disregard for the presence of
large concentrations of civilians or objects with special protection, causing excessive harm
and suffering. A small number of indiscriminate attacks were likely committed by the
Ukrainian armed forces.17
24. The Commission also documented the barrage of attacks targeting the energy
infrastructure of Ukraine, which started on 10 October 2022. It found these attacks to have
been disproportionate, widespread and systematic.
25. Furthermore, the Commission investigated instances in which parties to the armed
conflict failed to protect civilians or civilian objects against the effects of the hostilities.
26. The use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas was one of
the main causes of civilian casualties. OHCHR estimated that 90.3 per cent of the civilian
casualties were caused by explosive weapons. 18
Such attacks damaged or destroyed
thousands of residential buildings, more than 3,000 educational institutions,19
and more than
600 medical facilities.20
The systematic targeting of energy-related installations deprived
large portions of the civilian population of electricity, water and sanitation, heating and
telecommunications during certain periods and hampered access to health and education.
27. In all the places that it visited, the Commission documented considerable civilian
harm and observed first-hand the damage to buildings and infrastructure. It was struck by the
extent of the destruction in the cities of Kharkiv, Chernihiv and Izium. While it was unable
to visit the city of Mariupol, it interviewed more than 30 civilians who had been in the city
during the siege and bombardment by the armed forces of the Russian Federation. They
reported intensive shelling and air strikes, including on civilian buildings, and described the
use of explosive weapons during the period as “constant” and “never-ending”. Photographs,
videos and satellite imagery corroborated the widespread destruction of residential areas. In
addition, civilians were left without basic services during that period.
2. Unlawful attacks in territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine
28. TheCommissioninvestigated attackscarriedoutwithexplosiveweaponsinpopulated
areas controlled by the Ukrainian authorities.21
Some of these attacks were conducted in the
context of attempts by the armed forces of the Russian Federation to capture towns or cities,
while others struck areas far from the front lines. The attacks investigated were a small
fraction of the total number.
29. According to international humanitarian law, indiscriminate attacks are those which
are not directed at a specific military objective, employ a method or means of combat that
cannot be directed at a specific military objective, or employ a method or means of combat
17
For the purposes of the present report, the term “Ukrainian armed forces” is used to refer to all
combatants who have been identified as such or as directly affiliated with the Ukrainian armed forces.
18
See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/turk-deplores-human-cost-russias-war-against-
ukraine-verified-civilian.
19
See https://www.unicef.org/ukraine/en/press-releases/war-has-hampered-education.
20
World Health Organization, figures for the period 24 February 2022–1 February 2023, Surveillance
System for Attacks on Health Care. Available at https://extranet.who.int/ssa/Index.aspx.
21
For the purposes of the present report, the term “Ukrainian authorities” is used to refer to Ukrainian
civilian and military authorities and all associated persons and groups.A/HRC/52/62
6 GE.23-04706
whose effects cannot be limited. 22
The documented attacks affected civilian objects,
including residential buildings, hospitals, schools, a hotel, shops, a theatre, a pharmacy, a
kindergarten and a train station.
30. In some of the situations examined, the Commission could not identify a military
objective. When objects of military value that might have been the intended targets of the
attacks were present in the vicinity of some of the impact sites, the Commission generally
found that the armed forces of the Russian Federation used weapons that struck both military
and civilian objects without distinction. It identified four types of weapons whose use in
populated areas led to indiscriminate attacks: unguided bombs dropped from aircraft;
long-range anti-ship missiles of the Kh-22 or Kh-32 type, which have been found to be
inaccurate when striking land targets; cluster munitions, which, by design, spread small sub-
munitions over a wide area; and multiple-launch rocket systems, which cover a large area
using inaccurate rockets.
31. The circumstances of the attacks launched or likely launched by the armed forces of
the Russian Federation that the Commission investigated led it to determine that the majority
of them were indiscriminate. These attacks included such widely reported instances as the
attack of 16 March 2022 carried out during the siege of Mariupol on the city’s drama theatre,
which killed and injured a large number of people; the attack of 8 April 2022 on the
Kramatorsk train station, which killed 59 people and injured 92; and the attack of 27 June
2022 on a shopping mall in Kremenchuk, which killed 21 people and injured dozens.
32. The Commission found that in several attacks, the armed forces of the Russian
Federation had failed to take feasible precautions to verify whether civilians were present.23
Hundreds of civilians had gathered in the areas affected by the attacks on the Kramatorsk
train station and the Mariupol drama theatre. Similarly, hundreds of civilians were in the
residential areas of Chernihiv during attacks of 3 March 2022, which killed at least 20 people
and injured many others. Irrespective of whether there was a military objective, an
assessment of the targets should have alerted the armed forces of the Russian Federation to
the presence of large numbers of civilians.
33. That the attacks affected civilian buildings, such as functioning medical institutions,
also manifests a failure to take precautions. Such attacks include that of 9 March 2022 on the
Mariupol Primary and Sanitation Aid Centre No. 3, also referred to as Maternity Ward No. 3,
in which at least one pregnant woman and her unborn child were killed. Even if the armed
forces of the Russian Federation had military objectives in conducting the attacks, the special
protected status of medical institutions should have led them to take extra care.
34. The Commission concluded that the armed forces of the Russian Federation
committed, and in some cases likely committed, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks,
in violation of international humanitarian law.24
The multiple examples of such attacks and
the failure to take feasible precautions show a pattern of disregard on the part of the armed
forces of the Russian Federation for the requirement to minimize civilian harm.
35. The Commission also assessed whether the bombardment of Mariupol and the
conduct of the siege in the city may have constituted a crime against humanity.25
However,
as the Commission did not have access to Donetsk Province, including Mariupol, it did not
have a sufficient basis on which to make such a determination. It recommends further
investigations in this regard.
3. Unlawful attacks in areas controlled by the armed forces of the Russian Federation
36. The Commission found instances in which the Ukrainian armed forces likely used
clustermunitionsandrocket-delivered anti-personnellandminestocarryoutattacksinIzium,
in Kharkiv Province, from March to September 2022, when it was controlled by the armed
forces of the Russian Federation. Ukraine, unlike the Russian Federation, is a State party to
22
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 51 (4) and (5).
23
Ibid., art. 57 (2).
24
Ibid., art. 51 (4) and (5).
25
Rome Statute, art. 7 (1).A/HRC/52/62
GE.23-04706 7
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, which bans all use of anti-personnel
landmines.
37. Thefollowingthreeexamplesillustratetheuseofweaponsthatbearthecharacteristics
of cluster munitions in the Izium during that period. On 9 May 2022, an attack struck a
residential area, killing three people and injuring six. On 14 July 2022, an attack hit the area
aroundthecentralmarket,injuringtwoolderwomen.On 16July2022,severalsub-munitions
hit a residential area, including a kindergarten, where about 250 people had sought shelter,
killing two older persons.
38. Witness testimonies also indicated that anti-personnel high-explosive landmines were
used in populated areas from July 2022, specifically before the withdrawal of the armed
forces of the Russian Federation. They caused grave civilian injuries. After inspecting
unexploded landmines, photographs and weapon remnants, the Commission identified them
as anti-personnel high-explosive landmines, known as “PFM” or “butterfly mines”, likely
delivered by Uragan rocket-launcher. The Ukrainian armed forces were at that time stationed
within the striking distance of such rockets.
39. After considering the context of these incidents, notably the fact that the attacks struck
an area during a period when it was controlled by the armed forces of the Russian Federation,
the weapons systems used, and the fact that the attacks were repeated and affected civilians
or civilian objects,the Commission found itlikely that theUkrainian armed forces committed
indiscriminate attacks, in violation of international humanitarian law.26
4. Attacks against Ukrainian energy-related infrastructure
40. The Commission investigated the barrage of attacks on energy-related installations in
UkrainelaunchedbythearmedforcesoftheRussianFederation, startingon10October2022.
Critical energy-related infrastructure in Ukraine had come under attack from the early stages
of the invasion, but on that date, Mr. Putin declared the following: “This morning, at the
proposal of the Defence Ministry and in accordance with the plan of [the] General Staff, a
massive strike was launched with long-range precision air-, sea- and land-based weapons
against Ukrainian energy, military and communications facilities.”27
After that declaration,
the attacks changed in several important ways.
41. First, the intensity of attacks increased significantly, with at least 13 waves of attacks
between 10 October 2022 and 1 February 2023 using hundreds of long-range missiles and
drones equipped with explosives. Second, the geographical scope widened, with attacks
affecting 20 of the 24 provinces in Ukraine. Lastly, while attacks prior to 10 October 2022
had been focused mainly on fuel installations and electric infrastructure related to the railway
system, attacks after that date systematically targeted power plants and other infrastructure
critical for the transmission of electricity and the generation of heat across Ukraine. On the
basis of these factors, the Commission found that the attacks on energy infrastructure since
10 October 2022 were widespread and systematic and that the objective was to disrupt the
energy system of the entire country, with the predictable effects on the heating system.
42. The disruption of electrical substations, power plants and other installations used to
produce the energy and heating indispensable to the survival of the population inflicted
significant harm on civilians. Entire regions and millions of people were for periods left
without electricity or heating, particularly during the winter, and consequently with impaired
access to, notably, water, sanitation, food, health care and education. Despite the availability
of public information about the civilian harm after the first few attacks, the armed forces of
the Russian Federation continued to target energy infrastructure.
43. The Commission concluded that these attacks by the armed forces of the Russian
Federation were disproportionate and that they constituted the war crime of excessive
26
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, art. 51 (4) and (5).
27
President of Russia, “Meeting with permanent members of the Security Council”, 10 October 2022.
Available at http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/deliberations/69568.A/HRC/52/62
8 GE.23-04706
incidental death, injury or damage.28
It also found that the attacks were widespread and
systematic and may have amounted to the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts.
Further time and resources are needed to investigate the attacks to clarify whether their
accumulated impact becomes comparable, as it might give their magnitude, to one of the
enumerated acts of crimes against humanity, and the extent to which the policy was directed
against the civilian population.29
5. Endangering civilians
44. During the conduct of hostilities, the armed forces of the Russian Federation exposed
civilians to significant risks. The Commission found that, on repeated occasions, they
deliberately positioned their troops or equipment in residential areas and, at times, forced
civilians to remain there or in the proximity of their positions.
45. Military operations near or from within the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, in
Enerhodar, in Zaporizhzhia Province, have significantly endangered the plant, creating the
risk of a serious nuclear incident. On 4 March 2022, the armed forces of the Russian
Federation launched an attack on the facility and heavy fighting erupted as they attempted to
take control of it. Videos show that a fire broke out as a consequence of the attack and
inflicted damage to parts of the plant. In addition, the armed forces of the Russian Federation
placedmilitaryequipmentinandnearthefacilityandhavebeen launchingattacksfromthere.
Satellite imagery from 29 August 2022 appears to show military equipment less than
150 metres from a reactor.
46. The Commission also documented that, in territory controlled by the Ukrainian armed
forces, on some occasions, there was a lack of separation between the armed forces and
civilians, which placed civilians at risk. For example, in the city of Chernihiv, the Ukrainian
Territorial Defence Forces set up headquarters at school 18 and stationed some of their
members at school 21. Those schools were also used to distribute humanitarian aid to the
population. On 3 March 2022, an air strike hit both schools and killed civilians and military
personnel.30
47. The Commission concluded that the parties endangered civilians by not taking the
requisite precautions to the maximum extent feasible, such as avoiding locating military
objectives within or near densely populated areas, and thereby violated international
humanitarian law.31
Additionally, it follows from international humanitarian law that the
armed forces of the Russian Federation must avoid locating any military objectives in the
vicinity of a nuclear power plant, and that the plant should not be made the object of attack
by either party.32
B. Violations of personal integrity
1. Violations of personal integrity committed by the authorities of the
Russian Federation
48. The Commission documented patterns of wilful killings, unlawful confinement,
torture, rape and unlawful transfers of detainees in the areas under the control of the
authorities of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. Violations were also committed against
persons deported from Ukraine to the Russian Federation.
49. The Commission noted certain elements that were common to the different patterns
of violations that it identified, as detailed in the following paragraphs.
28
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, arts. 51 (4) and (5) and 57 (2) (a) (iii) and
(b) (on the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks), and art. 85 (3) (b) and (5) (on the war crimes of
excessive incidental death, injury or damage).
29
Rome Statute, art. 7 (1) (k).
30
A/77/533, para. 55.
31
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, art. 58.
32
Ibid., art. 56.A/HRC/52/62
GE.23-04706 9
50. In cases of summary execution and torture, the perpetrators targeted persons mostly
for any form of real or perceived support of the Ukrainian armed forces,33
or for any action
directed against the armed forces of the Russian Federation.
51. During the initial control by the armed forces of the Russian Federation of localities
in Ukraine, many of the cases of wilful killing, unlawful confinement, rape and sexual
violence were committed in the context of house-to-house searches aimed at locating
supporters of the Ukrainian armed forces or finding weapons.
52. Furthermore, when the authorities of the Russian Federation controlled areas for
longer periods of time, they established dedicated detention facilities, used more diverse
methods of torture and targeted persons who refused to cooperate. A wider array of
perpetrators were involved in the commission of unlawful confinement, torture and sexual
and gender-based violence, according to victims and witnesses, including perpetrators from
the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, the National Guard of the Russian
Federation and its subordinate units, and armed groups aligned with the Russian Federation
from the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic.
(a) Summary executions
53. Evidence collected showed a widespread pattern of summary executions in areas that
the armed forces of the Russian Federation controlled in 17 localities of Chernihiv, Kharkiv,
Kyiv and Sumy Provinces, with the highest number in Kyiv Province, including in the city
of Bucha. The Commission confirmed the execution of 65 men, 2 women and a 14-year-old
boy. Most of the cases documented in the areas visited by the Commission took place during
the first few months of the armed conflict.
54. In more than half of the executions investigated, witnesses had last seen the victims
in the custody of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. In a few cases, eyewitnesses
had seen the armed forces of the Russian Federation carry out the executions. The
Commission concluded that the armed forces of the Russian Federation were responsible in
those cases. In the remaining cases, the victims’ bodies were found at or near locations that
the armed forces of the Russian Federation had used as bases. The Commission also
concluded that the armed forces of the Russian Federation were likely responsible in those
cases.
55. Detention, interrogation, torture or ill-treatment often preceded execution. Some
victims had been found with their hands or feet tied. According to medical records and
photographs, the most common method of killing was a gunshot to the head at close range.
56. The Commission concluded that the armed forces of the Russian Federation
committed wilful killings of civilians or persons hors de combat in areas that came under
their control, constituting war crimes and violations of the right to life.34
(b) Attacks against civilians on the move
57. The Commission found a pattern of attacks against civilians on the move in Kharkiv,
Kyiv and Sumy Provinces when they were under the control of the armed forces of the
Russian Federation. It documented 18 such cases in February and March 2022, in which
14 men, 8 women, 3 boys and 1 girl were killed and 6 other civilians injured. Among the
cases examined, most were committed in Kyiv Province. In many of these instances, the
Commission found enough evidence to conclude that the armed forces of the Russian
Federation were responsible for these attacks.
58. The attacks occurred while civilians were trying to evacuate or were carrying out
routine activities. In all the cases, the victims were wearing civilian clothes, were unarmed
33
Persons involved in the former Anti-Terrorist Operation, which was run in parts of Donetsk and
Luhansk Provinces between 2014 and 2018, and members of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces
were among those specifically targeted.
34
For example, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(Fourth Geneva Convention), art. 147, and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 6 (1).A/HRC/52/62
10 GE.23-04706
and were driving civilian cars, some with signs on the windows indicating that children were
on board. Several attacks occurred in or around the same location, such as the E40 highway
in Kyiv and Kharkiv Provinces. The Commission interviewed survivors of attacks and
witnesses and relatives of those killed, and reviewed video footage showing yet more
damaged cars on the highway where the attacks had taken place. The attacks were thus not
isolated, suggesting that some military units were responsible for multiple incidents. Some
of the attacks seem to have been deliberate, such as when soldiers opened fire on civilian cars
that posed no risk because they had stopped or were driving away. In other cases, there were
no indications that the attackers had taken steps to verify whether the target was a military
objective.35
59. The Commission concluded that the armed forces of the Russian Federation
committed or likely committed indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian objects,
which are violations of international humanitarian law and violations of the right to life.36
In
some cases, they did not do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked
were not civilians or civilian objects. The attacks that appear to have intentionally targeted
civilians amount to war crimes.37
(c) Unlawful confinement
60. The Commission established a pattern of widespread unlawful confinement in areas
controlled by the armed forces of the Russian Federation targeting broad categories of
persons. Victims were men and women of all ages and children. The Commission identified
detention facilities where the authorities of the Russian Federation detained large numbers of
people for long periods of time in Chernihiv, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv and
Zaporizhzhia Provinces of Ukraine and in the Russian Federation. It focused its investigation
on 14 such places. Procedural requirements for detention were not met. Conditions of
detention were consistently inhuman. In numerous cases, the confinement was prolonged,
with the longest instance over nine months. Relatives were not informed and the reasons for
confinement were not properly communicated.
61. The authorities of the Russian Federation confined persons of different occupations,
with the majority beingyoungor middle-aged men, includingany personformerly associated
with Ukrainian armed forces,38
local officials, State personnel, current and former law
enforcement officials, activists and journalists, education personnel, employees of the
Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, volunteers evacuating civilians, and others. They also
confined people who were influential in their communities, in order to coerce them and the
local residents to cooperate. Some were confined together with their relatives, including
children, or as a group.
62. Unlawful confinement started at checkpoints or filtration points staffed by the armed
forces of the Russian Federation, or on the street. The authorities of the Russian Federation
also detained people during house-to-house searches (see para. 51) or at their workplace.
Detention was often a precursor to torture and execution.
63. Perpetrators generally accused the detainees of real or perceived assistance to the
Ukrainian armed forces or found something that, in their view, looked suspicious during
phone searches. In numerous cases, the authorities of the Russian Federation detained people
on invalid grounds, such as having relatives in Ukrainian security or law enforcement
agencies, refusing to cooperate, participating in protests against the occupation, holding
pro-Ukrainian views or having certain types of tattoos.
64. Amongthedetentionfacilities that the Commissionidentified, some wereimprovised.
Such facilities were more common during the first weeks of the occupation. Others were
established in permanent structures, such as police stations. Conditions were poor in all the
facilities. Cells were overcrowded, with people forced to sleep on the floor or to take turns to
sleep. At times, men, women and children were held together. A lack of light and ventilation,
35
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, art. 57 (2).
36
Ibid., art. 51 (4) and (5), and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6 (1).
37
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, art. 85 (3) (a) and (5).
38
Persons involved in the former Anti-Terrorist Operation were among those specifically targeted.A/HRC/52/62
GE.23-04706 11
difficulty breathing and the absence of heating in freezing temperatures were reported.
Sanitary conditions were inadequate, with, at times, buckets or a bottle used as a toilet and
limited or no possibility of washing. In one case, 10 older people died as a consequence of
the inhuman conditions in a school basement, while the other detainees, including children,
had to share the same space with the bodies of the deceased.
65. Such conditions of detention can disproportionately affect people depending on their
gender. Some women restricted their water and food intake out of shame at having to use the
toilet in front of others. When water was available, there was no privacy. Menstruating
women suffered because of a lack of hygiene, which can lead to serious infections and
diseases.
66. Numerous persons detained in areas that were under the control of the Russian
Federation are still missing. Family members who reached out to the authorities of the
Russian Federation reported that they most often received no response or were not informed
of the whereabouts of the victims.
67. On the basis of the large number of cases that it documented, the Commission
concluded that the authorities of the Russian Federation unlawfully detained wide categories
of civilians and other protected persons, frequently in the absence of valid reasons or without
respecting procedural requirements. Detention conditions were generally inhuman. Such
confinements constitute war crimes and are violations of the right to liberty and security of
persons.39
(d) Unlawful transfer and deportation of detainees
68. The Commission reviewed situations in which the armed forces of the Russian
FederationtransferreddetaineeswithinUkraineordeportedthemtotheRussianFederation.40
Victims were both men and women. In the Russian Federation, some of the detainees were
confined in pretrial facilities in Bryansk and Kursk Provinces. A large number of Ukrainians
were detained there. According to former detainees, the authorities of the Russian Federation
labelled some of the detained persons as prisoners of war. However, after reviewing their
circumstances, the Commission found that they retained their civilian status.
69. In its investigations, the Commission identified several instances of transfer and
deportation in March 2022. In two cases, the victims were first detained in a makeshift
detention facility in the town of Dymer and then transferred to another such facility at
Hostomel Airport, both in Kyiv Province, and subsequently deported with other detainees
through Belarus to the Russian Federation, to a detention facility in Bryansk Province. In
another case, ayoungwomanwas first detained in amakeshift detentionfacility in the village
of Novyi Bykiv, in Chernihiv Province, and subsequently deported with other detainees to
the Russian Federation, to a detention facility in Kursk Province. Upon arrival, the three
victims were interrogated, accused of providing support to the Ukrainian armed forces and
subjected to torture. In two further cases, concerning three men, the victims were first
confined in a makeshift detention facility in the village of Boromlia, in Sumy Province, and
subsequently deported with other detainees to the Russian Federation, to a place not far from
the border. The authorities of the Russian Federation held them there, in a basement with
other detainees from Ukraine, and interrogated them.
70. The Commission concluded that the authorities of the Russian Federation committed
unlawful transfers within Ukraine and deportations to the Russian Federation of civilians and
of other protected persons, constituting war crimes.41
(e) Torture and inhuman treatment
71. The Commission found a widespread pattern of torture and inhuman treatment
committed by the authorities of the Russian Federation against people that they detained in
Chernihiv, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia Provinces of Ukraine
39
Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 147, and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 9 (1).
40
A/77/533, para. 80.
41
For example, Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 147.A/HRC/52/62
12 GE.23-04706
and in the Russian Federation. The use of torture was prevalent against certain categories of
people. Most victims were men, and both civilians and prisoners of war were tortured. The
Commission found that, as the authorities of the Russian Federation consolidated control
over certain areas, more diverse but similar methods of torture were used systematically in
detention facilities across various provinces of Ukraine.
72. Torture was particularly severe against current or former members of the Ukrainian
armed forces and associated persons and their relatives. Local officials, law enforcement
personnel, employees of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and civilians with
pro-Ukrainian views were also victims of torture.
73. The aim was to obtain information about the Ukrainian armed forces, extract
confessions,forcevictimstocooperate,orinflictpunishments.Torturewasusuallycombined
with long interrogation sessions. Victims often had their hands tied or handcuffed, their legs
tied and their eyes covered with tape or with a hood, clothes or a bag placed over their head.
According to some former detainees, the authorities of the Russian Federation referred to
them as “Nazis”, “fascists” and “terrorists” and forced them to undergo “denazification
sessions” consisting of severe beatings.
74. The perpetrators inflicted severe physical and mental pain and suffering. Victims
described instances of beatings with rifle butts or batons, electric shocks with taser guns, rape
and prolonged exposure to cold that had taken place during the first weeks of the armed
conflict and in makeshift detention facilities in Ukraine. In some cases, torture was followed
by execution (see para. 55).
75. In areas under the prolonged control of the Russian Federation and in more permanent
detention facilities, additional methods of torture were used. One such method involved
electric shocks administered using a military phone known as a “Tapik” connected to an
electric cable with clips that were applied to the feet, the fingers or men’s genitals. The
perpetrators referred to this procedure as the “call to Lenin” or “call to Putin”. Other methods
included hanging detainees from the ceiling with their hands tied in the so-called “parrot”
position, strangling them with cables, suffocating them with plastic bags or gas masks, and
rape and other sexual violence (see paras. 81 and 82). Victims witnessed the death of
co-detainees following severe torture.
76. In the Russian Federation, confinement at times started with an abusive “acceptance
procedure”. Victims reported electric shocks with taser guns, beatings with batons,
suffocation with plastic bags, and forced nudity in front of others. A former detainee reported
undergoing beatings as punishment for speaking Ukrainian and for not remembering the
lyrics of the national anthem of the Russian Federation. One woman said that she had passed
out a few times from beatings, but that the perpetrators had woken her and continued.
77. On the basis of the cases that it documented, the Commission concluded that the
authorities of the Russian Federation committed acts of torture and cruel or inhuman
treatment, constituting war crimes and violations of the prohibition of torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.42
In addition, given the targeting of specific
categories of persons and the consistent use of the same methods of torture across several
provinces that the authorities of the Russian Federation controlled in Ukraine for extended
periods of time, the Commission concluded that the authorities of the Russian Federation
used torture in a systematic and widespread manner. These circumstances, which also
involved elements of planning and resource availability, indicate that the authorities of the
Russian Federation may have committed torture constituting crimes against humanity. The
Commission recommends further investigations to ascertain whether the torture of detainees
by the authorities of the Russian Federation in detention facilities that they held in Ukraine
and of detainees deported from Ukraine to the Russian Federation was committed in
furtherance of a specific policy.43
42
For example, Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, art. 75 (2) (a) (ii), and
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2.
43
Rome Statute, art. 7 (1) (f).A/HRC/52/62
GE.23-04706 13
(f) Sexual and gender-based violence
78. The Commission documented cases of sexual and gender-based violence involving
women, men and girls, aged 4 to 82 years, in nine provinces of Ukraine and in the Russian
Federation.44
It found that the authorities of the Russian Federation committed sexual
violence in two main situations: during house-to-house searches and against victims whom
they had confined. In addition, the Commission documented situations in which the
authorities of the Russian Federation imposed forced nudity in detention, at checkpoints and
at filtration points.
79. As the armed forces of the Russian Federation took control of localities in Ukraine
and undertook house-to-house searches to find people who had supported the Ukrainian
armed forces (see para. 51), in some instances, soldiers committed acts of rape and sexual
violence when they broke into the victims’ houses. The Commission documented such
violations in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kherson and Kyiv Provinces, with the majority in Kyiv
Province,mainlyduringthefirsttwomonthsofthearmed conflict.Mostvictimswerewomen
alone at home.
80. Acts of rape were committed at gunpoint with extreme brutality and with acts of
torture, such as beatings and strangling. The perpetrators at times threatened to kill the victim
or her family if she resisted. In some cases, more than one soldier raped the same victim or
the same victim was raped several times. In one incident, thevictim was pregnant and begged
the soldiers to spare her, in vain; she had a miscarriage a few days later. The perpetrators, in
some instances, executed or tortured husbands and other male relatives. Family members,
including children, were sometimes forced to watch the perpetrators rape their loved ones.
81. The Commission found numerous instances of sexual and gender-based violence
committed by the authorities of the Russian Federation during unlawful confinement in
Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv and Luhansk Provinces of Ukraine and in the Russian
Federation (see paras. 74 and 75). The cases of sexual and gender-based violence in
confinement affected mostlymen,bothcivilians andprisoners ofwar. The evidencecollected
showed that sexual violence amounting to torture, and the threat of such, were important
aspects of the torture exercised by the authorities of the Russian Federation, with methods
including rape, electric shocks on genitals, traction on the penis using a rope and
emasculation. The Commission also analysed signs of such acts on the bodies of deceased
victims. According to survivors, the perpetrators aimed to extract information or confessions,
force cooperation or punish, intimidate or humiliate victims as individuals or as a group.
82. Among the incidents documented by the Commission were those of two women,
interviewed separately, who had been detained in facilities maintained by the authorities of
the Russian Federation in two different locations in Kharkiv Province. They described how
soldiers hadordered them toundress fully,touched them allover their bodies and raped them.
The Commission also analysed a video showing how the armed forces of the Russian
Federation had emasculated and then shot a captured Ukrainian soldier.
83. The armed forces of the Russian Federation inflicted forced nudity in a variety of
situations, ordering people to undress and remain naked, including for prolonged periods of
time, which can constitute a form of sexual violence. Cases were identified in Donetsk,
Kharkiv and Kyiv Provinces of Ukraine and in the Russian Federation. Victims were men,
women and, in one case, a 17-year-old boy. Such acts were committed during confinement
or at filtration points and checkpoints, in order to humiliate the victims during torture and
detention or to verify the presence of tattoos, among other reasons. The forced nudity went
beyond what would be acceptable in the framework of a security verification.
84. For example, the Commission documented instances of hours-long forced nudity
imposed in a humiliating way on new detainees upon their arrival at the Olenivka penal
colony in Donetsk Province and in detention facilities in the Russian Federation. In another
situation, the armed forces of the Russian Federation detained a priest, fully undressed him,
beat him and ordered him to parade naked for one hour through the streets of his village.
44
A/77/533, paras. 88–98.A/HRC/52/62
14 GE.23-04706
85. On the basis of the evidence that it collected, the Commission concluded that some
members of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, in areas that they controlled,
committed the war crime of rape and sexual violence, which can amount to torture.45
Rape
and torture constitute war crimes and violations of the corresponding human rights
obligations. Acts of forced nudity can be a form of sexual violence and may constitute the
war crime of outrages upon personal dignity.46
2. Violations of personal integrity committed by the Ukrainian authorities
(a) Torture and wounding of prisoners of war
86. The Commission has previously described two incidents, in Mala Rohan, in Kharkiv
Province, and in Dmytrivka, in Kyiv Province, in which the Ukrainian armed forces shot,
wounded and tortured captured soldiers of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.47
In a
letter to the Commission on this issue, dated 27 January 2023, the Office of the Prosecutor
General of Ukraine noted that it had initiated pretrial investigations into those cases. It further
stated that no objective data supporting the involvement of Ukrainian military service
personnel had been gathered at that time, but that the investigations were continuing. The
Commission, however, found that the persons responsible for the violations either belonged
officially to the Ukrainian armed forces or were fighting closely with them at the time of the
incidents.
(b) Alleged torture and ill-treatment of collaborators
87. Since 24 February 2022, the Ukrainian authorities have opened thousands of
investigations into allegations of collaboration and treason in the context of the armed
conflict.48
The Commission collected dozens of accounts from lawyers, former detainees and
detainees’ relatives relating to cases of detention on charges of high treason, collaborative
activity and support for the aggressor State. Allegations were made that the Ukrainian
authorities committed torture and ill-treatment against detainees, violated their procedural
rights and detained them in inhuman conditions.
88. Witnesses reported beatings, mock executions and threats to harm the detainee or the
detainee’s family. Reportedly, no arrest warrants were produced in some cases, and some
detainees were held incommunicado, sometimes for several days. Sleep and food deprivation
was also reported.
89. The Commission is concerned about these allegations. However, at the time of the
writing of the present report, it was not in a position to corroborate them. It recommends
further investigations.
C. Violations of the laws of occupation
90. The Commission examined the context and circumstances in which the authorities of
the Russian Federation organized and held so-called referendums between 23 and
27 September 2022 in the occupied areas of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia
Provinces concerning the annexation of the provinces to the Russian Federation. It found that
the holding of the so-called referendums was in disregard for the Ukrainian Constitution,
which regulates the organization of referendums in Ukraine.49
The referendums were
therefore held in violation of international humanitarian law, which prescribes that an
occupying Power must respect the laws in force in the territory that it occupies.50
Moreover,
the Commission concludes that the annexation of the four provinces was unlawful on the
45
For example, Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 27.
46
Ibid., and Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, art. 75 (2) (b).
47
A/77/533, paras. 86 and 87.
48
See https://www.gp.gov.ua (in Ukrainian only).
49
Constitution of Ukraine, arts. 72 and 73.
50
Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, arts. 42 and 43.A/HRC/52/62
GE.23-04706 15
basis of principles of international law that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat
or use of force may be recognized as legal.51
91. In addition, the Commission found that the so-called referendums were held in a
general climate of fear and coercion. Some interlocutors reported that, prior to the vote, the
authorities of the Russian Federation had carried out visits to private residences to ask people
what they would do in relation to the referendum. On voting days, interlocutors had seen
“electoral staff” accompanied by armed personnel going from door to door with ballot boxes.
92. Pursuant to the so-called annexation “treaties” between the Russian Federation and
the four occupied provinces, citizenship of the Russian Federation was granted in the areas
concerned. The Commission was informed of situations in which local residents had felt
compelled to apply for passports of the Russian Federation. Civilians of retirement age, in
particular, had applied for passports after receiving messages from representatives of the
authorities of the Russian Federation suggesting that they would need to do so in order to
receive or continue to receive pensions. Civil servants and other employees of State services
who sought to retain their employment under the administration of the Russian Federation
were required to apply for passports as a condition for maintaining their positions.
93. According to testimonies, the authorities of the Russian Federation detained local
officials and employees in the occupied areas to force them to cooperate. In March 2022, the
Mayor of Melitopol, in Zaporizhzhia Province, was detained at the Palace of Culture in
Melitopol. Furthermore, in August 2022, the head of a rural community in Kherson Province
was detained by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, who broke into her home. The
Commission obtained the names of 27 heads of territorial communities in Kherson Province
who were reportedly detained by the authorities of the Russian Federation. There were also
cases in which school principals and teachers were detained, subjected to ill-treatment and
expelled from their hometowns to force them to apply the curricula of the Russian Federation
in schools. Threatening and intimidating messages were sent to parents to force them to enrol
their children in schools operating under the system of the Russian Federation in occupied
areas.
94. The Commission concluded that the authorities of the Russian Federation exercised
physical and moral coercion against civilians in occupied areas, in violation of international
humanitarian law.52
In addition,they unlawfully confined persons, constituting a war crime.53
D. Forced transfer and deportation of children
95. The Ukrainian authorities and the authorities of the Russian Federation have declared
that hundreds of thousands of children have been transferred from Ukraine to the Russian
Federation since 24 February 2022, citing figures that vary greatly. A data-collection system
maintained by the Government of Ukraine indicated that 16,221 children had been deported
to the Russian Federation up to the end of February 2023.54
The Commission was unable to
verify these figures.
96. According to statements and media reports, the authorities of the Russian Federation
have taken legal and policy measures regarding Ukrainian children transferred to the Russian
Federation. These measures include the granting of citizenship and the placement of children
in foster families, which appear to have created a framework under which some of the
children may end up remaining permanently in the Russian Federation. In this regard, in May
2022, Mr. Putin signed a decree facilitating applications for citizenship of the Russian
Federation for some categories of children.55
In July 2022, Maria Lvova-Belova, Presidential
51
See General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), annex. See also Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX),
annex, art. 5 (3).
52
Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 31.
53
Ibid., art. 147.
54
See https://childrenofwar.gov.ua.
55
Available at http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202205300008 (in Russian only).A/HRC/52/62
16 GE.23-04706
Commissioner for Children’s Rights, declared that “now that the children have become
Russian citizens, temporary guardianship can become permanent”.56
97. The Commission identified three main situations in which the authorities of the
Russian Federation transferred Ukrainian children from one area that they controlled in
Ukraine to another or to the Russian Federation. The transfers affected children who had lost
parents or had temporarily lost contact with them during hostilities, children who had been
separated following the detention of a parent at a filtration point, and children in institutions.
The Commission reviewed incidents concerning the transfer of 164 children, 4 to 18 years of
age, from Donetsk, Kharkiv and Kherson Provinces.
98. Under international humanitarian law, no party to the armed conflict may arrange for
the evacuation of children, other than its own nationals, to a foreign country except for a
temporary evacuation where compelling reasons of the health or medical treatment of the
children or, except in occupied territory, their safety so require, and the written consent of
the children’s parents or legal guardians is required.57
In none of the situations that the
Commission examined did transfers of children appear to have satisfied the requirements set
forth by international humanitarian law. The transfers were not justified by safety or medical
reasons. There seems to be no indication that it was impossible to allow the children to
relocate to territory under the control of the Government of Ukraine. It also does not appear
that the authorities of the Russian Federation sought to establish contact with the children’s
relatives or with the Ukrainian authorities. While the transfers were supposed to be
temporary, for a variety of reasons most became prolonged, and parents or legal guardians
and children encountered an array of obstacles in establishing contact, achieving family
reunification and returning the children to Ukraine.
99. In a separate situation, large numbers of children from areas that had come under the
control of the Russian Federation in Kharkiv, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Provinces travelled
temporarily, with parental consent, to vacation camps in the Russian Federation or in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine. According to the
parents and children concerned, when the three provinces returned to the control of the
Government of Ukraine, the authorities of the Russian Federation required parents or legal
guardians to travel in person to pick up their children. As this involved long and complicated
journeys and security risks, not all parents were able to do so, which led to prolonged or even
indefinite family separation.
100. Parents and children told the Commission that during the children’s stay in the
Russian Federation or in areas of Ukraine that were controlled by the Russian Federation,
social service workers had in some cases told the children that they would be placed in
institutions, accommodated in foster families or adopted. Parents also told the Commission
that in some places to which their children had been transferred, the children wore dirty
clothes and were screamed at and called names. Meals were poor and some children with
disabilities did not receive adequate care and medication. Children expressed a profound fear
of being permanently separated from their parents, guardians or other relatives.
101. In all the incidents examined by the Commission, the onus to trace and find parents
or other relatives fell primarily on the children. Parents and relatives encountered
considerable logistical, financial and security challenges in retrieving their children. In some
cases, it took weeks or months for families to be reunited. Witnesses told the Commission
that many of the smaller children transferred havenot been able to establish contact with their
families and might, as a consequence, lose contact with them indefinitely.
102. TheCommissionconcludedthatthe situationsthatitexaminedconcerningthetransfer
of children within Ukraine and the deportation of children to the Russian Federation violated
international humanitarian law and amounted to war crimes.58
It found that the authorities of
the Russian Federation violated their obligation under international humanitarian law to
facilitate in every possible way the reunion of families dispersed as a result of the armed
56
Human Rights Watch, “Russia: submission to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child”,
12 December 2022.
57
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, art. 78 (1).
58
Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 147.A/HRC/52/62
GE.23-04706 17
conflict.59
Such conduct could also amount to the war crime of unjustifiable delay in the
repatriation of civilians.60
In addition, the citizenship and family-placement measures, which
could have profound implications for the identity of the children concerned, were in violation
of the children’s right to preserve their identity, including nationality, name and family
relations, without unlawful interference, as recognized under international human rights
law.61
V. Accountability measures
103. The Commission is mandated to make recommendations on, in particular,
accountability measures.62
The term “accountability measures” is broad in scope, covering
not only criminal responsibility, but also non-judicial measures.
104. The International Criminal Court is investigating alleged war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide in Ukraine.63
The Court does not have jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression in Ukraine. Suggestions have been made to establish a special tribunal on
aggression. Any such tribunal would have to coordinate with the Court. Furthermore, it
should have the required international legitimacy with respect to both its establishment and
its functioning. Discussions about a new tribunal should be combined with efforts to amend
the Rome Statute, so that the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is identical to
its jurisdiction over the other three crimes.
105. In addition to judicial measures, other dimensions of accountability include truth,
reparations and guarantees of non-repetition.64
The full satisfaction of victims’ rights will be
impossible before the cessation of hostilities, but measures can be taken already to contribute
to the eventual satisfaction of those rights. Priority should be given to a victims’ registry and
to institutional support, including mental health and psychosocial services.
106. The Commission encourages the robust coordination of the many national and
international accountability actors. Minimizing duplication and the retraumatization of
victims while increasing the efficient use of resources is achievable. Practical steps include
mapping the various actors conducting investigations, which could facilitate the
establishment of an index of shareable evidence.
VI. Conclusions and recommendations
107. The armed conflict in Ukraine has had devastating effects at various levels, most
notably on individuals and communities and on the society, environment and economy
ofUkraine.Ithashadaconsiderableeffectontheenjoymentofalmostallhumanrights.
People are living in a climate of unbearable uncertainty and fear. Scores of survivors
are coping with the immediate consequences of violent events and large-scale damage.
In addition to the many physical injuries that will take time to heal, the deep
psychological impact will have long-lasting effects.
108. The Commission is concerned about the number, geographic spread and gravity
of the human rights violations and the corresponding international crimes that it has
documented under its mandate, which have affected men, women, boys and girls of all
backgrounds and ages.
109. The Commission has concluded that the authorities of the Russian Federation
have committed numerous violations of international humanitarian law and
international human rights law, in addition to a wide range of war crimes, including the
59
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, art. 74.
60
Ibid., art. 85 (4) (b) and (5).
61
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 8 (1).
62
Human Rights Council resolution 49/1, para. 11 (e).
63
International Criminal Court, “Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan, QC, on the situation
in Ukraine: receipt of referrals from 39 States parties and the opening of an investigation“,
2 March 2022.
64
See General Assembly resolutions 60/147 and 40/34.A/HRC/52/62
18 GE.23-04706
war crime of excessive incidental death, injury or damage, wilful killings, torture,
inhuman treatment, unlawful confinement, rape, and unlawful transfer and
deportation. The Commission has also found that the waves of attacks by the armed
forces of the Russian Federation, starting on 10 October 2022, on the energy-related
infrastructure of Ukraine and the use of torture by the authorities of the Russian
Federation may amount to crimes against humanity.
110. In a limited number of cases, the Commission has found that the Ukrainian
armed forces were likely responsible for violations of international humanitarian law
and international human rights law and for some incidents that qualify as war crimes,
includingindiscriminateattacksandtwoincidentsofwoundingandtortureofprisoners
of war of the Russian Federation.
111. Beyond sharing with the Commission their deep loss and trauma, survivors have
highlighted the importance of identifying those responsible and bringing them to
account. One man, whose father was executed by the armed forces of the Russian
Federation in a village in Kharkiv Province, told the Commission: “They punished
innocent people; now those who are guilty, if they are still alive, need to be punished to
the fullest extent.”
112. The Commission recommends that the parties to the conflict:
(a) Respect and ensure compliance with all obligations stipulated in relevant
treaties and customary international law regarding international humanitarian law,
international human rights law and international criminal law;
(b) Comply with all the obligations enshrined in international humanitarian
law, including keeping accurate records of all people under the control of each party
and exchanging information on that basis;
(c) Ensure that the International Committee of the Red Cross has
unrestricted access to carry out its work in accordance with its mandate under
international law;
(d) Respect the space for humanitarian action and protect it from
disinformation, politicization and polarization;
(e) Take all feasible measures, in accordance with international standards, to
locate all disappeared or missing persons, including women, men, girls and boys,
establish their fate and ensure communication with their families;
(f) Ensure the timely, effective, thorough, independent, impartial and
transparent investigation and prosecution of all allegations of international crimes and
violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law,
including sexual and gender-based violence and violence against children;
(g) Hold all perpetrators accountable through judicial proceedings, in
accordance with international human rights standards;
(h) Take all the measures necessary to ensure that the right to truth of all
victims is satisfied and that they eventually obtain redress and remedy, including
compensation and rehabilitation;
(i) Ratify international instruments to which they are not yet party that will
strengthen the protection of civilians in armed conflict.
113. The Commission recommends that the Russian Federation immediately:
(a) Cease aggression and all acts of violence committed against civilians in
violation of applicable international human rights law and international humanitarian
law and end the use of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, including sexual and
gender-based violence;
(b) Take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and civilian
infrastructure and end massive attacks against energy-related infrastructure in
Ukraine;
(c) Provide reliable and comprehensive information about the number and
whereabouts of all children who have, for whatever reason, been transferred withinA/HRC/52/62
GE.23-04706 19
Ukraine or deported to the Russian Federation; facilitate effective communication
between such children and their families, and promptly and proactively initiate the
return to Ukraine of children deported to the Russian Federation, in accordance with
their best interests and with international obligations, using technical assistance from
international organizations; and prevent any further transfers of children within or
their deportation from Ukraine;
(d) Release or return to Ukraine all Ukrainian civilians who have been
deported to the Russian Federation and are being detained there as a consequence of
the armed conflict.
114. The Commission further recommends that the Russian Federation:
(a) Ensure that all perpetrators, including commanders and other superiors
andthoseordering,soliciting orinducingthecommissionofinternationalviolationsand
crimes, are held accountable;
(b) Take the measures necessary to prevent the commission of such violations
and crimes, in particular through unequivocal instructions to all branches of the armed
forces and other entities participating in the armed conflict, with a view toensuring that
military discipline and respect for international human rights law and international
humanitarian law are upheld along with the principle of command responsibility;
(c) Limit the use of private military and security companies in the conflict, as
experience has shown that they frequently engage in violations of international law and
are generally less accountable than regular forces since they lie outside the formal lines
of command and have a great incentive to compete with one another and with regular
forces;
(d) Respect international humanitarian law applicable to occupied territories
and refrain from placing any impediment to humanitarian assistance in those
territories;
(e) Cooperate fully withall international monitoring and investigative bodies.
115. The Commission recommends that Ukraine:
(a) Establish a victims registry as an institutional portal for better
coordination of available government services to victims, constituting a preliminary
step towards a comprehensive reparations programme;
(b) Comprehensively address the mental health and psychosocial needs
resulting from the armed conflict by tackling access and the allocation of resources to
the relevant services and enhancing their institutional coordination, legal regulation,
monitoring and evaluation, in the context of the Ukrainian operational road map on
prioritized multisectoral mental health and psychosocial support actions during and
after the war;
(c) Harmonize its legislation relating to war crimes where it is not in
conformity with international standards and amend its criminal code to clarify the
definition of “collaborative activity” to avoid legal uncertainty and harm to social
cohesion;
(d) Develop an investigatory and prosecutorial strategy that prioritizes cases
on the basis of clear criteria and ensure due process and transparent monitoring, taking
into account both the enormous caseload and the limited resources.
116. The Commission recommends that other States and regional and international
organizations:
(a) Strengthen national, regional and international accountability
mechanisms, both judicial and non-judicial, including by improving their coordination
and supporting the effective participation of civil society and groups representing
victims and survivors;
(b) Integrate the human rights dimensions of the armed conflict in Ukraine
more fully into the agenda of the Security Council.